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This dissertation analyzes the works of Sperone Speroni degli Alvarotti (Padua 1500–1588), 
his re-evaluation of ancient sophistic perspectives and his legacy in the early modern age. 
Although international studies on the subject are taken into consideration, this research is 
mainly conducted through a systematic exploration of ancient and early modern primary 
sources. The rigorous and direct analysis of the texts is a consistent practice for 
determining results. The subject of this research, at the intersection of Italian literature 
and philosophy, requires an interdisciplinary approach throughout the dissertation. 
Speroni was one of the most important protagonists of the Renaissance debate on language 
and logic as well as civil and speculative philosophy. Educated as an Aristotelian, he 
eventually developed a distinctive literary and philosophical production and was the first to 
challenge Plato’s (327-447 BCE) condemnation of sophists. Still, despite the fact that 
Speroni was a central figure of Renaissance philosophy and literature in the vernacular, he is 
one of the most neglected authors in international scholarship. Furthermore, scholars have 
considered Speroni’s interest in ancient sophists as a marginal aspect of his oeuvre and have 
disregarded the paramount role of the period’s vernacular writing on sophistry that began 
with his works and spread throughout sixteenth-century Italy. This four-chapter dissertation 
fills the gap in international studies, being the first monograph dedicated to Speroni written 
in English and the first work written in any language investigating the fundamental role 
of the ancient sophistic tradition in the Italian Renaissance. The first chapter analyzes 
fifteenth-century authors’ translation and comments on works related to sophistry. The 
second examines Speroni’s works that argue for the rehabilitation of the ancient Greek 
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sophists. The third explores Speroni’s sophistic writing in the form of double arguments 
and paradoxical dialogues. The fourth chapter focuses on the debate about sophistry and its 
relationship with literature and arts in Italy at the end of the sixteenth century, which also 
involves the quarrel about Dante’s poetry. The conclusions summarize the most relevant 
aspect of the dissertation and present further paths for research in different fruitful direction. 





















Between my first doctoral degree earned in Italy and my current doctoral research project 
at Johns Hopkins University, I taught history and philosophy in Italian licei for several 
years. As a teacher I realized that Renaissance culture is not an easy subject to both teach 
and learn. Antiquity and modernity fitted into the yearly program as a sequence of very 
manageable philosophical systems. My students and I could go through them fluidly, 
knowing, ultimately, where the path would lead. Even the complex thinkers, the 
monumental ones, could be reduced within a clear structure so that students could have a 
distinct idea of their literary style and major theories. For authors such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Kant, and Hegel, a larger project was necessary at the beginning for mastering the lexicon 
of key concepts, but then it was only a matter of following a clear path, paralleling my 
teaching and students’ learning. However, when it came time to approach the fifteenth 
and sixteenth century, both the students and I had to leave the quiet streaming waters to 
face the most perilous and exciting falls called Renaissance. For the very same reason, 
since my graduation I have chosen to work on the Renaissance era and I hope I have been 
able to contribute to recovering one of the most fascinating periods of Western culture. 
 For my first doctoral research, at the University of Rome, I studied the medical 
works of Marsilio Ficino to demonstrate how fruitful a study of the most Platonic author 
of the fifteenth century could be from the perspective of history of medicine and natural 
philosophy. Throughout my four-year research in the Department of German and 
Romance Languages and Literatures at Johns Hopkins University I have wanted to prove 
how the Aristotelian Sperone Speroni, writing in the age of Reformation and Counter-
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Reformation and considered an inoffensive author, could be the spring for the rebirth of 
one of the most ‘heritical’ movements of antiquity, sophistry. Both my doctoral projects 
have benefited from a strong interdisciplinary approach and have been situated at the 
intersection of different fields: history of philosophy and history of medicine in the first 
case, Italian literature and history of philosophy in the second. 
To avoid any misunderstanding from ambiguous meaning of the term “sophistry,” 
I would like to clarify that this word does not have a derogatory connotation in this 
dissertation. Unlike the ordinary meaning in non-academic discussions, which refer to 
“sophistry,” “sophistic art,” “sophism,” “sophist” mostly in order to blame something or 
someone, in this dissertation these expressions will be always used within the specific 
meaning that they have in the field. The same type of misunderstanding might affect the 
word “appearance” in the title of this dissertation (A World of Appearances), although 
reading this study on the sophistic Renaissance will reveal how much the term 
“appearance” actually enables connecting philosophy, rhetoric, poetry, and painting in 
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Sperone Speroni degli Alvarotti (Padua 1500–1588) was Pietro Pomponazzi’s (1462–1525) 
pupil at the University of Bologna where he was educated as an Aristotelian. He was one 
of the main members of the “Accademia degli Infiammati” (“Academy of the Burning 
Ones”) in Padua and “Accademia delle notti vaticane” (“Academy of the Vatican 
Nights”) in Rome. He taught logic and philosophy at the University of Padua. His 
extraordinary rhetorical ability and performances were well known in the Italian political 
and cultural environment. Being an advocate of the use of Italian language for any and all 
disciplines, he was presented as one of the fathers of the vernacular in Bernardino 
Tomitano’s (1517-1576) Ragionamenti della lingua toscana (1546). He was also in 
contact with the most important protagonists of the sixteenth century, including Pietro 
Aretino (1492-1556), Bernardo Tasso (1493-1569), Torquato Tasso (1544-1595), 
Gasparo Contarini (1483-1542), Jacopo Mazzoni (1548-1598), Pope Pius IV (1499-
1565), and the Duke of Urbino Guidobaldo II della Rovere (1514-1574), among others.1 
Sperone Speroni is mostly famous for his central role in the quarrel about language 
(“questione della lingua”) addressed in his Dialogo delle lingue (1542). His defense of the 
vernacular as a valuable language for literature and philosophy resulted in his choosing to 
write all his works in Italian. At the same time, Speroni proposed a revolution in philosophy 
promoting ancient sophists’ perspectives and arguments as the most appropriate for political 
and civil life.  
1 An introduction to Speroni’s biography and work is provided by M. Pozzi, “Nota introduttiva.” Trattatisti 
del Cinquecento. Ed. M. Pozzi. Tome II. Milano: Ricciardi, 1996. 471-509. The book Sperone Speroni 
(Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1989) collects essays on several aspects of Speroni’s production and 
above all provides two highly important tools for any scholarly research: a bibliography of Speroni’s 
published works and a catalogue of Speroni’s manuscripts collected in the Biblioteca Capitolare of Padua. 
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There is evidence that sophistry is constantly addressed and practiced in Speroni's 
oeuvre, from his dialogues through his trattatelli to the Apologia dei dialoghi. Within these 
works, Speroni carries on a defense of ancient sophistry against its accusers, primarily 
Socrates (469-399 BCE) and Plato (c. 429-347 BCE).  
According to Speroni, sophistic rhetoric should regain the significance it possessed 
before Socrates and Plato destroyed it and fundamentally changed the history of Western 
culture. Speroni argued that the sophistic approach to the human world is more appropriate 
than any metaphysics. In fact, the sophists’ relativism and flexibility in politics and ethics fit 
political and civil life better than Plato’s eternal essences. Implying that ancient Greece and 
Renaissance Italy share a similar political and ethical situation, Speroni advocated for a 
rebirth of sophistic rhetoric as the best way to enhance the public life of each particular 
community. 
Given the specific situation of Renaissance Italy, it being fragmented in a variety of 
regional cultures, a study of the relationship between Speroni's thinking and the tradition of 
ancient sophists, which is at the core of this dissertation, may also significantly impact the 
understanding of the Italian Renaissance. Despite the fact that Speroni’s works deeply 
influenced early-modern culture even beyond Italy, from Bernardino Tomitano to Joachim 
du Bellay (c. 1522-1560), his oeuvre and legacy have been mostly neglected. Therefore, the 
study of this subject carries the urgency of reconstructing an important part of Italian and 
European cultural heritage beyond specific disciplinary boundaries. 
All of Speroni's manuscripts are collected in 17 volumes in the Biblioteca 
Capitolare of Padua. A description of them was first provided by Claudio Bellinati’s 
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Catalogo dei manoscritti di Sperone Speroni nella Biblioteca Capitolare di Padova.2  A 
second and more detailed description is now available in Silvio Bernardinello’s Catalogo 
dei codici della Biblioteca Capitolare di Padova.3 Speroni’s works have been published 
several times from 1542 through the twentieth century.  A full description of all editions 
is available in Mariella Magliani’s Bibliografia delle opere a stampa di Sperone 
Speroni.4 In 1740, Natale dalle Laste and Marco Forcellini published the only complete 
edition of Speroni’s works.5 Their edition is based on both manuscripts and previous 
editions. Scholars of Speroni can find just a few of these works in critical editions. Mario 
Pozzi published a critical edition of the following works: Dialogo d'amore, Dialogo delle 
lingue, Dialogo della retorica (book I), Dialogo della istoria (part II), Della dignita' delle 
donne, Apologia dei dialoghi (part I), and some letters. 6 
There are modern translations of only a few of Speroni’s works. A French translation 
of the Dialogo delle lingue is available in a bilingual edition, as well as the Dialogo 
d’amore. 7  The Dialogo delle lingue was also published with a parallel German 
translation.8 No English translation is available for any of Speroni’s works. 
Several contributions have been published in Italy in recent decades. Among the most 
significant are the studies on Speroni and the “Accademia degli Infiammati,” on rhetoric 
2  C. Bellinati. “Catalogo dei manoscritti di Sperone Speroni nella Biblioteca Capitolare di Padova.” 
Sperone Speroni. 323-356. 
3 S. Bernardinello. Catalogo dei codici della Biblioteca Capitolare di Padova. In appendice gli incunaboli 
con aggiunte manoscritte. 2 vols. Padova: Istituto per la storia ecclesiastica padovana, 2007. 
4 M. Magliani. “Bibliografia delle opere a stampa di Sperone Speroni.” Sperone Speroni. 275-322. 
5 S. Speroni. Opere […] tratte da’ mss. Originali. Eds. N. dalle Laste and M. Forcellini. 5 tomes. Venezia: 
Appresso D. Occhi, 1740 (reprint: ed. M. Pozzi. Roma: Vecchiarelli, 1989). 
6 Pozzi, ed. Trattatisti del Cinquecento. 471-849. 
7 S. Speroni. Dialogue des langues. Eds. G. Genot, P. Larivaille and M. Pozzi. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
2001. Id. Dialogue traittant d'amour & jalousie. Eds. C. Gruget, P. Martin and J.-L. Fournel. Poitiers: La 
Licorne, 1998. 
8 S. Speroni. Dialogo delle lingue [reprint from Speroni. Opere. I. Venezia, 1740]. With a German trans. 
Ed. H. Harth. München: W. Fink, 1975. 
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and politics in Speroni’s oeuvre, and the important essays collected in the volume 
Sperone Speroni.9 
French scholars have focused primarily on Speroni’s Dialogo delle lingue and have 
demonstrated that this work was an important source for Joachim du Bellay’s Défense et 
illustration de la langue française, while Jean-Louis Fournel has written the only 
monographic study on Speroni available throughout all international scholarship. 10 
In North America, Speroni is known mostly for his theory of the dialogue. In almost 
every work dedicated to that topic Speroni is present as an important voice of the 
Renaissance debate. More specifically, Jon Snyder offered an interpretation of Speroni’s 
enigmatic writing as a strategy of defense against the Catholic Inquisition’s charges. 
Virginia Cox wrote about the significance of Speroni’s theory and practice of the “open” 
form of dialogue and its place in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century culture. Olga Zorzi 
Pugliese worked particularly on the connection between Speroni’s theory and the idea of 
the “ludico” with an intriguing reference to Giorgio Colli’s studies on the labyrinth as a 
powerful symbol in ancient Greek culture.11 
9  Among the most important Italian contributions, see F. Bruni. “S. Speroni e l’accademia degli 
Infiammati.” Filologia e letteratura 13 (1967): 24-71; C. Vasoli. “Sperone Speroni: la filosofia e la lingua. 
L’ombra del Pomponazzi e un programma di ‘volgarizzamento’ del sapere.” Il volgare come lingua di 
cultura dal Trecento al Cinquecento. Atti del Convegno internazionale (Mantova, 18-20 ottobre 2001). 
Eds. A. Calzola et al. Mantova: Olschki, 2003. 339-360; and the essays collected in the volume Sperone 
Speroni.  
10 The first important study on the subject is P. Villey. Les sources italiennes de la Defense et illustration de 
la langue françoise de Joachim du Bellay. Paris: Champion, 1908. J.-F. Fournel, Les dialogues de S. 
Speroni: liberté de la parole et règles de l'écriture. Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1990. 
11 J. R. Snyder. Writing the Scene of Speaking. Theories of Dialogue in the Late Italian Renaissance. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989; V. Cox. The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in 
its Social and Political Contexts, Castiglione to Galileo. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992; O. Zorzi Pugliese. “Il concetto ludico del dialogo: Problema testuale 
nell’Apologia dei dialogi di Sperone Speroni.” Il veltro: Rivista della civiltà italiana 40 (1996): 340-344.. 
See also G. Colli, La nascita della filosofia, Adelphi, Milano 1975.  
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Despite the relevance of ancient sophists in understanding Speroni’s oeuvre, Mario Pozzi 
and Raffaele Girardi are the only two scholars who have addressed the subject, and no 
comprehensive study has yet been provided.12 On the one hand, Jean-Louis Fournel’s book 
provides only a brief account, although it has merit in pointing out the issue; on the other 
hand, Eric MacPhail in his The Sophistic Renaissance does not intend to treat the Italian 
Cinquecento, although it should be said that his book is the only monograph on the rebirth of 
sophistry in early modern European culture. 13  Furthermore, no exploration has been 
conducted on the Renaissance rebirth of skepticism as a vehicle for the diffusion of ancient 
sophistry in the works and milieu of Speroni, although scholars, such as Edward Muir, have 
established that during the Counter-Reformation period a new form of skepticism arose in the 
Venetian area.14 Considering that Speroni was educated and wrote his works in the vibrant 
atmosphere of intellectual life in Bologna, Padua and Venice, where Aristotelianism and 
skepticism often overlapped, it is likely that skepticism had a role in Speroni’s rehabilitation 
of sophistry. 
Scholars in Italian studies have addressed the Renaissance debate about the relationship 
between sophistry and other arts, but their contributions still lack an appropriate 
contextualization within a broader overview.15 In general, scholars coming from the fields of 
philosophy and literature have missed the opportunity to collaborate. 
12 M. Pozzi. “Speroni e il genere epidittico.” Sperone Speroni. 55-88; R. Girardi. “Ercole e il Granchio: 
figure della ‘sofistica speroniana’.” Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana 167 (1990): 396-411. 
13  E. MacPhail, The Sophistic Renaissance, Genève: Droz, 2011. See in particular Marsilio Ficino’s 
interpretation of Plato’s anti-sophistic works, Pietro Bembo’s translation of Gorgias, Aldus Manutius’ 
editions and other significant events (pp. 37-52). 
14 E. Muir. The Culture Wars of the Late Renaissance. Skeptics, Libertines, and Opera. Cambridge, MA and 
London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2007. On early modern skepticism in Europe, see R. H. Popkin. 
The History of Scepticism. From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
15 Evidence of this is the absence of Speroni in C. Scarpati. “Iacopo Mazzoni tra Tasso e Marino.” Aevum 59 
(1985): 433-458; and E. Russo. “Il rifiuto della sofistica nelle postille tassiane a Jacopo Mazzoni.” La 
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The overall objective of this project is to fill the gap in international scholarship 
through a study of the rebirth of ancient sophists in Speroni’s oeuvre and the debate over 
sophistry in his milieu among philosophers and writers. 
The first chapter aims at presenting a survey of the fifteenth-century authors who 
first translated and commented on ancient sophistic works. Attention is paid to Leonardo 
Bruni (c. 1370-1444), Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406-1457), Teodoro Gaza (c. 1400-1475), and 
George of Trebizond (1395-1484), whose works are related especially to Gorgias of 
Leontini (c. 483-c. 376 BCE) and Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490-c. 420 BCE). The last 
part of the chapter focuses on Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) as the major interpreter of 
Plato’s dialogues against sophists. 
The second chapter examines how Speroni employs ancient Greek sophists to 
reverse a dominant Platonic perspective and rehabilitate sophistic rhetoric as a central activity 
in public and civic life. Particular attention is given to Speroni’s arguments against Plato’s 
metaphysics and political thought. To demonstrate my thesis, I provide an analysis of the 
following works of Speroni: the Apologia dei dialoghi, the trattatelli entitled In difesa dei 
sofisti and Contra Socrate, and the Dialogo della retorica. 
The third chapter explores the variety of sophistic argumentations that Speroni 
applies in several works. Two principal categories of texts will be examined: the double 
arguments, or antilogies, such as the two letters condemning and praising sobriety 
addressed to Luigi (Alvise) Cornaro (1484-1566), and the so-called paradoxical 
dialogues Dialogo dell’Usura and Dialogo della Discordia, in which style as well as 
content are related to the author’s interest in ancient rhetoric. 
cultura 38 (2000): 279-318. 
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The fourth chapter focuses on the debate over sophistry and its relationship with 
metaphysics, politics, rhetoric, poetry, and the pictorial arts that took place in the second half 
of the sixteenth century in Italy and involved many central figures of the time, such as 
Torquato Tasso, Jacopo Mazzoni, and Gregorio Comanini (1550-1608). The chapter also 
engages the Renaissance debate on the value of Dante Alighieri’s poetry and explores the 
role it played in the rebirth of sophistry. 
In the conclusion of this dissertation, I summarize the results of my work and outline 
the paths of research that seem to be the most fruitful for future projects. I foresee potential 
innovations in the exploration of Speroni’s legacy in the Italian and European sophistic 
Renaissance from the sixteenth century to today. As examples for possible subjects for 
broadening this research, I briefly address Gerolamo Cardano (1501-1576), Michel de 
Montaigne’s (1533-1592) Essays, the Italian Baroque, the debate on sophistry in early 
modern and modern Spain, the nineteenth-century German philosophy, and “living thought” 
in present-day Italy.  
Considering the limited number of scholarly studies directly related to the subject of 
my research, I have based my investigation mostly on primary sources. Some of them are 
available in modern editions and English translation; others are accessible only in the original 
languages, in early modern editions or manuscripts. The main primary source for the study of 
Speroni’s works remains the five-volume edition of 1740, which is a consistent reference in 
my dissertation. For the first chapter of the dissertation, I benefit from the modern editions 
and translations of the fifteenth-century Latin works. The survey of the first chapter has 
served as a necessary starting point not only in featuring the rebirth of sophistic texts in the 
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Latin literature of the Quattrocento but also in providing a clear idea of the sources available 
for Speroni and his contemporaries. 
The role that this project may play in the broader scholarship on the Renaissance has 
held my consistent attention. On the one hand, I have contextualized the subject of my 
research in a broader history of literature and philosophy with the main purpose of stressing 
the originality of the debate that involved some of the protagonists of sixteenth-century 
culture. On the other hand, I have avoided treating topics already sufficiently explored by 
international scholarship and I have referred to appropriate studies for the subjects connected 
to my research but not directly involved in it. 
Ancient sophists’ approaches to practical and theoretical issues have been broadly 
demonized from Plato’s condemnation until their re-evaluation by modern German 
philosophers, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –1831) and Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900). Despite the fact that fine scholars in ancient studies, and especially Jacqueline 
De Romilly, have addressed the originality of the sophistic movement, the stigmatization 
inspired by Plato still tends to restrain scholarly endeavors to explore this important part of 
the Western philosophical heritage.16 Because of its fervid activity in promoting ancient 
authors, the Renaissance was not only the age of the rebirth of Plato and Aristotle (384-322 
BCE) but also of other significant, although uncomfortable, traditions, among which 
sophistry had a primary role. So far, no scholar has treated the rebirth of sophists in Italy, 
where the Renaissance began, with the interdisciplinary approach and extended study that 
this subject deserves.  
16 J. De Romilly. The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens. Tr. J. Lloyd.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992. 
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The fact that the Aristotelian Speroni dedicated so much of his intellectual production 
in the vernacular to the rebirth of sophistic arts makes his attempt a unique case in these 
respects within the span of roughly twenty-three centuries. Because of its innovative findings, 
I believe that this project may shed new light on the Italian Renaissance and lead scholars to 





Fifteenth-century perspectives on ancient sophists 
 
Nul auteur ne rend si fortement les sentiments d’autrui 
à moins que son proper coeur ne batte à l’unisson 
A.-J. Festugière. Contemplation et vie contemplative 





Twentieth-century scholarship on fifteenth-century culture recovered authors and texts 
that had received no previous attention. Although from different perspectives and with 
different methodology, two scholars, Paul Oskar Kristeller and Eugenio Garin, played 
major roles in exploring the literary and philosophical production of the fifteenth century. 
They addressed primary sources through an extended exploration of ancient editions and 
manuscripts that no other scholar had taken into account. Through decades of work, 
roughly from the 1930s to the 1990s, they made available some of the most precious 
treasurers of the first Renaissance. The volumes of the Iter italicus and the Supplementum 
Ficinianum by Kristeller as well as Prosatori latini del Quattrocento and La cultura 
filosofica del rinascimento italiano by Garin have continued to be essential references for 
international scholarship. Their titanic endeavor was particularly aimed at uncovering the 
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rebirth of the ancient classics in the Renaissance, addressing both the translation and 
variety of interpretations provided by the humanists of the fifteenth century.17 Platonism 
and Aristotelianism were, of course, the two major philosophical traditions engaged in 
the research of Kristeller and Garin. Those two traditions were important not only in and 
of themselves but also as vehicles for other authors and perspectives. In fact, thanks to 
Plato and Aristotle, it was possible to access the pre-Socratic thinkers, even those with 
whom Plato and Aristotle intended to impose their philosophical point of view. This is 
particularly true for ancient sophists. 
Nowadays, scholars who study sophistry and its legacy can rely on several tools 
for exploring authors and texts in the field. From the volumes of The Fragmente die 
Vorsokratiker of Hermann Alexander Dies and Walther Kranz to Mario Untersteiner’s I 
sofisti, in the last century scholars have had direct access to the sources as well as to 
valuable attempts in providing an interpretation of sophists’ works. That knowledge was 
impossible for any early modern author. But thanks to humanists’ Latin translation and 
interpretation of Aristotle and Plato, the level of knowledge about the sophistic tradition 
tremendously increased and reached a level that the Middle Ages had never achieved. 
This chapter presents an overview of the main strains of fifteenth-century literary 
production related to sophistry. In providing a survey with punctual references to the 
most significant texts, the chapter prepares the ground for the study of Sperone Speroni’s 
works and debate over sophistry among the sixteenth-century authors. 
17 For the relevance of Garin and Kristeller in the twentieth century and essential bibliographical references, 
see Ch. Celenza. The Lost Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin's Legacy. The Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore and London, 2004 (chapter 2). 
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This first part of the dissertation examines the presence of Gorgias of Leontini 
and Protagoras of Abdera in the Latin works of Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, George 
of Trebizond, Teodoro Gaza, and Marsilio Ficino. Thanks to their translations and 
interpretations, the sophistic Renaissance of the sixteenth century became possible, 
althought Speroni’s defense of sophists and the debate that followed had original and 
innovative aspects. 
Fifteenth-century authors present different interpretations of ancient sophistry. In 
searching for a main distinction, one finds two different approaches. Some humanists 
argued for the validity of sophistry as a valuable approach to opposing metaphysical 
philosophy; others adopted Plato’s point of view, rejecting all types of sophistic 
approaches. George of Trebizond is the most fitting example of the former, whereas 
Marsilio Ficino led the Platonists.  
Ficino’s case is particularly interesting for the paradox of its results. In fact, even 
though Ficino’s commentaries on Plato’s dialogues are clearly against sophistry, his 
expansive work in translating and interpreting Plato played a major role in the re-
emergence of ancient sophists in the early modern age. The paradox is evident when one 
considers that Speroni’s rehabilitation of sophistic rhetoric would not have been possible 
without Ficino’s oeuvre, as Plato had been one of the major sources for knowledge of the 
ancient sophists, and Ficino made all of Plato’s dialogues available in Latin. 
 Gorgias of Leontini and Protagoras of Abdera are the most popular sophists since 
antiquity. Plato titled two of his major dialogues after them, and Protagoras’ relativism is 
the main subject of his Theaetetus; Aristotle praised Gorgias’ prose in his Rhetoric while 
also arguing with sophistic arguments in his Organon; and Sextus Empiricus (160-210) 
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used the arguments of Gorgias and Protagoras to support the skeptical position. Given 
their relevance, this study of the Italian sophistic Renaissance must begin with the two 
greatest sophists of antiquity. 
 
 
2. Gorgias Redivivus 
 
“Is it possible to […] claim that the key tenets of Humanist rhetoric are analogous to 
those of Gorgias?”18 This question posed by Nancy Struever’s study more than thirty 
years ago might be applied to other ancient sophists, Protagoras among them. 
Nevertheless, the answer to this question is still uncertain because of the gap in 
international studies with regard to the sophistic legacy in the early modern age. A solid 
contribution to finding a satisfactory answer may be given by focusing on primary 
sources, but such research must aim to examine what humanists actually read, translated, 
and commented upon. This type of investigation can help to clarify humanists’ familiarity 
with sophistic sources and, therefore, the possible analogy between fifteenth-century 
rhetoric and ancient sophistry. 
In spite of Plato’s intention, his Gorgias certainly presents persuasive arguments 
in favor of rhetoric, a realization that fascinated not only pre-modern authors but also the 
German philologist and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who appreciated the anti-
Platonic arguments presented by the sophist Gorgias and his pupil Callicles in Plato’s 
18 N. Struever, The language of History in the Renaissance. Rhetoric and Historical Consciousness in 
Florentine Humanism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 46. Struever significantly dedicated 
the whole first chapter (“The Background of Humanist Historical language: The Quarrel of Philosophy 
and Rhetoric”) to the connection between Gorgian epistemology and its conception of language and the 
Humanistic debate on history, politics, and rhetoric. 
 13 
                                                        
dialogue. The paradoxical aspect of Platonism was well outlined by the classical scholar 
Eric Robertson Dodds: “it is a strange irony of history that Plato’s exposition of the ideas 
he meant to destroy should thus have contributed to the formidable renaissance of those 
ideas in our days.”19 
One of the most striking defenses of rhetoric in the Gorgias is Callicles’ rhesis 
(Gorgias 482c-486d), a speech made against Socrates, which crushed the Platonic 
supremacy of philosophy over rhetoric. Scholars have not found any evidence of the 
existence of such a sophist, and we do not know whether Callicles is a fictitious name for 
another sophist or a character that Plato invented. In either case, as Dodds points out, 
“one is tempted to believe that Callicles stands for something which Plato had it in him to 
become (and would perhaps have become, but for Socrates).”20 If Plato created Callicles’ 
rhesis – perhaps disclosing the dark side of his soul – he proved himself able to perform 
an explosive sophistic speech. If he just copied the speech from an original source, we 
owe him the knowledge of an important piece of sophistic rhetoric. In either case, Plato 
provided a most powerful weapon against his own philosophy.     
According to the speech that Callicles performs in the Gorgias, philosophy cannot 
aspire to any supremacy in the Greek paideia because it cannot replace the function of 
rhetoric. Furthermore, Callicles argues that laws are merely conventions made up by 
weak people to preserve their power. Moreover, Callicles attacks Socrates’ method of 
argumentation, pointing out its contradictions.  
19 E. R. Dodds. “Appendix.” Plato. Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Ed. E. R. 
Dodds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. 390. 
20 E. R. Dodds. “Introduction.” Plato. Gorgias. 14. 
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In this first part of the chapter, I intend to mention some examples of the 
Gorgias’s legacy, particularly the part on Callicles’ speech, in the fifteenth century, in 
order to prepare an understanding of Speroni’s use of it to defend sophistic rhetoric from 
its detractors. 
The humanist Leonardo Bruni translated Plato’s Gorgias in Latin in 1409.  Before 
this translation, Western readers had known the dialogue from secondary sources. This is 
evidence of a strong interest in rhetoric as well as Platonism since the beginning of the 
fifteenth century in Italy. Bruni’s work also initiated the recovery of ancient sophistry in 
the pre-modern Western world. For the first time, Latin readers could appreciate the 
agonistic competition between the most popular sophistic rhetorician and Plato/Socrates, 
indicative of the ancient agon between metaphysical philosophy and rhetorical tradition. 
Thanks to the detailed study and edition of Bruni’s translation by Matteo Venier, scholars 
have the opportunity to appreciate Bruni’s interpretation of the Gorgias, which is the 
most important Platonic work against sophistic rhetoric. 21 Furthermore, Bruni shared his 
interest with other Humanists. In his letter addressed to Niccolò Niccoli (1364-1437) in 
1409, Bruni urged Niccoli to copy the translation of Plato’s Gorgias that he had sent to 
him so that he could have it back as soon as possible.22 
Bruni’s translation, introduced by a dedicatory letter to pope Giovanni XXIII and 
an argumentum, is also interesting because of Bruni’s contradictory attitude towards the 
matter. On the one hand, Bruni admired Plato’s attack against rhetoric; on the other hand, 
he highly esteemed the rhetorical art. 23 Bruni’s was not an isolated approach. Other 
21 M. Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. Firenze: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 
2011. 
22 Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 12-13. 
23 For the letter and argumentum, see Ibid. 239-241. About this contradiction see J. Hankins, Plato in the 
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authors related to Platonism were embarrassed by Plato’s rejection of rhetoric and 
responded in different ways. The most relevant example, which will be deepened in the 
last part of the chapter, is Marsilio Ficino who argued that Plato intended to condemn 
only sophistic rhetoric, as he considered it a detrimental practice. 
According to Hankins, Bruni was led to the Gorgias by Cicero’s (106-43 BCE) 
De oratore, which supports the model of an orator involved in civic life and opposes 
Plato’s banishment of rhetoric from the ideal city. Hankins suggested that this very 
opposition drew Bruni’s attention to Plato’s Gorgias: “the possibility of a conflict in 
cultural values between two heroes of the humanist movement would surely have roused 
Bruni’s interest in translating the dialogue.”24 In either case, Bruni tends to soften the 
conflict that is going on in the Gorgias, although he shows a clear awareness of the 
intensity of the dialectical strife between Plato/Socrates and Gorgias/Callicles. Moreover, 
Bruni’s notes, next to several of Gorgias’ pronouncements, prove his appreciation for the 
sophists and some of their arguments.25 
 Unlike Bruni, the byzantine Teodoro Gaza is explicitly engaged in defending 
rhetoric from Plato’s attack, as shown by John Monfasani. Teodoro came to Italy in 1440 
and taught in Ferrara from 1446 to 1449, when he gave two courses on Demosthenes’ 
(384-322 BCE) speech On the Crown and Plato’s Gorgias. His students produced the 
reportata, or lecture notes, which report the main topics of the courses. Remarkably, 
Teodoro did not use Leonardo Bruni’s translation of the Gorgias; he rather paraphrased 
or translated most of the text. Apparently, he intended to give a different interpretation of 
Italian Renaissance. 2 vols. Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn and Köln: Brill, 1990. I. 57-58 and passim. 
And Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 22-23. 
24 Hankins. Plato in the Italian Renaissance. I. 53. 
25 Ibid. 56-57. For further details on Bruni’s translation of Gorgias, see Ibid. 394-396. 
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Plato’s work. Teodoro reads the text from an Aristotelian perspective, which endorses 
rhetoric and brings him to criticize Plato’s approach. In fact, Teodoro attacks Plato and 
argues that his rejection of rhetoric stems from the traditional antagonism between 
rhetoricians and philosophers. Moreover, Teodoro claims that Plato, in attacking his 
enemies, proves to be an excellent rhetorician. Furthermore, he notices contradictions in 
Plato’s argumentation and proposes solving them with philosophical tools provided in 
Aristotle’s works. 26 
Teodoro Gaza’s activity in supporting rhetoric, even the sophistic type, is also 
related to his collaboration with Giovanni Andrea Bussi (1417-1475) in translating and 
publishing the editio princeps of Aulus Gellius’ (130-180 CE) Noctes Atticae in 1469. 
Indeed, Aulus Gellius inserts into his work (Noctes Atticae X, 22) Callicles’ rhesis 
presented by Plato in his Gorgias (482c-486d). This speech was either not usually 
translated or absent in the manuscripts of Aulus Gellio’s work, but Bussi decides to 
translate it for the editio princeps and, in the dedicatory letter “ad Paulum II Venetum 
pontificem maximum,” recognizes the significant collaboration of Teodoro Gaza in 
translating the Greek part of Aulius Gellius’s work.27  
Another byzantine who supported the argument for rhetoric in the Gorgias is 
George of Trebizond, as Monfasani shows in his study.28 His most important work on the 
recovery of the ancient sophistical rhetoric is the Oratio de laudibus eloquentie, 
26 For a complete analysis of Teodoro Gaza’s commentaries on Demosthenes’ and Plato’s works see J. 
Monfasani. “L’insegnamento di Teodoro Gaza a Ferrara.” [1988] Id. Greeks and Latins in Renaissance 
Italy. Studies on Humanism and Philosophy in the 15th Century. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. 8-11. 
Monfasani is editing a critical edition of the texts from the courses.  
27 A complete analysis of the translation and publication of the rhesis in Aulius Gellius’s work is provided 
by Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 374-379. 
28 J. Monfasani. George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic. Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1976. 255-261. 
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presented in Venice in the early 1430s, which is similar to the preface of his 
Rhetoricorum libri quinque. 29  George chooses to defend rhetoric by reproducing 
Gorgias’s defense in Plato’s Gorgias (456c-457c). In fact, George claims that rhetoric 
should not be cast out of the cities because of evil orators.30 In other words, we should 
not confuse the art with those who use it incorrectly. Indeed, the guilty rhetoricians, and 
not rhetoric, should be banished. 31 According to Monfasani’s study, George adjusted 
Aristotle’s arguments to support the sophistic perspective and “justified the sophists’ 
claim to teach a ‘political science,’ while at the same time trying to preserve Aristotle’s 
authority for rhetoric.”32 Moreover, “he found in the Sophists criticized by Plato and 
Aristotle not merely inspiration but also the basic themes of this endeavor.”33 
Another case of a humanist becoming attracted to the sophistic arguments in the 
Gorgias is Lorenzo Valla. He recalls the dialogue in his marginal notes on Quintilianus’ 
(c. 35-100 CE) Institutio oratoria and in his De vero falsoque bono. Valla’s appreciation 
for the sophistic rhetoric criticized by Plato was more than pure philological interest. 
According to Venier, Valla was inspired by Callicles’ rhesis and found in it the most 
efficacious argument to support the opinion of the Epicurean character in his De vero 
falsoque bono.34 Remarkably, the Epicurean’s perspective is presented as a Pagan version 
of the Christian point of view, so that the use of Callicles’ speech ultimately results in an 
argument for the defense of virtue. It should be noted that Valla does not explicitly 
29 The edition of the text is published in Monfasani. George of Trebizond. 365-369 (“Appendix XI”). 
30 Ibid. 258. 
31  Speroni uses the same argument in his work, as we will see. A further similarity with Speroni’s 
arguments is presented in Monfasani. George of Trebizond. 331-333. 
32 Ibid.260. 
33 Ibid. 261. On George of Trebizond against Plato, see also Hankins. Plato in the Italian Renaissance. I. 
168-170. 
34 Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 45-48. 
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endorse Callicles and his sophistic speech but rather extracts from it what he needs for his 
purpose. Nevertheless, in doing so, Valla recognizes the value of sophistic rhetoric. 
Considering the approach of Leonardo Bruni, Teodoro Gaza, George of 
Trebizond, and Lorenzo Valla, one may certainly agree with Venier’s conclusions: 
Plato’s Gorgias influenced humanists’ works more for the sophistic rhetoric that it 
displayed than for the philosophy of Socrates and Plato.35  
 
 
3. Protagoras and humanist literature 
 
In the proem of the third book of his Dialecticae disputationes, Lorenzo Valla mentions 
the “traps and tricks of the sophists who […] have fabricated certain new terms for the 
ruination of their opponents, with no less malice or even more, perhaps, than those who 
dip their arrows in venom when they go into battle.” 36  This comparison to battle, 
certainly appropriate for describing the ancient rhetorical agon, suggests the image of a 
harsh struggle that, according to Valla, should be avoided since it opposes the correct 
method of discussion. Valla, therefore, proposes an alternative image that suggests how 
interlocutors should correctly conceive of themselves when debating: “when two of us 
dispute with one another, we are not really enemies, as those people are when they fight; 
35 Ibid. 48: “Nella prima parte del Quattrocento, il Gorgia sembra avere dunque esercitato un’influenza 
originale sul pensiero storico e filosofico di alcuni umanisti; ma ciò piuttosto per il tramite delle tesi che vi 
sono esposte per bocca di Callicle, l’antagonista di Socrate – tesi dunque antitetiche a quelle propugnate 
da Platone -, anziché per il tramite delle tesi promosse da Socrate, e, in ultima analisi, da Platone stesso.” 
36 L. Valla. Dialectical Disputations. Eds. B. P. Copenhaver and L. Nauta. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2012. I. 209. 
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both of us soldier under the same commander – the Truth.”37 Proposing the model of 
dialogue presented by Plato/Socrates, where the interlocutors should actually be allies in 
reaching a common goal, Valla reduces the ancient agon to a peaceful opportunity for 
reaching a common level of understanding. 
 The practice of double and opposing speeches is based on an opposite idea of 
truth. According to Protagoras, whoever is looking for a firm conclusion at the end of a 
speech or debate will be disappointed in finding that one can argue for and against the 
same thesis at the same time. Since antiquity, Protagoras has been considered the founder 
of the practice of double speeches. Diogenes Laertius (c. 3rd century CE) claims that “he 
was the first to declare that there are two possible positions on every questions, opposed 
to each other; and indeed he was the first to present arguments along these lines” (Life of 
the Philosophers IX, 51). 38 According to Diogenes, The Art of Controversy and two 
books on Opposing Arguments are on the list of works that Protagoras would have 
written (Life of the Philosophers IX, 55).39  
Despite the fact that Plato and Aristotle had attempted to demonstrate the 
destructive results of Protagorean rhetoric, which challenges the fundamental law of 
noncontradiction, early modern authors were fascinated by it, not only for the rhetoric but 
also for its broader relativistic and anthropocentric view of the human world. The most 
popular of Protagoras’ claims, as reported by Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
I, 216), sounds like a humanist manifesto: “man is the measure of all things […] and by 
measure he means the criterion of truth.” This is unquestionably a glorification of the 
37 Ibid. 209. 
38 J. Dillon and G. Tania, eds. The Greek Sophists. London: Penguin Books, 2003. 3. 
39 Ibid. 4. 
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power that the human being has for shaping his own world through the most fitting rules, 
without any metaphysical bond. 
 MacPhail argued that “the Sophistic Renaissance is, in its most important 
manifestations, a Protagorean Renaissance” and arguing both sides of an issue, which is 
the core of Protagoras’ method, becomes one of the most popular rhetorical models in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.40 There are different works that have been considered in 
relation to the double-speech form, although their proximity to the Protagorean genre is 
controversial. I would like to mention some of them in preparation for chapter three, in 
which I explore how Speroni applies double-argument speech.  
 Eugenio Garin, Jerold Seigel and Francesco Bausi have suggested that Leonardo 
Bruni’s Dialogi ad Petrum Histrum are a rhetorical exercise of antilogical literature, 
practiced through a Ciceronian model and considered part of the humanist paideia.41 One 
may consider this to be one of the ways in which the culture of the Quattrocento emulated 
the ancient world with the intention of recreating conditions for a new Athens or Rome. 
According to Garin, Bruni’s dialogue first aims to practice oratory skills, instead of 
logical demonstrations, for application in ethical discussions. 42  In his study, Bausi 
40 E. MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. Genève: Droz, 2011. 73. For a survey of ancient literature 
related to the Protagorean antilogic - including Plato, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius - see MacPhail. The 
Sophistic Renaissance. 73-79. 
41 See J. Seigel. “’Civic Humanism’ or Ciceroniam Rhetoric? The Culture of Petrarch and Bruni.” Past and 
Present 34 (1966). 3-48; E. Garin. L’età nuova. Ricerche di storia della cultura dal XII al XVI secolo. 
Napoli: Morano, 1969. passim; Id. “La cultura fiorentina nella seconda metà del ’300 e i ‘barbari 
britannici’.” La Rassegna della Letteratura Italiana 64 (1960). 181-195; F. Bausi. “Nota sul procedimento 
antilogico nei Dialoghi di Leonardo Bruni.” Interpres 12 (1992). 275-283.  
42 “Nei dialoghi del Bruni […] il fulcro è una esercitazione retorica sic et non: un esempio vistoso di quella 
‘dialettica’ che gli antichi opponevano ai ‘moderni’, disputa pro e contro, duplici discorsi, argomentazioni 
persuasive valide sul terreno ‘morale’, di fronte alle tecniche logiche della dimostrazione e confutazione 
condotte sul terreno rigorosamente ‘formale’.” (E. Garin, “La cultura fiorentina nella seconda metà del 
’300 e i ‘barbari britannici’.” 192). A similar interpretation is presented by P. O. Kristeller. La tradizione 
classica nel pensiero del Rinascimento. Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1965. Sec. ed. 1987. 150-151. For an 
overview of the scholarly debate on Bruni’s Dialogi in the twentieth century, see S. U. Baldassarri. 
“Introduzione.” L. Bruni. Dialogi ad Petrum paulum Histrum. Ed. S. U. Baldassarri. Firenze: Olschky, 
 21 
                                                        
mentions other work that would be considered cases of antilogical literature of the 
fifteenth-century. For example, in Cristoforo Landino’s (1424-1498) Disputationes 
Camaldulenses Lorenzo de’ Medici praises the active life and Leon Battista Alberti 
defends the value of the contemplative life.  
Nevertheless, the examples reported by Garin and Bausi risk extending the 
category of antilogic to the entire literary genre of the dialogue. Protagorean antilogic is 
not a sequence of opposite opinions expressed by different interlocutors, even when they 
do not achieve any final common conclusion, it is rather a much more radical practice 
that aims to affirm the truth of two opposite opinions at the same time. Moreover, and 
much more destabilizing, the author of this Protagorean practice does not intend to 
persuade of anything except the impossibility of choosing an opinion truer than the 
opposite. MacPhail pointed out that the fifteenth–century dialogues presented by Garin 
and Bausi as examples of antilogical literature are misleading; indeed, “in the sophistc 
antilogia, we cannot determine what the speaker really means, other than that he means 
to insinuate the truth of opposites.” 43 Evidence of this fundamental difference between 
dialogue and sophistic antilogia is the fact that Plato and Aristotle, who considered 
Protagoras the worst enemy of ontology and logic, supported the dialogue as an 
extremely valuable means of practicing philosophy. Even the aporetical or Socratic 
dialogues of the first Plato, such as the Laches, and the dialectical form of dialogue 
proposed by Aristotle for discussing matters about which we cannot reach any absolute 
truth are completely different from any Protagorean double argument. 
1994. 6-12. 
43 MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. 83. 
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Although one does not consider the Renaissance dialogue as an example of 
Protagorean antilogia, dialogue as a genre may be related to Plato’s Protagoras in other 
respects. As Andrea Capras has demonstrated in his study of this dialogue, Plato 
presented a rhetorical performance on a virtual stage, probably following the same rules 
of the Greek agon as it was performed by the rhetoricians of ancient Greece. Thanks to 
the Protagoras and Plato’s other dialogues, we can access one of the most important 
aspects of this classical culture, for the dispute between the two characters Protagoras and 
Socrates follows the rules for debating that interlocutors applied between fifth and forth 
century BCE, a period of time when sophists were protagonists of the public scene in 
Greece. In other words, Plato did not invent the verbal conflict that takes place in his 
Protagoras, he rather portrayed, with a good degree of verisimilitude, what one could 
actually witness at that time.44 One may see in the dialogues of Bruni and Landino the 
same type of verbal agonistic competition of Plato’s Protagoras. By this similarity, some 
humanists reproduced one of the main features of this classical culture and found a way 
to honor their ancient models. 
However, a direct influence of the Protagoras, as well as of Plato’s other 
dialogues on sophistry (except for the Gorgias), on Renaissance culture was not possible 
before Marsilio Ficino’s translations and commentaries. Given that Ficino had been 
considered for centuries as the principal source for understanding Plato’s oeuvre, it is 
necessary to examine his interpretation of Plato’s dialogues before investigating how the 
Protagorean rhetoric, and sophistry in general, affected sixteenth-century culture. 
 
44 A. Capras, Agon Logon. Il Protagora di Platone tra eristica e commedia, Milano: Edizioni Universitarie 
di Lettere Economia Diritto, 2001 (passim). 
 23 
                                                        
 
4. Marsilio Ficino’s interpretation of sophists 
 
With his translations and interpretations of Plato’s works, Marsilio Ficino had a special 
role in the recovery of ancient sophistry in the Renaissance. Thanks to Ficino’s 
translations and commentaries on Plato’s dialogues, European scholars gained access to 
Platonic texts that had only been partially or indirectly known in the Middle Ages. He 
was also the author of original works in Latin and in the vernacular, the latter written 
with the aim of reaching a broad public, including the emerging middle class of 
Florentine traders, which was involved in politics and cultural life. His translations, 
commentaries and original works have influenced Western culture in a number of fields, 
including philosophy, philology, religious studies and psychology. Scholars are still 
exploring the impact of Ficino’s oeuvre on the early modern and modern world. After 
receiving an Aristotelian education, Ficino was introduced to the milieu of Cosimo de’ 
Medici who, at the beginning of the 1460s, asked Ficino to translate a Greek manuscript 
of Plato’s oeuvre. Ficino’s life coincided closely with the rebirth of Platonism and the 
associated ancient traditions. Ficino’s complete translation of Plato’s works was 
published in 1484, and the complete series of his commentaries in 1496. Ficino’s 
interpretation of Platonism immediately became the main reference for all the European 
culture, and he played an influential role as the most authoritative interpreter of Plato 
until the nineteenth century.45 
45 See A. Carlini. “Marsilio Ficino e il testo di Platone.” Marsilio Ficino. Fonti, testi, fortuna. Eds. S. 
Gentile and S. Toussaint. Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2006. 25-64. 
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The rediscovery of the sophists’ works by Marsilio Ficino is a sort of duplication 
of what ironically happened with Plato’s dialogues. On the one hand, he is considered an 
alter Plato who revived the Platonic metaphysics conceived against sophists; on the other 
hand, he is the major author involved in the rebirth of sophistry because of his expansive 
translations and interpretations of Plato’s texts, where sophists and their arguments are 
often protagonists. 
In his commentaries, Ficino is certainly on Plato’s side against Gorgias, 
Protagoras and the other terrible enemies of Socratic and Platonic philosophy, but at the 
same time he is forced to explain the sophistic perspective reported by Plato. In other 
words, Ficino experiences the impossibility of reviving Platonism without reviving 
sophistic rhetoric at the same time, so that the new diffusion of Plato’s oeuvre through 
Europe beginning at the end of the fifteenth century brought a new awareness of the 
ancient sophists. 
If it is true that Ficino’s translation and interpretation of Plato had been 
considered as a main source by the European public, at least until the new philological 
enterprises in the nineteenth century, one should also consider that sophists had been read 
mostly from the Ficinian perspective. There were surely other sources, such as the 
skeptic’s texts and ancient historiography, but it is certain that Ficino, thanks to his 
philological and philosophical authority, had a central place in the libraries of early 
modern authors.  
This part of the chapter will examine Ficino’s commentaries on Plato’s dialogues 
about sophistry, particularly The Sophist, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Protagoras, and 
Gorgias. Ficino’s commentary on The Sophist is the only one published in a critical 
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edition with an extended introduction by M.J.B. Allen.46 For the others we can count on 
an English translation and no specific study. 
Plato’s The Sophist is conceived in order to demonstrate the real identity of the 
sophist as an imposter, a character diametrically opposed to the philosopher. The 
dialogue establishes a specific meaning of the term “sophist,” which is defined as a 
completely negative figure and relegated to the rank of false wise man. In fact, in 
imitating the philosopher, the sophist simulates a knowledge that he does not have. 
Beyond this general definition, Plato desires to catch the specific nature of the sophist 
who typically hides himself and, in so doing, maintains his reputation in the city. 
A comparison of the two kinds of image-making arts, proposed by one of the 
characters of the dialogue called the Stranger, serves in unmasking the sophist. Plato calls 
“icastic” the art that makes a likeness and “fantastic” the art that creates semblance. The 
first is practiced by the true painter or sculptor, who tries to reproduce faithfully the 
original, the second by the falsifying artist, who conveys the illusion of perfect 
proportions. Like the second type of painter, the sophist pretends to render the truth and 
dissimulates his true intention through a skillful manipulation of appearances.  The 
sophist is not a naive imitator but rather a practitioner of a fantastic verbal art, someone 
who talks about what actually does not exist. 
In an ingenious move, throughout his dialogue, Plato poses his champion, the 
philosopher, as a new cultural model – indeed, an eternal form – and the sophist as the 
anti-hero needing to be unmasked. Beyond analogous to the fantastic painter, the sophist 
is an ignorant and venal deceiver, a juggler of phantasms, greedy and ambitious, and far 
46 M. J. B. Allen. Icastes: Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1989. 
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from being a teacher since his art is far from reproducing truth. Ficino’s commentary 
follows and supports Plato’s condemnation of the sophist as a false and twisted image of 
the philosopher: “Finally the sophist is ignorant. He is a feigner and manipulator of 
phantasms, and an avaricious and ambitious refuter”.47  
The definition of the sophist and the features of his art mentioned above are not 
only important for an understanding of the approach of Plato and Ficino, which 
influenced Western culture for centuries, but also for preparing our exploration of the 
debate over sophistry and poetry as a fantastic art in chapter four, especially regarding the 
debate between Torquato Tasso and Jacopo Mazzoni. 
 Ficino’s commentary on the Euthydemus presents a defense of those who 
contemplate the truth, the philosophers, against the sophists’ attacks, which, in the 
beginning, deceive and then disappoint listeners. The commentary pays particular 
attention to the extremely dangerous type of eristic sophistry and to two of its 
representatives, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Ficino highlights how as the dialogue 
proceeds Plato gradually extends his critique to all kinds of sophistry, which become 
games or artifacts conceived in order to enmesh the audience. The best weapon against 
this sophistic practice is the clarification of terms and how specific words relate to each 
other: “Socrates says that the entire school of Sophists is a game of words, and that they 
utterly conceal the nature of things, and that their crafty barbs can be neutralised only by 
an exposition of words and by distinctions of meaning.”48 
47 “Denique sophista est ignorans, phantasmatum fictor et praestigiator, avarus ambitiosusque redargutor” 
(Allen. Icastes. 277-278). 
48 A. Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. Ficino on Plato. Shepheard-Walwyn: London, 2006. 76. “Tum 
Socrates universum sophistarum gymnasium ait, ludum esse verborum, eosque rerum naturam omnino 
latere, atque artificiosas illorum telas, sola verborum expositione significationisque distinctione posse 
dissolve” (M. Ficino. Opera Omnia. Basileae: Ex officina Henricpetrina, 1576. 1301). 
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 In summarizing Plato’s dialogue, Ficino has the opportunity to focus on the 
relationship between sophistry and poetry, which is not actually stated by Plato in his 
Euthydemus: “note that the common abuse of the art of rhetoric, such as is practiced by 
the Sophists, is directly repudiated as a kind of wicked enchantment which always strives 
to infect men’s minds with poisonous disturbances. For a similar reason he [i.e. Plato] 
denounces the abuse of poetry in other dialogues.” 49   Generally speaking, Ficino’s 
opinion on poetry is shifty; on the one hand, he agrees with Plato’s Republic in 
condemning a particular kind of poetry for its effect on citizens; on the other hand, he 
appreciates a different kind of poetry and praises several ancient and modern poets.50 In 
the specific case of the Euthydemus, Ficino considers poetry and sophistry alike because 
of their common effect on men’s souls; indeed, verses as well as speeches bring listeners 
into a world of false opinions. 
 Ficino interprets the last part of the Euthydemus as an extension of Plato’s 
condemnation to all of rhetorical art, for rhetoric in general keeps listeners away from 
metaphysics as well as moral and political philosophy: 
 
Soon afterwards he moves down from the Sophist to the rhetorician, for they both 
make a false show of civic virtue, as we read in Gorgias; and the Sophist feigns 
the contemplative nature of the philosopher, while the rhetorician feigns the 
philosopher’s moral training, both far from the truth. But Socrates shows that 
49  Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 78. “Attende iterum comunem hic oratoriae artis abusum 
sophisticae similem prorsus vituperari, tanquam fascinationis maleficae speciem, ubique ad inficiendos 
perturbationibus animos venefice contendentem. Simili quadam ratione communem poesis abusum alibi 
detestatur” (Ficino. Opera. 1302). 
50 The relationship between Ficino and Plato on the value of poetry is accurately analyzed by M. J. B. 
Allen. Synoptic Art. Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation. Olschki: Firenze, 1998. 93-
123. 
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while rhetoricians and orators profess to be both philosophers and statesmen, they 
are completely useless in both capacities.51  
 
The passage above is explicitly connected to the Gorgias, where Plato disqualifies 
rhetorical art as a mere practice of persuasion. But before expanding our analysis to 
Ficino’s commentary on this dialogue, it is useful to analyze his commentaries on two 
other dialogues, the Theaetetus and Protagoras, in which Plato displays the sophistic 
gnoseology, or theory of knowledge. 
 In his commentary on the Theaetetus, Ficino summarizes Protagoras’ point of view 
as it is presented by Plato in the dialogue: individual experiences and perceptions are the 
basis of any type of knowledge, and man is the measure of all things; therefore, anything 
one perceives must be true, even when one’s perceptions reveal opposite conclusions. 
Ficino considers imagination, the classical medium between senses and intellect, as a part 
of this process: 
 
Then he [i.e. Plato] introduces the definition given by Protagoras, who says that 
knowledge is sense. Indeed, Protagoras considers man to be the measure of all 
things: of things that exist as ‘are’, and of things that do not exist as ‘are not’; and 
however anything appears to anyone, that is how it is. For, he says, all things are 
as they are perceived through the senses; those which are perceived as imaginings 
51 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 80. “Mox a sophista descendit ad rhetorem: uterque enim civilem 
virtutem falso profitetur, ut scribitur in Gorgia: et sophista quidem philosophi speculationem, rhetor autem 
moralem philosophi disciplinam simulat procul a vero. Ostendit autem rhetores atque oratores dum se, et 
philosophos, et civiles simul profitentur, esse ad utrunque prorsus inutiles” (Ficino. Opera. 1303). 
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are therefore perceived by an inner sense. Thus he would have it that knowledge 
is sense.52 
 
In Ficino, the faculty of imagination (phantasia) is often central in the process of 
knowledge creation as well as in the relationship between human beings and demons. 53 
But no metaphysical or demonic dimension seems involved in the passage above. Rather, 
Ficino connects imagination to Protagoras’ gnoseology, so that relativism is clearly 
related to man’s ability to rework perceptions. 
 The remainder of the commentary summarizes the conflict between Socrates and 
Protagoras - who is not actually present as a character - in the manner set by Plato in his 
dialogue: an exposition and confutation of Protagoras’ relativism. One can consider this 
conflict between Plato and Protagoras as an example of a broader war between two 
opposite cultural fronts: on the one side, Socratic and Platonic philosophy based on the 
Eleatic tradition of Parmenides (V c. BCE), Melissus of Samos (V c. BCE) and Zeno of 
Elea (c. 490–430 BCE); on the opposite side, Protagoras and other authors, including 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 560-420 BCE), Homer, and Empedocles (V c. BCE), who 
presented similar theories. Through the text, the reader may learn the main features of 
both traditions. 
52 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 35. “Affert post haec Protagorae definitionem, scientiam sensum 
esse dicentis. Hominem quippe Protagoras rerum omnium mensuram esse censet, exsistentium quidem ut 
sunt non existentium autem, ut non sunt, et quaelibet cuique talia esse, qualia cuique videntur. Quales 
enim res quaeque sunt, tales sentiri. Quales sentiuntur, tales phantasiae, id est, sensui interiori videri. Quo 
effici vult, ut sensus scientia sit” (Ficino. Opera. 1274). 
53 The connection between sophistry and imagination is extensively treated by M. J. B. Allen.  Icastes. 117-
204. On demonology and imagination in The Sophist see also T. Katinis. “Daemonica machinamenta tra 
Platone e l’Umanesimo: a partire da un passo del commento di Ficino al Sofista.” Arte e daimon. Ed. D. 
Angelucci. Quodlibet: Macerata, 2003. 83-96; G. Giglioni. “Coping with Inner and Outer Demons: 
Marsilio Ficino’s Theory of the Imagination.” Diseases of the Imagination and Imaginary Disease in the 
Early Modern Period. Ed. Y. Haskell. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012. 19-50. 
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 Unlike in the Theaetetus, in the Protagoras Socrates confronts Protagoras as an 
actual character of the dialogue. Ficino’s commentary emphasizes Plato’s/Socrates’ 
ability in arguing against Protagoras but also shows the rhetorical art so skillfully 
performed by the sophist of Abdera. Additionally, Ficino connects Protagoras with the 
theologi veteres, the ancient philosophers-rulers-theologists whose thoughts would agree 
with the sophist’s oration. In other words, Protagoras appears as an important part of 
ancient Greek culture and of broader human history under the guidance of divine 
Providence, as we will see further in this chapter. 
 At the very beginning of his commentary on the Protagoras, Ficino presents 
Aesclepius and Plato as brothers, both sons of Apollo, the former dedicated to healing the 
human body, the latter to healing human souls. That said, the worst disease of the soul is 
false opinion, and sophistry is the most dangerous vehicle for spreading the contagion.  
 Ficino considers both Socrates and Plato as emissaries of God: 
 
There survives among the Greeks that absolutely true saying about Plato to the effect 
that Phoebus begot two sons in particular, Aesclepius and Plato: Aesclepius to heal 
bodies, and Plato to heal souls. All the followers of Socrates bear witness that 
Socrates, too, had been sent by God to purify men’s souls. 
 Now disease of the soul is seen to consist in false opinions and bad ways of 
living. But there is no easier way of imparting such a great evil to innocent souls 
than by means of the Sophists.54  
54 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 65. “Extat apud Graecos verissimum de Platone dictum, Phoebum 
videlicet duos praecipue filios genuisse, Aesculapium, et Platonem. Aesculapium quidem qui corporibus, 
Platonem vero qui animis mederetur. Socratem quoque Socratici omnes purgandorum gratia animorum a 
Deo missum fuisse testantur. Morbus autem animi in falsis opinionibus malisque moribus videtur 
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A similar argument can be found in Ficino’s De vita libri tres (Three Books of Life), 
which was intended to be a medical-magical-philosophical treatise on how to heal both 
body and soul and keep them healthy. The De vita is one of the most original of Ficino’s 
works and eventually became a bestseller and source for similar treatises written in the 
early modern era. In the preface of the first book of the De vita, Ficino presents Galenus, 
instead of Aesclepius, as a healer of bodies, while Plato is still kept as the healer of 
souls.55 Clearly, Ficino exploits the metaphor of the true philosopher as a good physician 
as a rhetorical device for defeating the poisonous art of sophistry.  
 In his commentary to the Protagoras, Ficino presents Platonism as an antidote 
against ignorance and sophistry as the opposite of philosophy: 
 
Philosophers, of course, are those who assiduously seek the truth from simple 
love of truth itself, while Sophists pursue opinion from love of opinion. For 
Sophists are like traders and dealers in learning: they indiscriminately assemble 
from all directions a variety of opinions which they can think about or talk about 
in any way they choose and which they later sell like merchandise to rich young 
men in exchange for wealth and vainglory.56 
consistere. Tantum vero malum ingenuis animis haud tam facile ab aliis, quam a sophistis solet inferri” 
(Ficino. Opera. 1296). 
55 M. Ficino. Three Books of Life. Eds. C. V. Kaske and J. R. Clarck. Binghamton, NY: Renaissance 
Society of America, 1989. 102: “Ego sacerdos minimus patres habui duos: Ficinum medicum, Cosmum 
Medicem. Ex illo natus sum, ex isto renatus. Ille quidem me Galieno tum medico tum Platonico 
commendavit; hic autem divino consecravit me Platoni. Et hic similiter atque ille Marsilium medico 
destinavit: Galienus quidem corporum, Plato vero medicus animorum.” 
56 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 65. “Profecto philosophi sunt qui veritatem studiose quaerunt, 
veritatis duntaxat ipsius amore. Sophistae vero opinionem affectant, similiter opinionis amore. Hi enim 
quasi disciplinarum mercatores et caupones, undique opiniones absque delectu varias congregant, tum ad 
excogitandum, tum ad dicendum utcunque libuerit pertinentes, quas deinde quasi venales divitibus 
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According to Ficino, sophists’ influence on young men is similar to the songs of the 
sirens and the deadly draughts of Circe on Ulysses’ men. 57 Illusion and deception remain 
the key terms for defining sophistic effects on citizens. Following the same path, the 
commentary then focuses on the confutation of Protagoras’s opinion of virtue. The 
sophist argues that he is able to teach the virtue even if he cannot define it, or, in other 
words, he is able to convey to students what he does not know. From a Platonic point of 
view, Proatgoras’ argument is untenable, for there is no true teaching without knowledge 
of the eternal forms. In other words, only the knowledge of the metaphysical dimension, 
which is the only true being, can guarantee a truthful communication.     
  Protagora’s oration presented in Plato’s dialogue (Protagoras 320C-328D) is one 
of the most popular speeches in classical literature. In his so-called “great discourse,” 
Protagoras narrates a myth involving the two brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus as 
well as Zeus and Hermes in order to present the development of human civilization as 
dependent on the art of politics, a divine gift. Ficino appreciated Protagoras’ speech, for it 
confirmed the tradition of the theologi veteres (“ancient wise men”) that he presented in 
its Theologia platonica (“Platonic Theology”), published in 1482. According to Ficino, 
human history is a progression from darkness to the light brought by Christian 
Revelation. On this path, Pagan mythical figures, such as Orpheus and Hermes 
Trismegistus, as well as Pagan authors, such as Plato (all considered theologi veteres), 
vendant adolescentibus, divitiarum et inanis gloriae gratia. Itaque nihil unquam habent pensi, utrum vera 
vel bona an contra, aut ipsi discant, aut alios doceant, sed et confundunt, et passim errores effundunt  
quotidie plurimos, nulla prorsus rectae elationis habita ratione, modo et divitias cumulent, et vulgarem 
gloriam consequantur” (Ficino. Opera. 1296-1297). 
57 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 65. Ficino. Opera. 1297. 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                                     
civilized mankind and prepared the coming of the true religion in the world. 58 It is 
possible that Ficino also found evidence of the proximity of Protagoras’ speech to his 
theory in other sources. For example, he might have known the story transmitted by 
Lucius Flavius Philostratus’ (c. 170-c. 247) Lives of the Sophists I.10 about the father of 
Protagoras, Maeandrius, who convinced the Persian king Xerxes to accept the young 
Protagoras as a student of the Persian magoi (“wise men”).59  
 In either case, Ficino’s commentary on the dialogue shows a clear appreciation for 
Protagoras’ words: “in his words Protagoras puts forward some mysteries of the ancients 
as being worthy of note. For although he is a Sophist, it is to his credit that he has 
actually read some good works; and although in Plato’s account he speaks at great length, 
it is to his credit that he introduces some useful points.”60 
 In accordance with one of the main strains of his philosophy, Ficino tries to find a 
consistency between the Judaic-Christian and pagan traditions without excluding 
sophistry, which he believes is connected to the history of Revelation. More specifically, 
Ficino considers the myth narrated by Protagoras in his oration to be a useful pagan 
allegory for the Hebrew-Christian message. In fact, the story that involves the 
unexperienced Epimetheus, the repairer Prometheus, and the wise Jupiter agrees with the 
biblical interpretation of mankind as being born from the earth as a last creation of God. 
In Ficino’s words: “In the same way, remember that, according to Moses, man was 
created from earth and was created last. Again, in the Mosaic tradition, the world had a 
58 See M. Ficino. Platonic Theology. Eds. M. J. B. Allen and J. Hankins. Vol. I. Cambridge MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2001. viii-ix. 
59 J. Dillon and G. Tania, eds. The Greek Sophists. 5. 
60 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 68. “Ad haec Protagoras longis probat ambagibus doceri posse 
virtutem. In quibus notanda quedam priscorum refert mystria. Decet emquamvis sophista sit, nonnulla 
etiam legisse bona, et cum prolixe loquatur apud Platonem, utilia quaedam adducere” (Ficino. Opera. 
1297-1298). 
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beginning.” 61  The Ficinian interpretation converts Protagoras into a servant of true 
religion and theology.  
 Ficino also interprets other segments of the oration allegorically in order to render 
Protagoras consistent with Platonism and Christian religion. Two segments are 
particularly significant. First, the fire given by Prometheus to civilize mankind refers to 
the Platonic dialectic, “because fire, like dialectic, divides, resolves, defines, and 
demonstrates, and because the rational faculty, like fire, illumines the intellect, fires the 
will, and raises both on high.” 62 Interestingly, according to Ficino, the myth, as narrated 
by the sophist, should be interpreted as praise for Platonism, which is apparently not a 
paradox from Ficino’s perspective. Second, the intervention of Jupiter, which results in 
the gift of civic virtue to men, represents God’s giving of the capacity for understanding 
and practicing justice for the common good.63 
 Ficino’s entire allegorical interpretation of Protagoras’ oration might be read as an 
attempt to answer a central question: why does Plato allow Protagoras to perform so long 
speech? Ficino must have seen here a sign of divine intervention that brought the sophist 
Protagoras to use his rhetorical skills in support of the true philosophy and religion. This 
is probably the most original of Ficino’s contributions to the interpretation of this 
61 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 69. “Proinde memento hominem hic quemadmodum et apud 
Moysen ex terra, et postremo creatum, item more quasi Mosaico mundum initium habuisse” (Ficino. 
Opera. 1298). For the connection between the Mosaic tradition and Protagoras’ oration see also Ficino’s 
letter Lex et Iustitia in M. Ficino. Lettere I. Epistolarum familiarium liber I. Ed. S. Gentile. Olschki: 
Firenze, 1990. 17-18. 
62 Farndell. Gardens of Philosophy. 69. “Quia ignis similiter dividit, resolvit, definit atque demonstrat. Item 
quia rationalis facultas ignis instar illuminat intellectum, accendit voluntatem, et utrunque elevat sublimia” 
(Ficino. Opera. 1298). For the myth of Prometheus and its allegorical interpretation, see also M. J. B. 
Allen. Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary. University of California Press: Berkeley-Los Angeles-
London, 1975. 238-245. On Prometheus in Ficino’s works see M. J. B. Allen. “Prometheus among the 
Florentines: Marsilio Ficino on the Myth of Triadic Power.” Rinascimento 51 (2011): 27-44. 
63 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 69. Ficino. Opera. 1298. 
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dialogue, an interpretation that meant to mitigate Plato’s war with sophistry, at least 
temporary. 
 In his commentary on the Protagoras, Ficino mentions several Platonic dialogues 
that focus on attacking sophistic rhetoricians and their dangerous art. He quotes the 
Sophist, the Hippias, the Euthydemus, and the Gorgias. The latter, already quoted in the 
commentary on the Euthydemus, is particularly significant, for it plays a relevant role in 
the broader fifteenth-century debate on the validity of rhetoric, as we saw in the first part 
of this chapter. 
 Ficino first read the Gorgias in the years 1454-1455, when he knew no Greek, in 
Bruni’s Latin translation, copying it for his specific needs. 64  Among the several 
marginalia that Ficino wrote on his manuscript, there is one reference to Gorgias 457a, 
which is particularly significant. Ficino notes “nulla ars mala est sed qui male utitur arte 
(sic)” (“no art is bad, but the art that is not used properly”).65 This is evidence of Ficino’s 
interest in the distinction made by the character Gorgias between the value of rhetoric and 
that of the people who practice it. This detail certainly does not affect Ficino’s general 
aversion to sophistic rhetoric; nevertheless, Gorgias’ exculpation of rhetoric was just as 
remarkable to Ficino as it had been to George of Trebizond and will be to Speroni. 
When Ficino accomplished his own translation and commentary of the Gorgias, as a part 
of the rebirth of Platonism, he did not hesitate in condemning the sophistic 
rhetoricians and decided not to develop his note on Gorgias 457a any further. 
64 Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 337. Venier refers to the manuscript S 14 sup. 
(Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana). 
65 They are all published in Venier, ed. Platonis Gorgias Leonardo Aretino interprete. 371. 
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 At the beginning of his commentary, Ficino presents a similarity between sophists, 
poets, and public orators. In fact, sophists lead people into ignorance, poets disturb the 
harmony of the soul with their pleasant verses, and orators agitate and mislead the 
audience. The length of the following citation is justified by the clearness of Ficino’s 
explanation of Plato’s broad attack on whoever diverts men’s souls from the truth: 
 
Since two things – consciousness and emotion – wield the greatest power in the 
soul, the Sophist, under the guise of truth, divert men’s consciousness towards 
what is false, while the popular poets, using the bait of harmonious pleasure, 
frequently hurl the emotions into inharmonious upheavals. Lastly, the popular 
declaimers deceive men’s understanding with their false notions and drive human 
emotions into multifarious activities. 
 For this reason, since it is through the assiduity of these people that the 
minds of men are made to grow sickly through false opinions and harmful 
emotions, Plato, the physician of men’s souls, draws us, quite unreservedly, far 
away from the Sophists and also, to some extent, from orators and poets. Indeed, 
he banishes all Sophists, wherever they are. 
 However, he does not ban all poets, but merely those who fabricate 
disgraceful accounts of the gods and those who are keen to repeat and recount the 
agitations in men’s souls; and these he does not ban from every place, but from 
the city, that is, from the crowd of the young and ignorant who are easily inclined 
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to become agitated and to fail to appreciate the allegorical meanings intended by 
the poets.66 
 
Ficino highlights Plato’s effort to preserve man’s soul from any kind of disease. The 
reference to the condemnation of a particular kind of poet, specifically those harmful for 
the city, connects Plato’s Gorgias to the Republic and strengthens the link between the 
question of the validity of rhetoric and the creation of the ideal state. This link also 
concerns orators, as Ficino specifies in the following passage: 
 
But to go back to the orators: Plato does not reproach all of these, either, but only 
those who assiduously apply themselves to persuading their hearers of anything 
they please, without any reason or discrimination, whether it be something bad or 
good, a false principle or a true one, or whether it be rhetoric to excite compassion 
or stir sedition, or rhetoric based on conjecture.67 
 
66 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 109. “Cum duo quaedam in animo potissima sint, cognitio et 
affectus, cognitionem quidem sophistae sub veritatis specie ad falsa detorquent, affectum vero populares 
poetae sub concinnae voluptatis esca in dissonas perturbationes saepe praecipitant. Oratores denique 
populares tum cognitionem falsis decipiunt coniecturis, tum affectum in motus varios concitant. 
Quapropter cum horum opera mentes hominum tum falsis opinionibus, tum perniciosis affectibus 
aegrotare cogantur, Plato humanorum medicus animorum nos a sophistis quidem omnino, ab oratoribus 
quoque atque poetis quodammodo procul abducit, profecto sophistas et undique et omnes exterminat, 
poetas autem neque omnes, sed illos qui vel turpia de diis et fingunt, vel perturbationes animos acrius 
imitantur, et referunt, neque undique, sed ex urbe, id est, ex iuvenum ignorantumque turba, qui in 
perturbationes admodum sunt proclives, et allegoricum poetarum non penetrant sensum” (Ficino. Opera. 
1315). 
67 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 109. “Sed ut revertamur ad oratores, hos quoque non omnes Plato 
vituperat, sed eos duntaxat, qui ad id incumbunt assidue, ut quicquid libuerit, quacunque valeant ratione 
audientibus persuadeant absque delectu, sive malum id est, sive bonum, seu falsa sit ratio, seu vera, vel 
commiseratio, vel concitatio, vel coniectura” (Ficino. Opera. 1315). 
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On the contrary, the “true orator” (“legitimus orator”) is required to compose speeches 
that persuade listeners toward the common good, aiming for what is pleasant to God 
rather than men’s ears.68 According to Ficino’s perspective, since Platonism anticipates 
the Christian religion, the ultimate goal of any human activity, including good rhetoric, is 
the divine sphere. 
 The commentary then focuses on the dialogue between Gorgias and Socrates, where 
Ficino highlights Gorgias’ incapacity in defining his specific kind of rhetoric. Gorgias, 
pushed by Socrates’ interrogation, is finally obliged to describe his rhetoric as a practice 
for persuading people in political contest as well as in court. Furthermore, the rhetorician 
presented by Gorgias does not have any knowledge of the content he conveys and can 
persuade only an ignorant audience.  
 Nevertheless, as Ficino recognizes, Plato’s Gorgias does not condemn all rhetoric. 
Indeed, Socrates presents a philosophical rhetoric to oppose the popular or sycophantic 
rhetoric that Gorgias applies. The former is an art that leads to the true good; the latter is 
only an empirical practice that leads to pleasure. Ficino points out that Plato, “who is by 
far the most eloquent of all” (“longe omnium eloquentissimus”), approves philosophical 
rhetoric as a healthy art comparable to medicine.69  
 As mentioned previously, Ficino chose not to recall the strong argument of Gorgias 
regarding the necessity of distinguishing between rhetoric and evil rhetoricians, which is 
proven by the fact that his note on Bruni’s translation does not have any place in his 
commentary. Indeed, the insertion of Gorgias’ argument would have strongly challenged 
Ficino’s defense of Socrates/Plato and weakened the Platonic front. For the same reasons, 
68 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 110. Ficino. Opera. 1315. 
69 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy. 113. Ficino. Opera. 1317. 
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Ficino proposes his interpretation in order to transform the powerful Callicles’ attack 
against Socrates’ method of arguing (Gorgias 482c-483c) – analyzed above – into a 
Platonic weapon against sophists: “when Callicles corrects Socrates for being too keen on 
subtleties, understand that Sophists, in the person of Socrates, are being refuted by 
Plato.” 70  As James Hankins notes, in this case “Ficino is compelled to subvert the 
integrity of Callicles’ dialogical persona” in the attempt of directing Callicles’ words in a 
Platonic direction.71 This attempt, as much as the attempt to present Protagoras’s “great 
discourse” as a prefiguration of the true philosophy and religion, unveils quite an 
interesting aspect of Ficino’s own rhetoric, which, in some respects, is not so far from the 
sophists he condemned, although different in its goal. 
 Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, George of Trebizond, Teodoro Gaza, and Marsilio 
Ficino represented the most important interpreters of ancient sophistry as the first to 
recover it through Latin translations and commentaries on Plato’s work, the most 
important source in these respects. Plato was not only significant as the principal vehicle 
for sophistic speeches, arguments and theories, but also as the creator of sophist 
characters in dialogues who express feelings, passions, conflicting aspects of their 
personality, and, finally, their humanity. Plato made them more alive than Parmenides, 
the Eleatic philosopher that he highly estimated, and as much as Socrates, his mentor and 
voice in his dialogues. Sperone Speroni and his contemporaries found in Plato’s 
dialogues and their fifteenth-century commentaries a paramount resource and path to 
explore the fascinating world of the sophists. Even more, they found the most dramatic 
70 Farndell, ed. Gardens of Philosophy, 115. “Proinde ubi Callicles Socratem corrigit quasi argutiarum 
nimium studiosum, intellige sub persona Socratis Sophistas a Platone redargui” (Ficino. Opera. 1318). 
71  For an analysis of Ficino’s concordist tendency in mitigating Plato’s hostility toward sophists and 
weakening sophists’ arguments, see Hankins. Plato. i. 325-328. 
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Speroni and the sophists 
 
Sofista è imitatore, il quale non è niente e simiglia ogni cosa […]  
sofista è lo esser nostro, perché non è e pare essere 
Speroni. In difesa dei sofisti (Opere. V. 432) 
 
 
1. Orator et philosophus 
 
Sperone Speroni degli Alvarotti was Pietro Pomponazzi's pupil at the University of 
Bologna, where he was educated as an Aristotelian. He taught logic and philosophy at the 
University of Padua and in 1541 was elected “principe” of the “Accademia degli 
infiammati.” Speroni lived in Rome from 1560 to 1564 and then 1573 to 1578, attracted 
by the cultural environment of the city that he found so different from Padua and 
definitely more fascinanting. Forced to go back to Padua, in 1580 he wrote to his 
daughter Giulia of how he wanted to spend his life in Rome: “è la mia intenzione di non 
morire in Padova, ove voi siete, ma a Roma ove sapete che io voglio andare.”72 Speroni 
did not succeed in his attempt and died in Padua, where he was buried. After his death, he 
was represented in various portraits up through the eighteenth century. At least two of 
these portraits have an inscription honoring the author for his achievements. The 
72  Quoted in M. Milani. “L’ultimo testamento di Sperone Speroni.” Sperone Speroni. Padova: Editoriale 
Programma, 1989. 269-273. 270. 
 42 
                                                        
inscription under the monument made by Marcantonio de Sordi in Palazzo della Ragione 
(Padua) says “Sperono Speronio Sapientiss[imo] Eloquentiss[imo]”, while the portrait by 
Hieronimus David and published in Giacomo Filippo Tomasini, Illustrium virorum 
elogia iconibus exornata (Patavii 1630) says “Speronus Speronius Patavinus Philosophus 
et Orator.” 73  Although the two inscriptions might suggest a peaceful coexistence of 
philosophy and rhetoric in Speroni’s intellectual life, several of his works witness to his 
scanty interest in metaphysics and rejection of the most dogmatic aspects of the Platonic 
tradition. 
Between 1560 and 1564 Speroni attended meetings of the Roman “Accademia 
delle notti vaticane”, founded by cardinal Carlo Borromeo, where he gave speeches and 
commented on Aristotle’s Rhetoric.74 As a member of the academy, Speroni chose the 
pseudonym Nestor, the Greek mythological character, model of rhetorical skills and 
author of several speeches in both the Odyssey and Iliad. Homer describes Nestor as a 
wonderful orator, whose words streamed like honey from his mouth (Iliad I, 248-9). The 
pseudonym is mostly appropriate considering that Speroni was a popular orator both in 
and out of the academic environment. After he quit teaching philosophy at the University 
of Padua in 1528, Speroni kept participating actively in the Paduan civic life until his 
death, first as a member of the Council and then as a magistrate of the city for several 
73 For a study on the iconographic tradition, see E. Saccomani. “‘… Dal naturale, come fe già Tiziano…’ I 
ritratti di Sperone Speroni.” Sperone Speroni. Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1989. 257-267. 
74 On this Roman academy, mostly unexplored, see L. Berra. L`Accademia delle Notti Vaticane fondata da 
San Carlo Borromeo. Roma: Bretschneider, 1915; and A. Sala. Biografia di San Carlo Borromeo. Milano: 
Ditta Boniardi-Pogliani di Ermenegildo Besozzi, 1858. 440-442. Sermons and other documents are 
collected in G. A. Sassi, Noctes Vaticanae seu sermones habiti in Academia a S. Carlo Borromeo Romae 
in Palatio Vaticano istituta. Mediolani: apud Joseph Marellum, 1748. Speroni’s broader partecipation in 
the Roman intellectual life is described in F. Cammarosano. La vita e le opere di Sperone Speroni. Empoli: 
Tipografia R. Noccioli, 1920. 134-139; and in M. Pozzi. “Nota introduttiva.” Trattatisti del Cinquecento. 
Ed. M. Pozzi. Tome II. Milano: Ricciardi, 1996. 478-481. 
 43 
                                                        
years. Furthermore, because of his rhetorical ability, he served as an emissary to Venice 
for a variety of purposes.75 
This chapter examines Speroni’s defense of rhetoric with particular regard to the 
role of ancient sophists and their perspectives. Remarkably, this defense often addresses 
the ancient sophists and their ideas about language, communication and truth as models 
for his time, while his criticism of Plato’s dialogues against sophists shows that when 
rhetoric and philosophy are incompatible, Speroni chooses the first, even in its most 
controversial form. In his monograph Jean-Louis Fournel underlined the uniqueness of 
Speroni’s position towards sophistry in early modern and modern culture. Far before the 
recovery of the sophists’ works in the Ninteenth Century, from Hegel to Nietzsche, 
Speroni understood that Plato’s position towards the sophists misleads the reader and 
does not allow him to understand their original message. 76  This brings Speroni to 
reconsider the sophists’ perspectives as valuable tools for understanding the nature of the 
human world and operating properly in public life. He uncovers the ancient enemies of 
Plato as an alternative to a large part of Western philosophical literature. Speroni displays 
his proposal in several ways and through different genres of vernacular literature that 
must be examined in detail to appreciate its revolutionary effects. 
 The first part of this chapter addresses those works in which Speroni presents his 
ground-breaking approach to sophistry, defending the ancient rhetoricians and their 
75 See Pozzi. “Nota introduttiva.” Trattatisti del Cinquecento. 472-474. 
76 J.-L. Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone Speroni: liberté de la parole et règles de l'écriture. Marburg: 
Hitzeroth, 1990. 218. “Speroni a parfaitement saisi que, pour comprendre la pensée des sophistes, il 
convenait de lire sans préjugés les interventions que Platon leur prête dans ses dialogues et de ne pas 
s'attarder aux seules considerations négatives formulées par Socrate. Au XVIème siècle, défendre les 
sophistes ne va pas de soi. On ne possède évidemment pas d'éditions de leurs fragments puisque celles-ci 
ne verront le jour qu'à la fin du XIXème siècle, en liaison avec les réflexions sur les présocratiques 
conduites par Hegel puis par Nietzsche.” 
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perspective, proposing it as the most valuable one for public life, and attacking Socrates 
and Plato for having unfairly blamed the sophists. The second part of the chapter explores 
the Dialogo della retorica, especially the parts less-considered by scholars, until now, 
with a particular focus on the last of Brocardo’s speeches. In all his writings, Speroni 
maintains his double nature of philosopher and orator, and revitalizes the long-lasting 
conflict between metaphysical tradition and rhetoric. He prefers to convey his ideas 
through flexible and even ambiguous literary forms, rather than treatises, which confirms 
his preference for dialogue and oratory as a most appropriate approach to the human 
world. Furthermore, Speroni is the first author to write extensively in the vernacular 
about one of the most relevant cultural conflicts of the Western tradition, so that a public 
with no acquaintance with Latin could access this debate. 
  
 
2. Defense and rehabilitation of sophistry 
 
In Speroni's oeuvre the rehabilitation of authors such as Gorgias and Protagoras is part of 
a larger project to re-establish the central role of rhetoric in the city. Sophistic rhetoric 
should regain the significance it possessed before Socrates and Plato destroyed it and 
radically changed the history of Western culture. 
Except for Mario Pozzi’s and Raffale Girardi’s articles, and a chapter of Jean-
Louis Fournel’s book, scholars have not yet paid attention to the extensive presence of 
sophistic rhetoric in Speroni’s oeuvre. 77 In this first part of the chapter, I intend to 
77 M. Pozzi. “Speroni e il genere epidittico.” Sperone Speroni. 55-88; R. Girardi. “Ercole e il Granchio: 
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contribute to the comprehension of Speroni’s arguments supporting the ancient sophistic 
art by providing a close reading of three significant works of Speroni: Apologia dei 
dialoghi, In difesa dei Sofisti, and Contra Socrate. 78 
 
 
2.1. Rhetoric: an imperfect science for an imperfect world 
 
Speroni wrote his Apologia dei dialoghi at the end of his life, between the years 1574 and 
1575, to defend his dialogues, published for the first time in 1542, before the Catholic 
Inquisition which considered them, especially the Dialogo della Discordia and Dialogo 
della Usura, a possible threat to Christian doctrine and public morality.79 In fact, this 
work is not just a response to the Catholic Inquisition but also a deep and extended 
clarification and reinterpretation of the author’s entire oeuvre. 
 The four parts of the Apologia are not clearly connected to each other and seem 
contradictory on several points. Scholars who have studied this work hold different 
positions about its general meaning and level of coherency, but for our purposes we will 
sidestep this issue and look directly at the massive presence of sophistry in the third part, 
which presents a treasure of information and arguments about ancient sophists and their 
theories.80 This is the most extended work on the subject in Speroni’s literary production 
figure della ‘sofistica speroniana’.” Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana 167 (1990): 396-411; 
Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone Speroni. 216-220 and passim. A reference to sophistry is also in M. R. 
Davi. “Filosofia e retorica nell’opera di Sperone Speroni.” Sperone Speroni. 95-97. 
78 Unfortunately, these three works, like the majority of Speroni's production, are still waiting for a critical 
edition as well as an English translation. The passages quoted are from the reliable edition of Speroni’s 
works published in 1740. 
79 See Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone Speroni. 191-195. 
80 The main studies which discuss the general meaning of the Apologia are R. Girardi. La società del 
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and perhaps in the whole of Renaissance vernacular literature. Furthermore, if one 
considers that Speroni’s Apologia is supposed to display his real intention and defend the 
legitimacy of his entire intellectual life, then the discourse on sophistry in the third part 
must be recognized as mostly revolutionary. But even if the author were not sincere, and 
his auto-defense was a work of dissimulation, the Apologia would stand as a unique piece 
of Italian literature. 
Regardless of the author’s intention, it is striking that such a defense of the 
sophists was accepted by the Roman Inquisition. One may hypothesize either an 
indulgent censor, a particular rhetorical expertise of the author in presenting sophistry as 
acceptable, or perhaps the interesting alternative that the Roman Counter-Reformation 
environment was more indulgent with sophistry than one might have expected. An 
example of this tolerant climate could be Antonio Possevino (1533–1611) who 
emphasized the connection between the second sophistry, whose rhetorician Libanius 
was a notorious representative, and the Church fathers, like Basilius, in his Bibliotheca 
selecta, published in 1593. 81  Either way, the third part of the Apologia is the most 
appropriate start for exploring the rebirth of the sophists in Speroni’s oeuvre, for it gives 
a helpful roadmap to explore his other works. 
 The third part begins with the author’s purpose to end the Apologia, but suddenly 
it becomes the beginning of the rest of his work. In fact, Speroni thinks that he has no 
more to say on the subject, but his conscience bursts onto the scene as an independent 
dialogo. Retorica e ideologia nella letteratura conviviale del Cinquecento. Bari: Adriatica Editrice, 1989. 
81-106; J. R. Snyder. Writing the Scene of Speaking. Theories of Dialogue in the Late Italian Renaissance. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1989. 91-102; Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone Speroni. 191-
223; V. Cox. The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in its Social and Political Contexts, 
Castiglione to Galileo. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 70-78. 
81 M. Fumaroli. L’âge de l’eloquence: rhétorique et res literaria de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque 
classique. Généve: Droz, 1980. 215-6. 
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character, like Socrates’ daimon, claiming to be his invisible spirit, servant and friend of 
truth (“genio invisibile, servo ed amico alla verità.”)82 She argues that the author has to 
complete the apology of his dialogues by leaving the Ciceronian arguing in utramque 
partem and embracing the truth: “all’ultimo lasciando star gli argomenti, che far si 
vogliono disputando per l’una e l’altra parte, vaglia lo amor della verità.”83  
Then she claims that he should blame himself along with his dialogues and 
primarily the Dialogo della Discordia which - his conscience says – none of these 
arrogant sophists ever made: “la qual opra mai non fu fatta da alcun sofista di quelli 
antichi arroganti.”84 This is the first mention of sophistry in the third part of the Apologia 
and is remarkably directed towards the author himself while stressing the originality of 
the subject of the Diaologo. Beyond the explicit meaning of the accusation that Speroni 
cast towards himself, one should notice the implicit self-praise for having achieved what 
no sophist ever did. 
The speech of his conscience incites Speroni to start a new attempt, which 
actually is not the third part of the defense, but rather a first move for a new assault.85 
Speroni spends several pages arguing about the three types of decorum that should 
dignify any dialogue: the decorum of the interlocutors which are introduced in the 
dialogue (“il decoro delle persone, che si introducono nel dialogo”), the decorum of the 
writer (“il decoro dello scrittore”), and the decorum of the language (“della natura della 
favella dearticolata”).86 The second one is the most relevant for our purpose, for Speroni 
82  S. Speroni. Opere […] tratte da’ mss. Originali. Eds. N. dalle Laste and M. Forcellini. 5 tomes. Venezia: 
Appresso D. Occhi, 1740. Vol. I. 326. 
83  Ibid. 329. 
84 Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 330-331. 
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explains that anyone who writes dialogues – including himself – is able to change his 
being into any kind of character.  In other words, every author is a professional deceiver 
that persuades his readers to laugh by his comedies or cry by his tragedies. The similarity 
between this type of author and the sophist is not explicitly mentioned, but is easily 
inferred from the passage below, where Speroni compares the Protean author with the 
orator: 
  
un buon poeta comico o tragico, uso a cangiarsi nel suo poema in diversi affetti, o 
d’ira, d’odio, di crudeltà, o di femminee concupiscenze, non possa essere ben 
costumato: e dir lo stesso dell’oratore, che non insegna, ma vende a prezzo la 
orazione a chi n’ha bisogno: essendo cosa impossibile che egli commove con sue 
parole il core e l’animo di chi ascolta e resti fermo in se stesso e non è buono chi 
non è fermo nella bontà. 87 
 
The good poet, author of comedies or tragedies, who is used to imitate in his poem 
different feelings, such as rage, hate, cruelty, and lust, ought to be shameless. The same 
applies to the orator, who does not teach anything, but rather sells his speech to 
whomever needs it. Indeed, it is impossible that both poet and orator are able to move the 
public’s heart and soul with their words without changing himself; and such changeable 
people are far from being virtuous. 
 If it is true that the third part of the Apologia, including the passage above, is an 
act of self-censorship to avoid the surveillance of the Inquisition, as suggested by 
87 Ibid. 334-335. 
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Virginia Cox, then the accusation Speroni is casting on the authors of dialogues with 
immoral characters is just a further act of his own deception and while his Apologia 
becomes a mise-en-scene.88 However, what is relevant for our purpose is the similarity 
between the author of dialogues and the figure of the sophist condemned by Plato; a 
similarity inspired by Plato himself in his Euthydemus (288b-d) where Proteus is 
presented as a metaphor for any sophist because of his ability to look like whatever he 
wants. 
 After having treated the three types of decorum, Speroni brings the reader’s 
attention to rhetoric and how it is applied in the life of a city. He employs the Ciceronian 
model of orator, engaged in the republic, to argue against the Platonic rejection of 
rhetoric. 
 Plato’s trope of rhetoric as cookery, not to be considered an art but only an ability 
to please people’s desire, is formulated in his Gorgias (462b-e). Speroni explains Plato’s 
interpretation as a reaction caused by his hate for Hippias, Prodicus, Polus, Gorgias, and 
the other sophists: 
 
Platone, generalmente parlando di tutta l’arte oratoria, alcuna volta in tal bassezza 
la rivolge che alla cucina l’assimigliava; e credo per l’odio che egli portava a 
Ippia, Prodico, Polo, Gorgia e a tutta quanta sì fatta scola. 89 
 
88 See Cox. The Renaissance Dialogue. 74. 
89   Speroni. Opere. I. 358. 
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It is noteworthy that Speroni repeats his critique of Plato’s trope at least twice in other 
works of his. Indeed, in the Dialogo della retorica the character Brocardo warns his 
interlocutor Valerio to avoid a misleading opinion about the nature of rhetoric: 
 
non creggiate che la buona arte retorica, di tutte l’arti reina, sia una certa 
buffoneria da far ridere (benché egli v’abbia di quelli che alla cucina 
l’assimigliarono).90 
 
While in Dell’arte oratoria Speroni presents Plato’s argument to deny its validity and 
reaffirm oratory as a legitimate art:  
 
Platone in più luoghi apertamente suol mantenere la rettorica non essere arte, ma 
perizia o studio, che l’uomo usa a conciliarsi il favore e la grazie degl’ignoranti: e 
perciò esser specie d’adulazione, rea e turpe per conseguente; ed esser simile alla 
cucina, cioè alla perizia di ben condir li cibi umani per compiacer al palato.91 
 
The so-called sophistic school (“scola”), mentioned in the first of the three passages, 
includes Gorgias of Leontini, his pupils, and the broader group of ancient sophists 
attacked by Plato. The evil reputation attributed to sophist leads Speroni to deepen its 
identity. The exploration of this controversial figure is introduced by a picture of 
Hercules that Speroni recalls from his reading of an anonymous author: 
 
90 Pozzi, ed. Trattatisti del Cinquecento. 648. 
91  Speroni. Opere. V. 535. 
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So aver letto in non vano autore, che anticamente là nella Scitia […] si aveva per 
fermo che quel nostro Ercole così forte fosse un sofista de’ più eccellenti, che 
avesse il mondo al suo tempo: e per sofista si dipingeva. La dipintura era questa: 
un uomo in piede grande e robusto, simile al Greco di Anfitrione, quanto alla 
clava e alla pelle; ma in ciò diverso oltre modo, che nella lingua, che aveva forata, 
tenea uno anello, quale hanno i bufoli in cima al naso, onde pendevano catenelle 
lunghe e sottili di più colori, tutte attaccate agli orecchi di una gran gente di donne 
e d’uomini d’ogni etade, che gli erano avanti, quasi bramosa dell’ascoltare; 
significando secondo i Sciti la dipintura, che la sua invitta eloquenzia tenea legati 
li ascoltatori e facea farli a suo senno. 92  
 
He records how the ancient Scythians believed that Hercules was one of the most 
excellent sophists and was portrayed as an imposing, strong man; they viewed him as 
similar to the Greek character Anphitryon for the club and skin he wore, yet different 
from him in other respects. In fact, he had a pierced tongue with a ring to which 
numerous chains were attached. They were long, thin, colorful, and connected to women 
and men of any age who were following him - craving to hear his speeches. According to 
Scythians - Speroni writes - the picture portrays Hercules’ eloquence as invincible and 
powerful enough to persuade and tie anyone to him. 
 No scholar has yet recovered the source of Speroni’s passage which depicts 
Hercules as a powerful sophist. The representation that Speroni describes is very close to 
that provided by the Greek sophist Lucian of Samosata (125-180 CE), quite possibly the 
92 Speroni. Opere. I. 359-360. 
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useful author (“non vano autore”) mentioned at the beginning of the citation above, in his 
Heracles translated into Latin by Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) in 1506.93 In his work 
Lucian indeed reports a Gallic version of the representation of the Greek god: “The Celts 
call Heracles Ogmios in their native tongue, and they portray the god in a very peculiar 
way. In their opinion, he is extremely old, bald-headed […] his skin is wrinkled, and he is 
burned as black as can be, like an old sea-dog.” Even more interesting is the rest of the 
picture: 
 
That old Heracles of theirs drags after him a great crowd of men who are all 
tethered by the ears! His leashes are delicate chains fashioned of gold and amber, 
resembling the prettiest of necklaces. Yet, though led by bonds so weak, the men 
do not think of escaping, as they easily could, and they do not pull back at all or 
brace their feet and lean in the opposite direction to that in which he is leading 
them. In fact they follow cheerfully and joyously, applauding their leader. 94 
 
Then Lucian finds particularly striking a specific detail of the picture: “Since the painter 
had no place to which he could attach the ends of the chains, as the god’s right hand 
already held the club and his left the bow, he pierced the tip of his tongue and represented 
him drawing the men by that means!” 95  
 Lucian narrates that while he was looking at this strange picture, a Celt 
approached and told him “we Celts do not agree with you Greeks in thinking that Hermes 
93 For the Latin translations of Lucian and his legacy in the early Renaissance, see D. Marsh, Lucian and 
the Latins. Humor and Humanism in the Early Renaissance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999. 
94 Lucian of Samosata. Heracles. Ed. A. M. Harmon, Priceton University Press: London-New York, 1913. 
63. 
95 Ibid. 65. 
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is Eloquence: we identify Heracles with it, because he is far more powerful than Hermes. 
And don’t be surprised if he is represented as an old man, for eloquence and eloquence 
alone is wont to show its full vigour in old age.”96 After having quoted Homer’s Iliad 
about Nestor’s oratory, as a further case of an old man with powerful eloquence, the Celt 
concludes his explanation and gives his interpretation of the allegorical meaning of 
Heracles’ weapon: 
 
In general, we consider that the real Heracles was a wise man who achieved 
everything by eloquence and applied persuasion as his principal force. His arrows 
represent words, I suppose, keen, sure and swift, which make their wounds in 
souls. In fact, you yourselves admit that words are winged. 97 
 
I could not find any source closer than this to Speroni’s description and even if Lucian 
replaces the Scythians with the Celts, the essential part of the allegory is kept. If Lucian is 
the source of Speroni’s version of the eloquent Hercules, then the definition of the Greek 
sophist Lucian as a respectable (“non vano”) author in Speroni’s passage is quite 
remarkable. Perhaps, Speroni did not explicitly mention him in his Apologia in order to 
avoid any further issue with the Catholic Inquisition. 
 There is a further difference between Lucian and Speroni in the way they describe 
the picture. While in the former Hercules stands for eloquence in general, in the latter, 
Hercules is no longer simply an orator but also one of the most excellent sophists (“un 
96 Ibid. 65-67. 
97  Ibid. 67. The flourish fortune of the Celtic Hercules in literature and arts was explored by R. E. 
Hallowell. “Ronsard and the Gallic Hercules Myth.” Studies in the Renaissance 9 (1962): 242-255. 
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sofista dei più eccellenti”). This suggests that Speroni either considers rhetoric/oratory 
and sophistry as synonymous or that he considers sophistry as the most valuable part of 
rhetorical art and oratorical practice. In either case, Speroni rehabilitates sophistry by 
connecting it to one of the most popular and doubtlessly positive figures of classical 
mythology. One cannot think of a better way to ennoble sophistry and bring it into the 
inner circle of the liberal arts. 
 After describing the Scythian Hercules, Speroni expresses he disagreement with 
common interpretations of the picture. He claims to believe that the orator, who has no 
personal interest in doing his profession, is dragged by his listeners and forced to think 
how they think, rather than the opposite, so that one can say he is a victim of his 
audience: 
 
Io allo ‘ncontro confesso il fatto, ma non consento generalmente al significato: 
anzi ho per fermo che l’oratore, che fuor dell’arte della rettorica attende ad altro 
che alla sua causa, sia egli tratto per viva forza senza avvedersi da questo e quello 
delli ascoltanti, a ragionare a loro modo, e sia da essi signoreggiato.98 
 
This seems an anticipation of the polemic that Speroni engages in with Socrates and Plato 
in his In difesa dei sofisti and Contra Socrate. As we will see later in the exploration of 
these two trattatelli, in Plato’s dialogues the sophist is often forced to leave his specific 
sphere and compelled by his interlocutors to reason and discuss about topics outside of 
his duty, so that he is actually a victim of contempt. While the picture is usually seen as 
98 Speroni. Opere. I. 360. 
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an allegory of the power of eloquence, Speroni reverses this interpretation hinting that it 
is rhetoric which falls in disfavor. According to Speroni’s interpretation, Hercules 
represents rhetoric banished from the very cities it contributed to shaping: 
  
direi più tosto […] chi ha legato questo [i.e Ercole] infelice a cotanti orecchi? Che 
non direi in contrario: chi gli ha legati alla lingua tutti gli orecchi di sì gran turba? 
Ma comunque noi siamo in dubbio di tal legame di orecchi e lingua nella orazione 
dello eloquente, non è già dubbio che la rettorica […] è poco cara al presente alle 
repubbliche italiane, ed assai meno alle oltramontane; o sia perciò che così si 
vuole, o forse è colpa dei miei dialoghi e d’altri scritti non molto onesti, che gli 
assimigliano; nelle lordure delle quali opre sendo bruttata la gentilezza oratoria e 
guasto il fior della bontà sua, non è ragione che ci debbiamo meravigliare se or si 
caccia delle cittadi, che son fattura della sua voce. 99 
 
According to Speroni’s analysis, rhetoric was banished from the cities that were founded 
thanks to its power of gathering citizens’ consensus for the common interest. And an 
even worse situation occurred abroad. In the spirit of the Apologia, Speroni includes 
himself among the authors that possibly ruined the reputation of rhetoric, but above all he 
denounces the ingratitude of the republics that rejected orators as their worst enemies 
instead of rewarding them for their service. Plato’s Republic is, of course, the 
archetypical work for this tendency as well as a model for contemporary cities. 
99 Ibid. 360. 
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 It is noteworthy that Speroni writes in the vernacular to denounce what he 
considered to be the Platonic origin of the modern political trend, while part of the Italian 
vernacular production at that time was proposing Platonism as an antidote rather than a 
problem. In fact, the second half of the Cinquecento is roughly the period when some 
Italian authors proposed the Platonic political ideal as an alternative model to the 
Aristotelianism of the Counter-Reformation. Pamphilo Fiorimbene’s translation of 
Plato’s Republic and Ciro Spontoni’s La corona del principe (“the Crown of the Prince”) 
- published with his translation I commenti di Marsilio Ficino sopra i dieci dialoghi del 
giusto (“Marsilio Ficino’s Commentaries to the Ten Dialogues on Justice”) - are two 
significant examples, the former at the beginning and the latter at the end of this 
tendency.100 
 All the matter about sophists is so interesting that Speroni decides to postpone the 
conclusion of the third part of his Apologia and continues to explore the subject. He goes 
on to discuss a certain dialogue that might have actually occurred in the Roman house of 
Cardinal Amulio (Marcantonio da Mula): 
 
Li sofisti che io nominai con quella Scitica dipintura m’hanno recato alla mente 
uno assai lungo, per vero dirne, ma non gia’ inetto ragionamento, tenuto in casa 
altra volta e nella presenza del cardinale Amulio da alcuni belli intelletti; udendo 
io sempre mai senza dir nulla, tanto fui vago dell’ascoltare.101 
100 P. Fiorimbene. La republica di Platone, tradotta dalla lingua greca nella thoscana […], Venezia, appr. 
G. Giolito de Ferrari, 1554. C. Spontoni. La corona del principe. I commenti di Marsilio Ficino sopra i 
dieci dialoghi del giusto. Verona: presso G. Discepolo, 1590. The matter is discussed in T. Katinis. “Il 
platonismo politico nell’età della Controriforma: Ciro Spontoni dalla Corona del principe ai Dodici libri 
del governo di Stato.” Storia del pensiero politico 4 (2014) (in press). 
101 Speroni. Opere. I. 361. 
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With this introduction, the reader is virtually invited to listen to the discussion among 
Amulio, Bernardo Cappello, Constantin Ralli, Paulo Manuzio, Silvio Antoniano, and 
Speroni himself as a silent spectator. It is a carnival evening and Amulio asks the guests 
to tell him about the debate they attended a few hours ago. Cappello tells how they talked 
about the new sophists who often bring confusion to every science by using unclear Latin 
words, such as essentia and quidditas, and who apparently have no goal outside of 
maintaining the privilege of being called philosophers.102 In the first part of the dialogue 
Amulio and Cappello agree to consider sophistry as a general name for a large group of 
human arts that share the particular use of language as a means of persuasion. Poetry is a 
kind of sophistry because of its effect on men’s soul, and tragedy too because of its 
power to lead spectators to cry and, at the same time, enjoy their crying.103 
 Cappello presents anecdotes about sophistic arguments, including the well known 
paradox omnis homo mendax that reveals an interesting connection with skepticism. 
Metaphors and allegories then follow, such as the popular battle of Hercules (the image 
of a true philosopher) against a gigantic crab representing any kind of sophist.  
The allegory of Hercules fighting the monster is particularly noteworthy because 
it sheds light on the relationship between Speroni and one of the first Italian humanists, 
Coluccio Salutati. According to Raffaele Girardi, indeed, Cappello reverses the meaning 
that Salutati gave to the allegory in his De laboribus Herculis. 104  In fact, Salutati 
considers Hercules the personification of the capacity of reason in fighting and defeating 
102 Ibid. 361-362. 
103 Ibid. 363-367. 
104 C. Salutati. De laboribus Herculis. Ed. B. L. Ullman. Zurich: Thesaurus Mundi, 1952. 191. On Girardi’s 
interpretation, see his “Ercole e il Granchio: figure della ‘sofistica speroniana’.” 398-400. 
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ignorance and vice, following two classical loci, Plato’s Phaedon (89c) and Euthydemus 
(297c); while Cappello presents a weak Hercules incapable of achieving his victory. 
Girardi draws the conclusion that Speroni recognizes the limit of philosophical reason 
and suggests adopting a probabilistic approach to the human world. Although Giradi’s 
interpretation points out an important part of Speroni’s perspective about the state of 
sciences and arts, I think that this specific passage is not the best demonstration of this 
thesis; I would argue instead that Cappello, the character who is reporting the allegory, 
seems to be enjoying a semi-serious conversation about the risk of facing a sophist rather 
than establishing a comprehensive view of life. As we will see, reading the end of the 
third part of the Apologia, the character in charge of drafting a new philosophy based on 
the reevaluation of sophistry is actually Amulio.  
Going back to the carnival evening, Amulio calls upon Manuzio to give his 
opinion on Cicero's rhetorical art, which is supposed to have some kind of relationship 
with sophistry. Manuzio summarizes Cicero's opinion, clarifying what a sophist is and 
also defending him: 
 
Cicerone nell'Oratore, se ben ricordo, tiene per fermo, quello esser vero oratore il 
quale orando move li affetti delli ascoltanti; e che in contrario il sofista non solo li 
move, ma li corregge ed acqueta […]. Dunque il sofista secondo lui non uomo 
vano o nugace, nè ingannatore nè falsatore della rettorica, ma buona e dolce 
persona. 105 
 
105 Speroni. Opere. I. 368. 
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Constantino Ralli underlines how Cicero's opinion is far from those of both Aristotle and 
Plato.106 Afterward, Speroni and Silvio Antoniano are asked to express their opinions. 
Speroni, as interlocutor in the dialogue, lets Silvio speak on his behalf.107 Silvio then 
refers to a discussion that happened elsewhere, probably in a meeting of the “Accademia 
delle notti vaticane.”108  
It is important to note that Speroni is very cautious in his writing. Although he 
includes himself among the interlocutors, he lets someone else speak for him; moreover, 
Silvio claims that he will only report what others said. The plurality of levels in such a 
narration – Speroni, as authorial voice of his Apologia dei dialoghi, tells of a dialogue 
where Silvio reports on another dialogue – ensures a certain degree of safety from the 
Inquisition, via this narrative distance. 
After his initial claims, Silvio presents the speech of the anonymous “accademico 
di palazzo” (“academic of court”) who provided a summary of the history of the sophistic 
art, paying particular attention to the shifting meaning of “sophist.” Initially, all the wise 
men, including Solon, Thales and Pythagoras, were called sophists. Socrates was the first 
to demonize this name. In spite of Socrates’ condemnation, the “accademico” suggested 
that we ought to appreciate Gorgias’ speech about Helen of Troy and Protagoras’ most 
beautiful oration - probably the so-called “great discourse” of Protagoras in Plato’s 
Protagoras (323a-328d). Moreover, he recalled the significant public role played by 
several sophists who also served as ambassadors. Centuries later, a second generation of 
106 Ibid. 370. 
107 “Io quella ora non aveva voglia di ragionare: però pregai M. Silvio, come persona che potea farlo, che 
mi togliesse da tale imbarazzo” (Ibid. 371). 
108 “Io Signor nostro, da ora innanzi non dirò nulla, ma gli altrui detti rinarrarò […]. Dico adunque che uno 
accademico di palazzo parlò una sera distintamente delli sofisti e dell'arte loro, senza nessuna sofisteria” 
(Ibid. 372). 
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sophists arose – which modern scholars call the Second Sophistic. One of the most 
famous, in Athens, was the rhetorician Libanius, friend of the Emperor Julian and Saint 
Basilius.109 
Afterwards, the “accademico” clarified that Socrates’ attacks, which are sophisms 
themselves, were mostly against the greedy sophists and sophists’ confusion about 
debating (“disputare”) and lecturing (“orare”).110 Common people concluded that every 
sophist should be condemned, and thus, greedy sophists ruined the reputation of wise 
men.111 That made the world full of miserable sophists who used languages – especially 
Greek and Latin – to impress the listeners without expressing any clear relationship 
between words and concepts. According to the “accademico,” it is necessary to point out 
a semantic distinction in order to avoid an unfair condemnation of the sophistic art: 
 
Confusamente insin ora, per quel che io creda, si è ragionato intorno a questa 
materia; ove era bene che si distinguesse tra sofisteria e sofista. E questo bene non 
si è ancor fatto dalli scrittori, né so perché. Farollo io. La sofisteria è artificio o 
perizia, onde Gorgia verbi grazia era sofista denominato: ma il sofista è 
quell'uomo che suole usarla ed adoperarla. E questa loro diversità non solamente è 
di voce e vocaboli ma è di vere e reali cose.112 
 
109 Ibid. 373. 
110 Ibid. 377-378. 
111 Ibid. 379. 
112  Ibid. 383. 
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After a metaphor is used to clarify the difference between the accidental and substantial 
features of an object – in the Aristotelian sense – the “accademico” concluded his 
argumentation: 
 
Così un sofista può esser reo e tristo uomo senza alcun biasimo di quella arte, 
quando è sofista denominato. Perciocché il vizio è in molti uomini, che non son 
punto sofisti; e la sofistica facultà, come è già stata, così può essere più che mai in 
buone e dotte persone.113 
 
A sophist may be guilty without shaming the sophistic art. The vice is in many persons 
who are not sophists, while the sophistic art can be performed by good and learned 
people, as it was in the past. Remarkably, this passage reproduces the argument in 
defense of rhetoric presented by the character Gorgias of Leontini against Socrates’ 
attack in Plato’s Gorgias (456c-457c). As we saw in the first chapter, the same argument 
drew the attention of humanists, such as George of Trebizond and Marsilio Ficino, 
because of its efficacy. Thanks to Speroni’s vernacular formulation, the same argument 
reached a broader public for the very first time. 
Afterward, the “accademico” more closely defined the sophistic art and found 
valuable support for his purpose in Aristotle's paradigm of sciences. He argued that 
sophistry is an imperfect science that produces imperfect and incomplete knowledge, 
while – according to Aristotle - a perfect science can explain something through its cause 
proceeding with certainty: 
113 Ibid. 383. 
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La facultà della sofistica è scienza, ma imperfetta. Perfetta è quella che noi 
abbiamo di alcuna cosa per la cagione del suo essere, e che ella sia sua cagione, e 
che altrimenti non possa essere né sapersi [...]. Chiama Aristotile questo sapere, 
che egli ha così difinito, semplicemente sapere; cioè certo e perfetto, che via levi 
ogni dubbio, che possa aversi in alcun quesito. Che ove è dubbio non è certezza; e 
chi è incerto di qualche cosa, non si può dire che egli la sappia di intera e certa 
scienza, ma è sofistico il suo sapere.114 
 
The statement is clearly based on the classical Aristotelian pattern of different types of 
knowledge, distinguished by different levels of certainty and specific methods of 
investigation. The “accademico” gave a good summary of Aristotle's position about the 
validy of each science and rhetoric in particular. He tied his point to the schema  outlined 
in Aristotle's Metaphysics, modifying, however, part of it. The “accademico” argued that, 
according to the Stagirite, we acquire a perfect knowledge through demonstration, 
opinion through dialectic syllogism and induction, and persuasive arguments through 
enthymemes and examples. At the same time, persuasion and opinion are sophistic types 
of knowledge, because of their intrinsic uncertainty and not because they are intentionally 
deceptive: 
 
la scienza certa e perfetta per la dimostrazione acquistiamo; la opinione per 
sillogismo e induzione; e la persuasione per entimema ed esemplo. Vuole 
114  Ibid. 385. 
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insomma Aristotile, che la persuasione e l'opinione, quantunque buone e diritte, 
siano sofistiche conoscienze. Son dunque tali non per inganno, che vi sia entro; 
che ciò è colpa e malizia della persona, di cui non parlo al presente: ma per difetto 
della certezza, la quale in esse per lor natura non si ritrova.115 
 
Aristotle actually endorses sophistry less than this passage suggests. In fact, on the one 
hand Aristotle recognizes a relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, while his Rhetoric 
seems to accept some forms of sophistic rhetoric as well; on the other hand he does not 
consider the entire domain of opinions as a part of sophistry. Speroni, though, connects 
sophistry and dialectic more closely than Aristotle, perhaps by emphasizing the passages 
in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1404a, 1408b) in which Gorgias’ art is pointed out as an example 
of rhetorical ability. 
According to the “accademico”, sophistry aims to persuade and create opinions 
and deals with politics and ethics. In these fields, knowledge is always probabilistic and 
findings are changeable. The last part of the “accademico’s” speech is particularly 
interesting with regard to the relationship between the sophistic art and civil life. The 
sophist is the ‘scientist’ of public life, and civil activities (“opere cittadinesche”) are his 
field. Finally, the sophist is asked to deal with common beliefs and to create consensus, 
as rhetoricians used to do in the ancient Greek and Latin worlds. 
As we mentioned earlier, the whole dialogue is set during a carnival evening, 
when jokes and ambiguous speeches are permitted. In the word of cardinal Amulio: “il 
sofista, siccome vano che egli è, non pare indegna materia che se ne parli nel carnassale 
115  Ibid. 386. 
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[sic]”, but since the carnival is ending and the Lent (“suo contrario”) is coming, the 
cardinal wants to finish the dialogue summarizing the most important ideas discussed so 
far.116 
The function of Amulio’s last speech is to prepare the forth part of the Apologia 
where the discourse on contemplative topics, guided by faith in God, should replace all 
the controversial subjects of the third part. Given the fact that Amulio’s speech has the 
function of guiding the reader from the earthly world, symbolized by the carnival, to a 
divine dimension, where the intellect is exposed to the true light, we should consider the 
words of the cardinal the most truthful in the dialogue.  
Amulio summarizes the whole matter in a comprehensive view of the human 
world, a Weltanschauung – to use a modern term – conveyed in few sentences. Amulio 
begins his speech quoting the anonymous “accademico di palazzo:” 
 
Quella fu vera sentenzia: […] tutto il mondo è sofista, cioè pien di sofisterie. Ma 
fu imperfetta quella parola, perché doveva aggiungere, che ‘l mondo anche esso è 
sofista. Dell’una e dell’altra farò parola. Sono mundane sofisterie non solamente 
le opinion e persuasion delli uomini intorno al vivere cittadinesco […] ma 
eziandio le scienze che noi chiamiamo dimostrative. 
 
Therefore, according to Amulio, sophistry includes more than we thought. Specifically, 
any thing that our intellect produces is a type of sophism, while what is above our 
116 Ibid. 389. 
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intellect is beyond sophistry but also impossible to understand because of our human 
limits. Amulio clarifyies his view further: 
 
Tutto l’avanzo delle scienze contemplative è veramente di cose alte e gentili, ma 
tanto ascose […] che non è occhio mortale che veder sappia la loro origine 
interamente. Quindi nasce la varietà dei pareri colla ostinazione del defender 
ciascuno il suo, la qual cosa mal si può fare senza l’aiuto della importuna 
sofisteria: perciocché il vero non è più d’uno, e mille sono le vanitadi che si 
raggirano intorno ad esso senza toccarlo […] tutte queste son manifeste 
sofisterie.117 
 
Apparently, even the contemplative dimension is involved in sophistry when we try to 
represent it with our human intellectual and linguistic means. The annoying sophistry 
(“importuna sofisteria”) is part of being human and the only type of knowledge human 
beings can achieve. Even if we can assume the existence of a sole truth, we dwell in a 
world made of conflicting representations that we crafted because we cannot proceed 
differently. According to this theory, any man is naturally a poet, in the original meaning 
of the Greek word poiesis, a demiurge of his own dimension that competes with others of 
the same kind.  
Amulio’s speech is certainly far beyond Platonism as well as Aristotelianism. In 
fact, the cardinal, to whom Speroni leaves the last words of the carnival to introduce the 
approaching Lent, presents the Platonic cave as man’s actual homeland and the 
117 Ibid. 390. 
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2.2. The defense of sophists 
 
Sperioni’s two trattatelli, In difesa dei sofisti and Contra Socrate, are much more 
explicitly against Plato’s perspective on sophistry. As the other trattatelli, they should 
have been written as first drafts for possible dialogues or orations. It would have been 
very interesting to read these final results, but unfortunately Speroni never wrote them.  
Speroni's In difesa dei sofisti attacks the entirety of Plato's anti-sophistic work. It 
is amazing to read such an evaluation of Plato and the sophists in a sixteenth-century text, 
which differs completely from the standard interpretation at that time. Speroni’s incipit is 
a declaration of war. He claims that when the ancient sophists disappeared, valuable 
thinkers were lost, and Plato is responsible for this loss. Before Plato, ‘sophist’ was an 
honorable title; after him it became a shameful name: “gran perdita è stata quella dei 
sofisti, della quale n'ha colpa Platone maggior sofista di loro. E prima si gloriavano gli 
uomini d'esser sofisti; or per cagion di Platone se ne vergognano.”118 
Speroni then recalls the usual distinction between the philosopher, a 
contemplative thinker who does not pursue any kind of useful aim, and the sophist, who 
does not care about the essence of virtues. Speroni admires especially Gorgias, an 
excellent orator (“oratore eccellentissimo”), and clarifies that the rhetorical art called 
118 Speroni. Opere. V. 430. 
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sophistry is based on habits and movement (“sul costume e sul movimento”). This kind 
of rhetoric is made for the city and public life. Speroni underlines the distance between 
sophistry and philosophy:  
 
Il sofista vuol, e la città vuol, che l'onor nostro e la gloria consista nell'opinione 
delle persone, cioè del volgo: ma il filosofo sapiente non già; ma parlando della 
natura dell'uomo, vorrà che seguiti di necessità la scienza e la virtù, e non dipenda 
dala opinione del vulgo; anzi si scosti da lui, perché è ignorante della natura ed 
essenzia di esso onore. 119 
 
As we discussed in the first chapter, Gorgias had already interested several authors in the 
fifteenth century, such as Leonardo Bruni, George of Trebizond, Teodoro Gaza, but 
Speroni goes beyond their defense of rhetoric and does not hesitate to attack Plato as a 
sophist of the worst kind - one who used to make his victims vulnerable by exposing 
them to people's judgment:  
 
Platone […] con fallacia disputava contro i sofisti, dimandandoli della natura ed 
essenzia d'alcune cose, le quali non erano sapute da' sofisti, perché non bisognava 
loro, come sofisti, saperle. E ciò faceva Platone alla presenza del vulgo, dinanzi al 
quale il sofista non osava dir di non sapere ogni cosa per non perdere il credito.120 
 
119 Ibid. 431. 
120 Ibid. 
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Plato unfairly questioned sophists about essences and eternal forms that were not their 
concern, since dealing with metaphysics was not their duty. Speroni is actually promoting 
a revolutionary interpretation suggesting that the reader invert his usual perspective: Plato 
is no longer a hero fighting the worst men in Greece. Rather, sophists were the victims of 
a man who was worse than any other sophist. Plato shares his guilt with Socrates, who 
sought the essence of civil virtues for influencing civil life, confusing ethics with physics 
and metaphysics:  
  
[Socrate] non doveva cercare la essenzia ma l'uso della virtù […] ognuno poteva 
conoscere che cosa fosse virtù, ma […] pochi sapevano esercitarla, ove e come si 
conveniva secondo l'uso della repubblica; e […] se la scienza della virtù è una, 
perocché una è la sua essenzia, non è però uno lo uso, ma vario secondo la varietà 
delle repubbliche, nelle quali quel che è vizio in una, nell'altre è virtù.121 
 
Against Plato and Socrates, Speroni argues that the science of virtue is one, because one 
is the essence of virtue, while the uses of virtue are as many as the actual republics. In 
fact, what is considered a virtue in one republic might be a vice in another and vice-versa. 
Finally, Speroni asserts that the sophist actually has a peculiar superiority, consisting in a 
greater awareness of human limits in knowing the truth. The similitude proposed in the 
following passage is particularly explicative. The philosopher is like an idle young man 
who loves something he cannot reach, such as wisdom, just like suitors loved Penelope. 
121 Ibid. 
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On the contrary, the sophist understands that he cannot reach the wisdom and is satisfied 
in having only the name of  “wise.” 
 
È da meno il filosofo che 'l sofista non è: perché il filosofo a guisa di giovane 
vano ama una cosa che non può mai ottenere, cioè la sapienza, come i Proci 
amavano Penelope. Ma il sofista, chiaro ormai di non potere essere sapiente, non 
si mette ad amare e desiderare la sapienzia, che aver non può, ma senza superbia 
alcuna va alle ancille e si contenta di averne il nome.122 
 
The sophist accepts the fundamental weakness of the human means of knowledge and 
does not dream of a metaphysical sphere. The trattatello ends by proposing an 
equivalence between the sophist and the human condition: “sofista è imitatore, il quale 
non è niente e simiglia ogni cosa […] sofista è lo esser nostro, perché non è e pare essere: 
non è, perché il presente dello essere è instante indivisibile, che fu piuttosto, e forse non 
sarà, che non è; e solo lo immortale è veramente.”123 
The sophist is presented as himself and, at the same time, as a metaphor for 
ephemeral human existence. This idea may certainly have several origins. One of these 
might be the contact with Attic tragedy through Gorgias' philosophy. As Mario 
Untersteiner suggested in the chapter on “tragic epistemology and ontology” of his book 
on ancient sophists, Gorgias' Encomium of Helen and On Not-being or On Nature are the 
philosophical version of what Attic tragedy used to show on the stage: the changeable 
122  Speroni. Opere. V. 432. 
123 Ibid. 
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and contradictory status of human life. 124 Gorgias’ Encomium was translated to Latin by 
Pietro Bembo (1470-1547) and published by Aldo Manuzio in 1513, and a summary of 
Gorgias’ On Nature was available in Sextus Empiricus’ Against Professors, which was 
published in a Latin translation in 1569.125 Therefore, either of the works might have 
inspired Speroni's idea of a natural inconsistency of human life. 
 
 
2.3. The condemnation of Socrates 
 
Speroni's Contra Socrate is a virtual trial leading for the second time to the condemnation 
of Plato's mentor and model. After considering the opinion of ancient sources, Speroni 
argues that Socrates conducted philosophical investigation the wrong way: 
 
Si dice comunemente dalli antichi, cioè Platone, Senofonte, Cicerone, ed altri, 
[che Socrate] partito dalla contemplazione delle cose e cause naturali, come da 
cose a noi non pertinenti, si ridusse alle operazioni virtuose proprie nostre ed a 
considerare come in quelle avanzassimo. E io dico che ben ciò fece, ma fece male 
e male appresso gliene successe. 126 
 
124 M. Untersteiner. I sofisti. Milano: Mondadori, 1996. 140. 
125  For Bembo, see E. MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. Genève: Droz, 2011. 39. On Sexus 
Empiricus’ work in the Renaissance, see L. Floridi. Sextus Empiricus. The Transmission and Recovery of 
Pyrrhonism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002. 25-51; R. H. Popkin. The History of Scepticism. 
From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 17-43. 
126 Speroni. Opere. V. 418.  
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According to Speroni, Socrates, famous for the coherency of his habit and thought, was 
actually living in an enormous contradiction originating in his misunderstanding of the 
double meaning of virtue. Speroni clarifies once more that the essence of virtue, which is 
true and unique, is an object of philosophical contemplation completely different from 
civil virtue (“virtù civile”). What is virtue in one place is vice in another and the laws of a 
particular city are not accepted in a different city. Therefore, the perfect, absolute, true 
virtue does not exist on earth: “imperrocché questa vita civile è l'esser tale secondo le 
leggi, le quali sono varie secondo le varie forme delle repubbliche […]. E però civilmente 
parlando, quello che qui è virtù, altrove è vizio, ove le prime leggi non sono accettate. 
Dunque qui non è vera, né assoluta, né perfetta virtù.”127 
Assuming that civil virtue and law are perfectly coincident, as Speroni suggests, 
Socrates confused the philosophical essence of virtue with civil virtue and tried to 
convince Athenians to follow the former while disregarding the laws of Athens. 
Eventually, he added a second contradiction when he refused to escape from jail, 
claiming his loyalty to the law: 
 
Par dunque che Socrate, parlando in tal modo, ignorasse, come è in proverbio, la 
voce propria e se stesso, et non constaret sibi ipsi: ora è tutto legale e civile, ora è 
astratto e metafisico, distruente i sofisti, ma sofisticamente volgendosi alla città ed 
alle virtuti civili e legali, or alla natura di esse virtù.128 
 
127 Ibid. 418. 
128 Ibid. 418-419. 
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Socrates' contradictory behavior was so strong that it affected his appearance. Speroni 
disregards the classical image of Socrates as a Silenus hiding a divinity, underlining 
instead how his physiognomy reflected his evil nature: 
 
Queste cose dirai contra Socrate per li sofisti, e contra la maniera della sua vita da 
lui tenuta contra le leggi e costumi della sua patria, considerando lui esser stato 
naturalmente un mal uomo, come la sua fisionomia il mostrava, la quale si vede 
non essere stata regolata in lui dalla filosofia mondana e civile, che ciò non può 
stare, né dalla naturale, o sopranaturale, la quale fu disprezzata da lui.129 
 
Socrates abandoned the study of natural philosophy to concentrate on ethics and politics, 
but at the same time he refused to deal with the customs of his city. No longer a 
philosopher and refusing to be a rhetorician, he assumed a monstrous aspect: neither a 
man nor a god, but perhaps a beast. Speroni supposes that the judges of Athens may have 
acted unjustly, through ignorance or malice, but Socrates deserved the capital sentence in 
any case: “con questo può anche star che i giudici fossero ingiusti, quando alla morte il 
condannarono. Perciocché può essere che egli non meritasse la morte, ma che la morte li 
fusse data per invidia o per odio, non per ragione, non conoscendo i giudici la ragione 
veramente, per la quale era degno di morte.”130 Speroni apparently did not agree with the 
Delphic Oracle, who declared Socrates the wisest of men, but he could approve of 
erecting a sculpture in honor of Gorgias at Delphi, as reported by Cicero’s De Oratore 
(III, xxxii, 129). 
129 Ibid. 419. 
130 Ibid. 419. 
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3. The Dialogo della retorica 
 
More than a century ago, the scholar Amelia Fano noted that Speroni’s dialogues are 
Aristotelian in contents but Platonic in form.131 While scholars may disagree with the 
first part of this statement, they usually accept the second part. On the one hand Speroni 
rejects Platonic metaphysics and its results; on the other hand he adopts the Platonic 
dialogue as a valid form of literature. In the first part of his Apologia, Speroni 
acknowledges his debt to Plato and defines himself as an author of dialogues in the same 
way Plato did. Plato stated that everything in his dialogue is not his actual thought, and, 
in fact, some of Plato’s characters praise injustice, condemn Socrates’ ideas, and in 
general defend opinions opposite to those of Plato’s: 
 
Certo [Platone] non scema punto ma lascia intieri di tali materie quei suoi dialogi 
scandalosi, e con sue sole due parolette queta il rumore che ne può nascere, 
scrivendo in fine di una sua lettera che la dottrina, piena di liti e contenziosi, nei 
suoi dialogi dispensare non era sua opinione; e non ha uomo oggidì tutta la nostra 
religione, né ha avuto insin ora, che a tale scusa non sia contento. Dunque il 
romore che si suol fare delle materie e delle forme d’ogni dialogo in generale si 
può acquietar facilmente.132 
131  “aristotelici nella sostanza, platonici nella veste” (A. Fano. Sperone Speroni. Saggio sulla vita e sulle 
opere. Padova: Fratelli Drucker, 1909. 45). 
132 Pozzi, ed. Trattatisti del Cinquecento. 688. 
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In other words, according to Speroni, Plato invented a long-lasting argument in defense 
of any kind of dialogue no matter what content is presented. According to Mario Pozzi, 
the letter mentioned in this passage may be Plato’s second letter, where the philosopher 
claims that Socrates – and not himself - says what he reports. This letter might suggest 
that Plato wanted to point out the difference between him as an author and his characters. 
The letter, however, does not discuss the truth of the contents of his shameful dialogues 
(“dialogi scandalosi”).  
There is, in fact, an argument more effective than this in Plato’s seventh letter - 
related to his unwritten doctrines (agrapha dogmata). The philosopher confesses that he 
does not trust language to express his philosophical views because linguistic means are 
weak, especially writing, which is unchangeable. Scholars have doubted the authenticity 
of the letter, but in the sixteenth century the authority on Platonism was Marsilio Ficino, 
who translated the letter and believed it to be an original work of Plato’s. 
There is also a further aspect of Speroni’s process of writing that needs to be 
considered in reading his dialogues. As Jon Snyder highlighted, the mostly unfinished 
dialogues of Speroni are similar to and perhaps inspired by the first of Plato’s dialogues, 
so-called aporetic because of their deeper focus on the process of reasoning rather than 
reaching a conclusion. The use of aporia – literally “lack of passage,” or better yet, “lack 
of conclusion” – in a dialogue allows one to overcome the rigidity that is hardly 
avoidable in a systematic treatise. Apparently, Speroni uses the aporetic form of dialogue 
against dogmatic Platonism - Plato against Plato, so to speak. This fact recalls the similar 
attitude that ancient skeptics had towards Platonism and suggests a possible connection 
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between Speroni and the skepticism circulating in the Venitian intellectual environment, 
as we will explore in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
 The Dialogo della retorica, like several others, is unfinished and the author does 
not provide the reader with any final statement on the subject, never officially disclosing 
his judgment. Nonetheless, the conflict between rhetoric and Platonic philosophy is 
clearly a major matter of debate. Brocardo, one of the characters, clearly plays the role of 
mentor in defending the identity and vital function of rhetoric against his detractors, 
especially Plato. The attack on the Platonic position becomes explicit approaching the 
end of the work, when Brocardo mentions Plato’s position on rhetoric. Although Plato is 
the virtual antagonistic character from the beginning of the work, Speroni choses to 
reveal his name only towards the end, when the polemic against the detractors of rhetoric 
reaches its climax. But before going into the analysis of the last part of the work, it is 
necessary to briefly summarize the characters and plot of the Dialogo.  
Gian Francesco Valerio and Marcantonio Soranzo, two Venetian gentlemen, and 
Antonio Brocardo, a Venetian author with a controversial intellectual relationship with 
Pietro Bembo, meet somewhere to discuss, in Soranzo’s words, civil life which is a 
human being’s main activity  (“della vita civile, nostra umana professione”). 133  The 
following definition provided by Soranzo places the subject between public life and 
poetry: “chiamo vita civile non solamente la bontà dei costumi col moralmente operare, 
ma il parlar bene a beneficio dell’avere, delle persone e dell’onore de’ mortali; la qual 
133 Pozzi, ed. Trattatisti del Cinqiecento. 639. For a more detailed presentation of the characters, see Pozzi’s 
introduction to the dialogue in (Ibid. 637-638). 
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cosa per aventura è vertù non men bella in sé stessa, o men giovevole alla umanità, della 
prudenzia e della giustizia.”134 
The topic is not related to any metaphysical subject, which is confirmed by 
Soranzo’s suggestion to skip the debate on the immortality of the soul held the same day 
in Gasparo Contarini’s house.135 The three interlocutors agree that their dialogue will 
focus rather on rhetoric and oratory. Brocardo begins the discussion with an attempt to 
define the good orator in opposition with the philosopher: “E veramente quello è buono 
oratore, il qual, parlando d’alcuna cosa principalmente, non con la causa trattata, sì come 
fanno i filosofi, ma col l’arbitrio […] e col piacere degli auditori tenta e procura di 
convenire.”136 All the following debate is an explanation of this very first statement with 
arguments, figures of speech, and examples. One of the metaphors presented concerns a 
central point for our investigation. To make clear the hierarchy among the three types of 
oratory, epideictic, forensic, and deliberative - according to Aristotle’s Rhetoric I - 
Brocardo applies the metaphor of the sunlight clearly taken from Plato’s Republic VII 
and imagines the epideictic oratory enlightening the other two types: 
 
riflettendo i suoi raggi l’altre due più inferiori scalda e alluma mirabilmente. 
Quindi adiviene che nelle cause iudiciali la iustizia e le leggi molte volte son 
laudate, e biasimato chi le perturba; e ne’ consigli delle republice la libertà, la 
pace e la iusta guerra con somme laudi si essaltano, e i tiranni con vituperio son 
lacerati.137 
134 Ibid. 639. 
135 Ibid. 639. 
136 Ibid. 642. 
137 Ibid. 658. 
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Epideictic oratory, which aims at praising or blaming someone or something, has a strong 
influence in all the spheres of public life, making this type of oratory superior and 
indispensable. Then a second metaphor is proposed to reinforce the previous one: 
 
Finalmente l’arte e le cause oratorie a’ sentimenti di nostra vita aguagliando, 
posso dire che le due prime sono il senso del tatto, senza le quali non nasceva, non 
viverebbe l’orazione; ma la causa demostrativa [epideictic], ornamento della 
retorica, è occhio e luce delle vita sua, lei a grado inalzando ove nulla dell’altre 
non è possente di pervenire.138 
 
Epideictic oratory is somehow present in the practice of the other two types of oratory, 
judicial and deliberative, and helps them in achieving their specific goals. Metaphorically 
speaking, the epideictic is the light that nourishes and guides the judicial and deliberative 
for achieving the best results. Speroni is suggesting a close relationship between 
epideictic oratory and political sphere, which is a crucial point for the rest of the 
dialogue. 
Speroni dedicates the last part of the Dialogo della retorica to an extended 
monologue by Brocardo started at the request of Valerio who asks to be instructed on 
how to respond to the detractors of rhetoric: 
 
138 Ibid. 658. 
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Almeno m’insegnarete rispondere agli argomenti d’alcuni grandi i quali, 
confessando (quel che voi dite) la retorica essere arte la quale ne’ nostri animi 
piacere e grazia partorisca, seguentemente non civile vertù ma perversa 
adulazione si fanno lecito di chiamarla e come vizio di mala guisa lei sbandiscono 
delle repubbliche.139 
 
Valerio is referring to Platonists (“alcuni grandi”) who wanted to banish rhetoric from the 
ideal republic considering it to be suspicious and harmful for political life. They argue 
that rhetoric is not civil virtue, but rather flattery. The keyword “civile” tightly connects 
this passage with the general purpose of the dialogue expressed at its beginning, where 
Soranzo decides that the public life (“vita civile”) and the oratory art (“parlar bene”) have 
to be the subject of the dialogue.  
The entire excursus accomplished up to this point does not explicitly address 
Plato as the worst enemy of rhetoricians and now Valerio asks Brocardo to discuss him 
directly. Presenting this discussion, Speroni brings back the ancient agon between 
Platonic philosophy and sophistic rhetoric giving a vernacular version of it. This 
translation of a most classical conflict could reach a broad public, the middle class of the 
Venitian area, which was particularly interested in rhetorics’ role in the life of a city.  For 
this type of public, Speroni’s dialogue could result much more usable and enjoyable than 
any other Latin work on the subject. 
 Brocardo’s response to Valerio leaves no doubt about the reference to the ancient 
agon, for it mentions the major figures involved in the conflict. The passages refer to 
139 Ibid. 676. 
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Plato and his character Socrates arguing with Polus, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and 
Glaucon: “Di Platone parlate, il quale in persona di Socrate, non per ver dire ma Polo e 
Gorgia tentando, con quello animo biasimò la retorica, che altra volta a Trasimaco e 
Glaucone fe’ laudar l’ingiustizia.” 140  Summarized here is the long-lasting war Plato 
waged - starting in one of his first dialogues, the Gorgias, and lasting until the 
masterpiece of his maturity, the Republic. Brocardo cannot accept Plato’s position and 
places himself on the side of the four sophists cited in the passage.  
Furthermore, one of the most remarkable aspects of the passage quoted above, 
perhaps not immediately recognizable since it is enfolded in Speroni’s prose, is the 
implied definition of Plato as a sophist, which was already provided in a passage of In 
difesa dei sofisti (discussed in the first part of this chapter). In the passage from the 
Dialogo della retorica, in fact, Speroni argues that Plato used the character Socrates to 
provoke Gorgias and his pupil Polus without actually meaning a condemnation of 
rhetoric (“non per ver dire ma Polo e Gorgia tentando”) but rather emphasizing its power 
by eliciting a verbal competition. In other words, Socrates/Plato would have engaged the 
two rhetoricians in a rhetorical game, pretending to be against their art.  
 The final part of Brocardo’s speech aims at defending the role of both rhetoric and 
poetry in a political setting with three main arguments related to sophistry. 
The first argument considers the changing role of rhetoric and poetry depending 
on social context and type of interlocutors. Brocardo compares rhetoric and poetry to 
different kinds of food available for different types of people and purposes. For 
philosophers these arts are not an essential vehicle of expression but rather an enjoyable 
140 Ibid. 676. 
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means of relaxing after an engaging discussion on difficult topics, similar to fruit at the 
end of the dinner. For people who do not care about philosophical subjects, but who do 
care about the political life of the city and possess a role in it, speeches and verses are the 
main course of their meal: 
 
se noi siamo filosofi, tali a noi sono la retorica e la poesia, quali i frutti alle tavole 
de’ signori, li quali, dopo cena quando sono sazii, compiacendo al palato, alquanti 
per gentilezza ne mangiano […] Al vulgo poi che non sa nulla, né fa pensier di 
sapere, e pure è parte della repubblica, l’orazioni e a le rime sono tutto il cibo e 
tutto ‘l frutto della sua vita […] Dunque io non vedo per qual cagion la retorica 
debba bandirsi delle repubbliche, sendo arte che ha per subietto le nostre umane 
operazioni, onde hanno origine le repubbliche.141  
 
What Speroni calls “vulgo” is the Venetian middle class: traders and people working with 
material goods, that can build, maintain, and increase the wealth of their republic. This 
middle class is not an intellectual elite of ruler-philosophers and needs to be addressed in 
a proper way. In other words, the Platonic republic cannot be considered a model for 
Speroni’s contemporary world, for the most productive social class does not understand 
and perhaps is not even interested in philosophy. On the contrary, it needs persuasive and 
enjoyable arguments provided by rhetoricians to gather social consensus on matters of 
general interest. An intrinsic pragmatism and a certain level of relativism lead Brocardo’s 
speech to overcome the idea that ruling comes from a dimension above actual society and 
141 Ibid. 677-678. 
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to assume that political and civil life originates from an agreement among people that 
share common interests. The anti-Platonic tone of Brocardo recalls the sophist Protagoras 
and his idea that ruling a state means to create as much consensus as possible to fulfill 
citizens’ needs and serve the interest of the city, without any regards to any metaphysical 
truth. Orators craft and perform probable and uncertain arguments (“ragioni probabili e 
anzi incerte che no”) as the best tools to employ in the public sphere.  
The second argument to highlight in Brocardo’s speech addresses the role of 
pleasure (“piacere”) and delight (“dilettazione”) in both rhetoric/oratory and poetry when 
they are used for political and civil purposes. Valerio already mentioned pleasure and 
gracefulness (“grazia”) in his request to be instructed to reply to Plato’s accusations 
against rhetoric. Brocardo now provides his argument pointing out that those feelings are 
major forces and capable of driving people towards issues of common interest. According 
to Brocardo, the philosopher is isolated and lives in solitude, whereas the orator is 
immerged in the public life and uses pleasure as a vehicle to convey his arguments. The 
orator’s art is a mix of faith and demonstrative science, and his acts and words are 
intrinsically related to the city (“sono cose propriamente cittadinesche”). The citizens’ 
delight (“dilettazione”) arises from an orator’s performance and he persuades them for his 
own glory as well as their wealth. Brocardo concludes his second argument with a 
comparison between citizens and animals who share the seeking of pleasure as their first 
goal and through satisfying their needs they accomplish higher ends.  In fact, citizens 
develop the city, while animals increase the number of members of their species: “con la 
qual dilettazione persuadendo, a se’ gloria e salute a’ suoi cittadini suol generare 
l’oratore, non altramente che coi diletti carnali gli animali senza ragione generando l’un 
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l’altro facciano intera la loro specie.”142 Furthermore, it should be noted that Brocardo’s 
reference to pleasure as the main motivation for action suggests an interesting 
intersection between Epicureanism and sophistry, both of them considered dangerous, 
although for different reasons. 
The third argument to highlight in Brocardo’s speech stems from his relativistic 
perspective. Indeed, Brocardo argues that if vices and virtues are different in different 
cities, then we should not rule the state relying on demonstrative sciences but rather on 
rhetoric and its changeable conclusions: 
 
se una opra medesima, in vari tempi dalle leggi cittadinesche or vietata e or 
commendata, può esser vizio e vertù, ragione è bene che le nostre republiche non 
da scienze demonstrative, vere e certe per ogni tempo, ma con retoriche openioni 
variabili e tramutabili (quali sono l’opre e le leggi nostre) prudentemente sian 
governate.143 
 
For that very reason, the philosopher is unsuitable for ruling: “il filosofo […] malamente 
può essere atto al governo della republica, le cui leggi per oneste cagioni avendo rispetto 
a’ tempi, a’ luoghi, alla utilità, alle sue leggi e all’altrui, spesse fiate da un dì all’altro 
mutano forma e sembianza.”144  
If human communities are changeable in space and time, then every ideal model 
is inappropriate and Speroni concludes his dialogue with an encomium of a new type of 
142 Ibid. 679. 
143 Ibid. 678. 
144 Ibid. 679. 
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ruler. As the sophist Protagoras claimed, each human community is the measure of the 
world that the community itself crafts for its own interest. The coexistence of political 
realities based on different systems of values that aim to fulfill different needs cannot be 
avoided. In fact, that was the actual geopolitical context in which Speroni and his 
contemporaries lived. In this situation, according to Brocardo’s speech, the rhetorician 
banished by Plato should replace the king-philosopher as the guide of republic. 
 Painting is one of the metaphors employed by Brocardo to discuss the rhetorical 
art and its effect and it is one of Speroni’s favorite tropes in the Dialogo della retorica as 
well as in other works. As Florence Malhomme recently pointed out, the metaphor of the 
orator as a painter sheds light on important aspects of Speroni’s concept of rhetorical art. 
Rhetoric and oratory produce images of the truth, verisimilitude instead of reality, and 
emotions that act like virtues but do not have any stability.145  
What Malhomme’s analysis does not mention is that painting is also one of 
Plato’s favorite tropes, although he gave it a mostly negative meaning. From the Gorgias 
(453c-454b) through the Republic to the Sophist, Plato aimed at delegitimizing rhetoric - 
comparing it to the art of crafting copies of the world, or, even worse, of creating 
illusions that substitute the real world.146 On the contrary, Speroni employs the metaphor 
to support rhetoric. In fact, he exploits the potentiality of a Platonic figure of speech as 
the most efficacious weapon against Plato. 
145  See the so-called “paradigme pictural” in F. Malhomme. “La rhétorique et les arts chez Sperone 
Speroni.” Rhetoric 29.2 (2011): 151-193. 157-62. The pictural trope is treated also in J.-L. Fournel. “Le 
‘portrait de la verité’ et la rhétorique vagabonde.” Discours littéraires et pratiques politiques. Ed. A. C. 
Fiorato. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987. 22-39. 
146 See E. C. Keuls. Plato and the Greek painting. Leiden: Brill, 1978. 
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While this chapter was dedicated to the defense of sophistry as a subject of 
discussion, the next chapter will examine the works of Speroni where sophistic rhetoric is 





Speroni’s practice of sophistic rhetoric 
 
Speech is a powerful lord, who with the finest and 
most invisible body achieves the most divine works. 
Gorgias of Leontini, Encomium of Helen 
 
 
Speroni’s literary production displays several examples of arguments, rhetorical 
strategies, and tropes that are variously related to ancient sophistry. The works that we 
are going to examine in this chapter show that Speroni was interested not only in 
recovering ancient sophists but also in experiencing a full exploitation of their art. The 
following pages are dedicated to the most representative works in these respects. Two 
types of texts are engaged. The first type uses the Protagorean double argument as a 
model of argumentation and, in fact, applies Protagoras’ relativism and theory of the 
human being as a measure of all things. The second type is the so-called paradoxical 
dialogue, in particular the Dialogo della Discordia (“Dialogue on Discord”) and Dialogo 
della Usura (“Dialogue on Usury”), which, I argue, draws on ancient sophistry as one of 
its main sources and encompasses discussion on major sophistic themes, such as the 
persuasive power of language and the use of the encomium to prove it. The practice of 
sophistry in these works is not a mere reproduction of the classics. Rather, it represents 
an original version of sophistic rhetoric in vernacular stemming from the profound 
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knowledge that Speroni had of the matter and from his literary brilliance. Ancient 
sophistry and its early modern version share one feature that made them suspicious: they 
challenge and undermine the bases of both Platonism and Aristotelianism. With his 
trattatelli, letters, and early dialogues, Speroni endorsed this challenge and provided 





The sophistic Double Arguments (Dissoi Logoi) are a collection of ancient texts by a 
single author who argues for and against several opinions. Most likely written in the 
second half of the fourth century B.C. by a rhetorician close to Protagoras’ school, they 
concern a variety of topics. They explore the nature of opposite concepts, such as good 
and bad, fine and shameful, just and unjust, and true and false.147 They were likely meant 
to be exercises for demonstrating how a skillful rhetorician is able to persuade his public 
of the validity and falsity of any opinion at the same time. The result of this practice is a 
new concept of truth and a substantial negation of the principle of non-contradiction, one 
of the three column on which Aristotle founded his logic. 
Aristotle acknowledged the risk involved in practicing double arguments and 
rejected the Protagorean theory implied in them in his Metaphysics (IV 5, 1009a, 7-16; 
IV 4, 1007b, 18-23), saying that it would bring a general confusion on both the 
epistemological and ontological level and result in the impossibility of reaching any 
147 They are collected in J. Dillon and T. Gergel, eds. The Greek Sophists. London: Penguin Books, 2003. 
318-333. 
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certainty. In other terms, Protagoras’ antilogies, like other aspects and consequences of 
his thought, strongly support a skeptical position, which explains why Sextus Empiricus 
discusses Protagoras’ perspective in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I, 216-19) as well as in 
Against the Mathematicians (VII, 60-4). 
Both Aristotle’s attack and Sextus’ interest make Speroni’s practice of the 
antilogic method not only remarkable in itself but also for its distance from the Stagirite 
and its affinity with skepticism. After a survey of early modern editions, MacPhail argued 
that “the Dissoi logoi had one edition but not translation or commentary in the 
Renaissance.” Indeed, the 1570 edition of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Philosophers 
published by Henri Etienne includes the Greek Dissoi logoi without Latin translation.148 
Perhaps Speroni read the double arguments in the Greek edition, or he knew them 
through Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus. This first part of the chapter aims to present 
three different examples of double argument in Speroni’s oeuvre to shed light on a 
significant part of his sophistic production. 
The first example concerns the opposition of arguments on an inter-textual level. 
On the one hand, as we already saw, Speroni defends sophists and their rhetoric in his 
trattatelli entitled In difesa dei sofisti and Contra Socrate; on the other hand, as we will 
examine, he attacks them in his Discorso dei lodatori (“Speech about the Admirers”).  
Although Speroni does not provide a clear connection between the two opposite 
arguments, it is a matter of fact that he writes for and against the same subject. The 
second example is the trattatello Della virtù (“On Virtue”)  in which Speroni analyzes 
opposing definitions of virtue and considers different aspects of each argument. In this 
148 E. MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. Genève: Droz, 2011. 41. 
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case the author acts as a referee between opposite interpretations and at the same time 
offers his own solution. The third examples concerns two letters to Alvise Cornaro and is 
the most explicit example of double argument in Speroni’s oeuvre; their titles, Contra la 
sobrietà (“Against Moderation”) and Per la sobrietà (“In Defense of Moderation”), the 
former against and the latter for moderation in life, clearly refers to a Protagorean model. 
The following analysis of the three examples is more focused on Speroni’s 
method of argumentation than on the topics treated in the texts, and more on forms than 
contents. The author’s actual intention in writing these texts is not part of our 
investigation; we will rather focus on his rhetorical ability to argue any position. 
     
 
1.1. Against the sophists 
 
The Discorso dei lodatori (“Speech about the Admirers”) is a short uncompleted text 
with no certain date. Speroni’s speech attacks two categories of orators. The first includes 
those who praise unworthy things for the only purpose of demonstrating their superior 
cleverness and being praised as divine men: 
 
E ciò fanno essi, come a me pare, perché si veda l’onnipotenza de’ loro ingegni, e 
sopraumani sian giudicati: e non si avvengono, che in ciò facendo, essi vituperano 
se medesimi; avvegna che ’l ragionar di tai cose, non che ’l lodarle e magnificarle, 
sia gran vergogna di chi ne parla.149 
149 S. Speroni. Opere […] tratte da’ mss. Originali. Eds. N. dalle Laste and M. Forcellini. 5 tomes. Venezia: 
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Although no name is explicitly stated, the description might fit Lucian of Samosata, the 
sophist, satirist, and rhetorician who wrote against common sense in a paradoxical 
fashion. One of the most famous of his works, The Fly, is an appreciation of what people 
usually consider a most annoying insect. According to Lucian, the fly is a noble and wise 
animal, full of virtues. Homer, for example, praised its courage. There is also evidence 
that its soul is immortal and can return to life. At the end Lucian declares that the list of 
fly’s qualities is so long that he will not be able to conclude his praise. In fact, it is almost 
impossible to exhaust such a subject.150 
 In his Apologia dei dialoghi I, Speroni condemns many of Lucian’s dialogues as 
hateful (“odiosi”). 151 In the third part of the Apologia, he portrays the sophist Lucian as a 
devilish Epicurean:  
 
Luciano sofista, uso a trattare in quei suoi dialoghi ed altri opuscoli così fatti nove 
menzogne di tutti i dei de’ gentili, con loro inferni poetici e lor ridicoli paradisi, la 
guerra e pace di Faetonte e di Endimione, ed altre simili vanitadi; alla perfine [sic] 
perduto il senno e la fede di cristian battezzato, non già da scherzo in uno asino, 
ma in un diabolico epicureo si tramutò veramente.152 
 
Paradoxically, Speroni himself attempts to write two works close to Lucian’s literary 
genre, the Dialogo dell’Usura and Dialogo della Discordia, in which usury and discord 
Appresso D. Occhi, 1740. III. 405 
150 For Lucian’s The Fly, see D. Marsh. Lucian and the Latins. Humor and Humanism in the Early 
Renaissance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan,1998. 150-152. 
151 M. Pozzi, ed. Trattatisti del Cinquecento. Tome II. Milano: Ricciardi, 1996. 721. 
152 Speroni. Opere. I. 345.  
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defend themselves and their role in human and natural life; consequently, his attack in the 
Discorso dei lodatori is against a literary tradition to which Speroni himself partially 
belongs. Furthermore, in his Apologia dei dialoghi he describes his two dialogues on 
usury and discord as a pleasant practice, and proposes a list of classical works that have 
the same legitimate purpose, including Lucian’s works: “è iscusabile al creder mio, 
chiunque legge ozioso, per sottraersi da qualche noia, Terenzio, Plauto, Ovidio, Gallo, e 
li epigrammi di Marziale, di Luciano la vera istoria, la mosca.” 153 Moreover, in the 
defense of his tragedy Canace, Speroni legitimizes the paradoxical works as rhetorical 
products with the ability to invert: “fo adonque anticamente lodato Busiri, la Musca e 
altre cose simili, e a’ giorni nostri la discordia e l’usura; al che fare arte nessuna non è 
che ci dia ragione o precetti, anzi è solo l’arte di fare il contrario.”154 The two dialogues 
are more than a pleasant practice and represent two exemplary cases of sophistic rhetoric, 
as will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
The fact that the Discorso dei lodatori was composed at an uncertain date 
prevents a clear understanding of its relationship with other works. One can hypothesize 
that the author either changed his mind about the value of praising unworthy things or did 
not reveal his true intention in any of the works mentioned above. In either case, the 
result is an inter-textual double argument: on the one hand Speroni practices Lucian’s 
literary genre and defends its legitimacy, on the other hand he condemns it as an evil 
practice. 
153 Speroni. Opere. I. 335. 
154 S. Speroni. Canace e scritti in sua difesa. Ed. Ch. Roaf. Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 
1982. 230. For a detailed analysis of this and similar passages in different Speroni’s works of Speroni, see 
M. Pozzi. “Speroni e il genere epidittico.” Sperone Speroni. Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1989. 
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The second category of orators that Speroni attacks in his Discorso dei lodatori 
concerns the sophist and is particularly striking for its contradiction with what we have 
read in the second chapter of this dissertation. One should blame sophists, Speroni says, 
because they perform speeches that do not prove almost anything: 
 
Sono anche alcuni poco men vani de’ sopradetti; li quali, mentre essi lodano 
qualche cosa, molto ne parlano, ma poco o nulla ne provano […] essi parlano 
parte a guisa di adulatori, siccome sono, parte a guisa di ostentatori di una lor 
certa loquacità, perché eloquenzia sia riputata. E di questi cotali nell’una lingua e 
nell’altra molto abbonda la nostra età.155 
 
One may argue that Speroni implicitly makes a distinction between the ancient sophists, 
such as Gorgias and Protagoras, and the sophists of his age. Indeed, in his Apologia dei 
dialoghi as well as in other works, he praises the former and blames the latter. That 
argument would avoid a contradiction in Speroni’s works but has to be rejected on the 
basis of the following passage from the Discorso dei lodatori: 
 
Or non è dubbio, che questi tali son della schiera de’ molto miseri ed infelici 
sofisti; i quali attendendo, siccome fan tuttavia, anzi a parere che ad essere, 
meritamente non uomini, ma ombre d’uomini dalli intendenti son riputati. 
Perciocché essi son quelli che il gran Platone in persona di quel buon Socrate, 
padre e maestro delle scienze e virtù, nei suoi divini dialogi or convincea 
155 Speroni. Opere. III. 405-406. 
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disputando, ed or schernendo ammirava, sempre ammonendo con gentil modo la 
sua repubblica, che da’ costumi e dottrine loro non men dannose che vergognose, 
guardar dovesse i suoi cittadini. De’ quali antichi sofisti quasi ombra d’ombra, ora 
a dì nostro il rimane ancora qualche sembianza; e sono costoro di cui pur dianzi si 
ragionava.156 
 
According to this passage, the first category of orators, which includes Lucian of 
Samosata, would be an unworthy copy of the second category, the great sophists 
mentioned in Plato’s dialogue. Nevertheless, Speroni condemns both categories and 
praises the great (“gran”) Plato and his mentor Socrates, father of all virtues, who blamed 
the sophists and urged the city to forbid their teaching. If the passage above were 
anonymous, one would say that the writer definitely is a Platonist, Marsilio Ficino, for 
example, rather than the author of the works In difesa dei sofisti and Contra Socrate. 
Indeed, it is striking how the same author could write in praise of sophistry against Plato 
and Socrates and then blame the sophists as enemies of Platonism. 
In the passage above, Speroni acts as a Platonist even in the terms and tropes that 
he employs. The attack begins with the classical opposition between appearance, 
connected to ignorance, and the real world. It continues with the representation of the 
ancient sophists as shadows and modern sophists as a darker duplication of them (“quasi 
ombra d’ombra”). Two parts of Plato’s Republic may have inspired this figure of speech: 
the myth of the cave (in book VII) where the prisoners are obliged to look at the shadows 
projected on the wall at the bottom of the cave, while they think this projection is the real 
156 Ibid. 406. 
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world; and the critique of the mimetic arts (in book X), which are considered useless 
activity aiming to create a copy of what already is a copy of an eternal form. 
 The fact that Speroni dedicates a longer and more articulated discourse in 
defending the sophists in his two trattatelli, than in condemning them in the Discorso dei 
lodatori, may suggest that his real intention is to defend them. The dialogue in cardinal 
Amulio’s house in the Apologia dei dialoghi and Brocardo speech in the Dialogo della 
retorica - both of them examined in the second chapter – suggest the same interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Speroni does not resolve the contradiction between those works and the 
Discorso dei lodatori and stands as an author of opposing discourses. This is exactly the 
goal of the double argument that leaves the reader confused about the possibility of 
finding the truth. Arguing against sophists after his defense of them, Speroni actually 
creates a unique example of antilogy. 
 
 
1.2. What is virtue? 
 
The second example to analyze reveals other aspects of Speroni’s rhetoric. Like his other  
trattatelli, Della virtù (“On virtue”) was probably conceived as a private note or first 
draft for a future dialogue or speech to present in an Accademia or to a broader public. 
On the one hand, this makes the text difficult to interpret and summarize. On the other 
hand, the reader has the opportunity to explore Speroni’s speechwriting technique. 
Metaphorically speaking, we can access Speroni’s scriptorium, his “place for writing,” to 
observe him at work. The draft version that we are going to examine, the only one 
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currently available, allows us to look at the steps of Speroni’s reasoning in building his 
text. From this draft, one can illustrate how Speroni writes as a rhetorician looking for the 
most persuasive way to present an issue. Moreover, one sees how a double argument may 
be employed in the process of writing.   
 Della virtù is essentially a sequence of differing opinions on what constitutes 
virtue. Speroni proceeds by presenting each opinion, considering its aspects and whether 
it is true or false.  
The first opinion states that virtue is a natural product: “Alcuni credono che la 
virtù sia natura, cioè che l’uomo della tale complessione sia di tal virtù, e dell’altra, 
dell’altra; come anche il tale animale bruto per sua natura è di tale virtù e vizio. Questa 
opinione puo’ essere bona o cattiva.”157 Speroni then presents both sides of the argument, 
showing how it is possible to defend and attack the validity of this position at the same 
time. At the end of his analysis, Speroni reveals to the reader that this opinion is partially 
true and partially false (“è dunque parte vera, parte falsa cotale opinione”). 158  It is 
possible either to defend or attack it, and the choice does not depend on the truthfulness 
of the position, but rather on the intention of the rhetorician who chooses the aim of his 
speech. The author also writes personal notes addressed to himself, which demonstrate 
the major steps of his reasoning. 
The second opinion examined by Speroni opposes the first one (virtue is natural) 
and states that virtue can be acquired only by a long practice of virtuous acts: “la seconda 
opinione si è che la virtù sia usanza e consuetudine acquistata con un longo esercizio, e di 
qui proviene il nome di costume, e quel che comunemente si dice, habitus fit ex 
157 Speroni. Opere. III. 391. 
158 Ibid. 391. 
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frequentatis actibus”.159 The author, then, applies the same pattern of argumentation, like 
a rhetorical refrain, showing that this second opinion may be considered partially valid: 
“questa ancora è in parte buona in parte cattiva. È cattiva se si crede che in ciò solo 
consista la perfezion dell’abito virtuoso, è bona, se si vuol dire che ciò aiuti a far perfecto 
l’abito virtuoso”. 160  Like for the first opinion, the rhetorician does not endeavor to 
discuss truthfulness, but rather the possibility of persuading the reader of different things 
by applying different arguments. As he did for the first opinion, Speroni takes note of the 
main steps of his reasoning and then, when he apparently finds a potentially convincing 
example, he writes that he should keep it in mind for employment at the most appropriate 
moment. In fact, it makes sense that he was writing a draft for a possible speech on the 
nature of virtue to perform in public.     
The third opinion presented in Della virtù is that virtue is the possession of 
knowledge. Through the way in which Speroni presents this option, one can understand 
that this is his personal contribution on the subject which marks the distance between his 
personal thought and the philosophical tradition. For a while, Speroni acts more as a 
philosopher than as a rhetorician and argue against Aristotle regarding the nature of 
virtue: 
 
Or veggiamo come questo abito della virtù scientifico si generi in noi. E dico che 
si genera per ragion dimostrativa e per ragion probabile. Probabile e superficiale è 
tutto quello che delle virtù dice Aristotele; perché non lo dice e prova per le 
ragioni delle virtù. Ma noi parleremo delle scienza della virtù acquistata per la sua 
159 Ibid. 391-392. 
160 Ibid. 392. 
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causa demostrativa, la qual causa è la natura. E questo mostraremo in noi stessi 
senza altri libri della Etica. Perché noi stessi saremo il libro, ove impararemo che 
cosa è virtù in sé e nelle sue specie particolari, senza leggere li altri autori.161 
 
If we were unfamiliar with the author and context of this paragraph, we might identify it 
as the introduction of an anti-Aristotelian treatise on ethics. Aristotle’s arguments on 
virtue are accused of being superficial, weak, and supported by no proof. It is a pity that 
Speroni did not complete this work, for it would have been of great interest, for the 
history of the Italian literature as well as the history of philosophy, to read the final 
version of such a refutation of Aristotle’s Ethics in vernacular language by a well-known 
Aristotelian. At least one can appreciate the original metaphor of the self as the book that 
one should trust the most to acquire virtue. 
 The fourth opinion on what is virtue is provided by Plato and Socrates. According 
to Speroni, this may also be considered from two opposing points of view, such that this 
opinion would be erroneous for some reasons and correct for others. As he did with the 
previous opinions, Speroni follows the antilogic pattern of arguing on the both sides of 
the issue and shows his ability to create double speeches opposing the different 
perspectives of the philosophical tradition.  
 
  
1.3. Condemning and praising moderation 
 
161 Ibid. 394. 
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The third example of opposing arguments is clearly expressed in the title of the two texts 
Contra la sobrietà and Per la sobrietà which are strictly connected. Both are dedicated to 
“Messer” Luigi (Alvise) Cornaro, who was popular for his sober life and wrote the 
treatise Della vita sobria published in Padua in 1558 and republished several times. 162 
His letter to Speroni dated April 1547 helps to clarify the reason for the composition of 
Speroni’s two opposing discourses. 163 In his letter Cornaro states that his moderation in 
life has made him immortal (“lo ordine ha fatto me immortale”) and evidence of this is 
his surviving the pain of the death of his friends, especially Ruzzante (Angelo Beolco, 
1502-1542), a popular actor close to Cornaro as well as to Speroni. He continues by 
praising the results of a moderate life and defines his as the happiest possible. There is 
just one thing that threatens his perfect state: the death of friends caused by lack of 
moderation. Thus, he asks Speroni to convince their common friends to embrace a 
regular and sober life. 
 Speroni’s first response to Cornaro’s request is his letter Contra la sobrietà which 
begins by referring to Cornaro’s letter: 
 
La vostra lettera mi è favore, perché è segno che amorevolmente vi ricordate di 
me, e che amate la vita mia: e mi è anche di gran disfavore, quando per lei si 
vede, che io faccio cosa, che mi è di danno e vergogna, e perciò me ne riprendete. 
Dunque io vi ringrazio parte, e parte devo iscusarmi, e se non posso o non voglio 
con lo ammendarmi, almeno con le parole; acciò non paia che con la mia vita non 
162 For a critical edition of the text and related letters with an historical introduction, see A. Cornaro. Scritti 
sulla vita sobria. Elogio e lettere. Ed. M. Milani. Venezia: Corbo e Fiore editori, 1983. A further study on 
Cornaro and his work, and the friendship with Speroni, is in E. Lippi. Cornariana. Studi su Alvise 
Cornaro. Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1983. 1-47. 
163 The letter is published in Cornaro. Scritti sulla vita sobria. Elogio e lettere. 141-143. 
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sobria, nella quale ho tanti compagni, anzi signori, manchi di difensore, poiche’ 
ella manca di laude.164 
 
The style of the double-speech performance is announced in this very beginning. Indeed, 
Speroni claims to be happy and sad at the same time in receiving Cornaro’s letter. He 
welcomes Cornaro’s letter as evidence of their friendship and declares it as the cause of 
his treatise against Cornaro’s argument on moderation. The above passage reflects these 
contradictory feelings with two oppositions of coupled terms (“favore […] disfavore”, “vi 
ringrazio parte […] parte devo iscusarmi”). Finally, Speroni expresses his need to defend 
his disorderly life by praising immoderation, which is in fact accomplished by 
condemning the life of moderation. 
 Speroni’s attack on sober living is introduced by a mythological allegory. When 
Pluto and the three Parcae complained about Aesculapius’ power to resurrect dead men, 
Jove struck Aesculapius with lightning because he was reversing the natural order. This 
myth shows that Cornaro’s dream of an immortal life runs against the divine rules. 
Several arguments follow to destroy possible defenses of the sober life. Among the most 
interesting is the idea that moderation – now personified – would be constantly focused 
on diet and thus would destroy any other virtue, above all the soldiers’ fortitude as well 
as advisors’ wisdom: 
 
che se la vita sobria comanda che si mangi tanto, e non più né manco, e di tai 
cose, ed a tal ora, e non più tardi o più per tempo; non bisogna dunque mai 
164 Speroni. Opere. III. 414. A defective copy transcribed by Girolamo Cornaro, a author’s relative, is 
published in Cornaro. Scritti sulla vita sobria. Elogio e lettere. 205-212. 
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digiunare, né mai far cosa che possa interromper questo ordine, né studiare, né 
camminare, né combattere per la patria; perché ciò facendo si interrompe l’ordine 
dei cibi e qualità di essi, e il tempo del suo mangiare […]. E la vita sobria non 
pensa ad altro che al suo mangiare […] bella cosa saria al tempo di consigliare e 
combattere per la patria veder il savio far la sua colazione.165 
 
The ironic tone conveys an efficacious argument: a perfectly moderate habit requires so 
much attention to one’s own private life that to focus on any other activity would be 
impossible, in turn resulting in general negligence towards public duties. This argument 
is reinforced by recalling philosophical authorities: 
 
La sanità secondo i buoni filosofi è gran bene, ma non però il sommo, né il dolore 
è il peggior male che si abbia. Maggior mal è il mancare del debito suo verso gli 
amici, li posteri, la patria: alli quali si manca di necessità, se il viver lungamente 
in sanità è il fine nostro.166 
 
Further arguments against moderation are based on medicine, natural philosophy, moral 
habits, and personal experience. The final part of the text restates the authentic affection 
of Speroni for Cornaro, but above all proposes to embrace the relativity of any 
perspective and to accept the impossibility of defining any stable value for moderation: 
165 Speroni. Opere. III. 416. 
166 Ibid. 417. 
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“Dio […] conservi vostra magnificenza, e me, e chi ne ama, ciascuno col suo ordine o 
disordine di vivere: che io ho il vostro per più disordine, che non avete voi il mio.”167 
 The reader convinced by the attack Contra la sobrietà would be disoriented by 
the opposite speech in Speroni’s letter Per la sobrietà, which is designed to endorse a 
moderate life habits. The author’s conversion towards Cornaro’s opinion is introduced by 
a comparison with a classical example that is a powerful first step to persuade the reader: 
 
Leggesi che Stesicoro poeta antico ciciliano, poiché in certi suoi versi disse male 
di Elena figliuola di Giove, divenne cieco: ma pentendosi poscia di averne mal 
favellato, e scrivendo in contrario, ricoverò la veduta. Or se ciò avvenne a costui 
per dir male, e ridir bene di una donna, bella certo, ma cagione per la sua bellezza 
di tante morti e di troiani, e di greci, e di sciti, e di etiopi con la roina di un sì gran 
regno, non debbo io credere, che similmente mi avvenga?168 
 
The rhetorical device already used in Contra la sobrietà is now applied with the opposite 
purpose of praising moderation as a virtue. Indeed, in both texts Speroni recalls a 
mythological anecdote to introduce his argument and give his advice. The two pairs of 
characters (Aesculapius-Cornaro in the argument against moderation and Stesicoro-
Speroni in the opposite argument) share the same pattern: the latter character should 
imitate the former as a model. Furthermore, in both the cases the myth highlights an 
aspect of divine order and is a source of inspiration to follow the right behavior. 
167 Ibid. 420. 
168 Ibid. 421. 
 101 
                                                        
Plato is among the most popular sources that could have inspired the passage 
above. Indeed, Speroni could perhaps have read about the story of the ancient Sicilian 
poet Stesichorus in the dialogue Phaedrus (243a), where Socrates, at the end of his 
speech and competing with the rhetorician Lysias, tells Phaedrus that he intends now to 
propose a true speech about Eros, since he feels guilty for having acted as a sophistic 
rhetorician and wants to expiate his sin. To explain his case, Socrates compares himself 
to Stesichorus who was punished with blindness for having composed a speech against 
Helen of Troy and recovered by composing a Palinode.  
As the lyric poet and Socrates did, Speroni intends to praise what he previously 
condemned since, unlike Stesichorus, he has already regained the sight – in his case the 
intellectual instead of the physical – before composing the palinode rather than after: 
 
Dissine male [della sobrietà], e se cieco non ne divenni, come colui [i.e. 
Stesicoro], certo in dicendone male io era cieco peggio di lui; perciocché io era 
cieco dell’intelletto, non conoscendo quanto io peccassi in scriver lettera cosí 
cattiva: ed ora non senza grazia di Dio credo esser mosso a disdirmi; e credo che 
non come Stesicoro dopo il fatto, ma innanzi tratto sia guarito e racquistato il 
buon lume della ragione. Perciocché non solamente vedo il mio errore, ma veggio 
chiaro tutte le laudi di questa rara virtú.169 
 
The palinode that follows, based on argumentation and citations of authorities, is 
unfinished. The last sentence presents a similarity between the sober eater and angels: 
169 Ibid. 
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“chi poco mangia, è prossimo agli angioli, che nulla mangiano; al diavol no, il quale 
devora il peccatore, et semper quaerit quem devoret. Peccò …”170 The comparison to 
Satan devouring sinners’ souls, which could evoke in a reader’s imagination one of the 
most popular and terrifying scenes of Dante’s Inferno (34, vv. 55-60), gives a clear moral 
and religious connotation to the two opposite habits. 
 The palinode is shorter and less articulated than the accusation, a weak and 
uncompleted eulogy (“un fiacco panegirico, non per niente incompiuto”) – as Emilio 
Lippi described it.171 Given that praise of moderation and temperance had been such a 
popular topic in medical, philosophical, and religious literature from Antiquity to the De 
vita libri tres of Marsilio Ficino, both in Pagan and Christian literature, Speroni might 
have thought his palinode would have appeared redundant, or a rhetorical performance 
too facile to attract the reader’s attention and not challenging enough for the author. 
On the contrary, the speech Contra la sobrietà was one of the most difficult 
arguments to present and needed to be thoughtfully designed. Speroni is aware that an 
orator is assessed by his public. One can imagine his pride, as a rhetorician, in designing 
the first speech ever written in Western culture against the virtue that had always been 
praised as a principle of health for body and soul. Speroni is competing with the classical 
models that he knew and quoted in his works, including Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and 
Lucian’s The Fly, but the difficulty of his rhetorical work increases remarkably because 
of the topic, for Speroni is not dealing with superficial subjects, like Lucian’s fly, nor 
with mythological figures, like Gorgias’ Helen. In his Contra la sobrietà Speroni is 
170 Speroni. Opere. III. 424. 
171 Lippi. Cornariana. Studi su Alvise Cornaro. 37. 
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condemning a virtue that was not supposed to be attacked and praising the vice that no 
author would publically defend. 
The summaries of the texts (Summario contra la vita sobria and Summario per la 
vita sobria), found in a manuscript of the Biblioteca Marciana in Venice and published 
by Lippi, allow us to look at the process of Speroni’s writing from a tentative list of notes 
through the last version of the works.172 Furthermore, we can appreciate the presence in 
the summaries of aphorisms, tropes, and examples that the author decided to omit from 
the final version for unknown reasons. Particularly interesting in the first summary are 
the arguments against common sense: “troppo desiderate di vivere, et in ciò non siete 
sobrio”; “La gioventù, nemica della sobrietà, è bella, non già la vecchiezza”; “la sobrietà 
è simile alla età aurea che fu goffa, et sotto Saturno, mal Dio, non così Giove”.173  
The structure of the two summaries allows the reader to easily perceive the 
opposition between arguments. The clearest and most sophistic example of rhetoric 
doubled across the two texts is how Speroni deploys the idea of measurement. In the 
summary against moderation Speroni describes the theoretical monotony of an 
impossible fixed position of the sun in Libra, comparing it to the obsessive act of 
measuring. He imagines Cornaro as the luminary persisting in the same celestial position 
for the entire year in order to show his paradoxical habit: 
 
rare volte si deve adoperare la libra, però una sol volta vi va il sole; se foste il 
sole, sempre sareste in libra, sempre li giorni sariano pari, sempre egualmente 
caldo et fredo: guai al  mondo se eravate sole, come hora sete in questa vita. O 
172 The two summaries are published in Lippi. Cornariana. Studi su Alvise Cornaro. 39-44. 
173 Ibid. 37-41. 
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misero colui che i giorni conta, et voi contate le hore! Altri non pesano i ducati, et 
voi li becci et li quattrini et li bagatini.174 
 
In the summary in support of moderation Speroni argues in the opposite sense: 
 
Pesiamo le monete per non essere ingannati nella roba; perché non pesar quel che 
mangiamo, per non c’ingannar noi stessi nella vita? Compriamo a peso le cose, e 
le mangiamo a discrettione? Il peso, il numero e la misura sono cose utilissime 
alla humanità, come si vede, et per mostrar la eccellenza sua si dà il pesar fin alle 
anime da San Michele.175 
 
The first passage points out the opposition between the practice of moderation and 
natural life, and stresses the strangeness of Cornaro’s habit. The second passage inverts 
the argument and proposes measurement as the supreme principle that rules the mankind 
in life and afterlife, with a biblical and iconographic reference to Saint Michael’s 
weighing of souls on Judgment Day. 
The texts Contra la sobrietà and Per la sobrietà as well as their summaries are 
opposing arguments representing a most relevant example of antilogia in the vernacular 
literature of the Renaissance. The speech against moderation and its summary are also 
particularly interesting in themselves as an attempt to invert common sense and convince 
the reader that what is universally considered a virtue is actually a vice. In Aristotle’s 
174 Ibid. 40. 
175 Ibid. 42. 
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words, Speroni aims at “making the weaker argument stronger” (Rhetoric 1402a) 
combining the rhetoric of Protagoras and Gorgias. 
 
 
2. Rhetoric in dialogues 
 
The dialogues and writings on the theory of dialogue are the most studied part of 
Speroni’s oeuvre. Evidence of this can be found in the large number of international 
scholarly contributions on the subject and modern editions of dialogues as compared to 
the attention given to other parts and aspects of Speroni’s works. However, the Dialogo 
della Discordia and Dialogo dell’Usura, published with the other dialogues in 1542 by 
Daniele Barbaro and then republished several times in the sixteenth century, have 
attracted less attention than some of the others. 176 The summary with extended quotes 
given by Francesco Cammarosano, almost a century ago, although useful for an initial 
study, does not investigate the meaning, relevance, or sources of the dialogues.177 Since 
then, uncertainty about the nature and final goal of the dialogues has most likely 
discouraged scholars from deepening their study and has led to a scholarly focus directed 
more toward Speroni’s intentions as a writer and his authorship. This particular attention 
has resulted in interesting interpretations but has not resulted in any consistent result 
because of Speroni’s contradictory statements.  
176  The dialogues were published in 1543, 1544 (1545), 1546, 1550, 1552, 1558, 1560, 1564, 1596 and 
finally in 1740. 
177 See F. Cammarosano. La vita e le opere di Sperone Speroni, Empoli: Tipografia R. Noccioli, 1920. 35-
38 (on Dialogo dell’Usura); 85-90 (on Dialogo della Discordia). 
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A brief survey of scholarly remarks will give the reader a general idea of the 
tendencies of the most recent research and of the tangled issue of identifying Speroni’s 
actual intentions. In his contribution published in 1989, after having collected several 
quotes from different Speroni’s works, Mario Pozzi was surprised that in some of them 
the author considered his two dialogues among the most precious he ever wrote because 
they were conceived as a pure exercise of rhetoric.178  In contrast, John Snyder, in both 
his essays published in 1989, argued that in the Apologia dei dialoghi, Speroni 
strategically masked his real intention in condemning his dialogues as being an error of 
his youth, and that Speroni’s self accusation should be read as a rhetorical device to avoid 
condemnation by the Inquisition.179 One year later, in his monograph on Speroni, Jean-
Louis Fournel noticed the contradiction between what the author repeatedly stated about 
the ancient authors, who had inspired him in composing his paradoxical dialogues, and 
the actual intention of those authors. In fact, Fournel argues, on the one hand Speroni 
compared his dialogues on discord and usury with the praise of Busiris by Isocrates and 
the appreciation of the fly by Lucian, considering all of them as a literary joke. On the 
other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that Isocrates and Lucian considered their own 
works a pure joke, a contradiction of which Speroni should have been aware.180 Finally, 
in her 1992 monograph on the Renaissance dialogue, Virginia Cox noticed that Speroni 
rejected his dialogue on usury not only in his Apologia but also in his private epistolary – 
178 M. Pozzi. “Speroni e il genere epidittico.” Sperone Speroni. Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1989. 85: 
“Risulta dunque, non senza qualche sorpresa, che lo Speroni considera l’Usura e la Discordia le gemme 
più mirabili dei dialoghi giovanili, quelli in cui la virtù retorica opera in tutta la sua purezza.” 
179 J. R. Snyder. “La maschera dialogica: la teoria del dialogo di Sperone Speroni.” Sperone Speroni. 117: 
“l’Apologia è la messa in scena di una serie di strategie di difesa.” See also J. R. Snyder. Writing the Scene 
of Speaking: Theories of Dialogue in the late Italian Renaissance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1989. Chapter 3. 
180 J.-L. Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone Speroni: liberté de la parole et règles de l'écriture. Marburg: 
Hitzeroth, 1990. 74. 
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which may be considered evidence against Snyder’s interpretation – while Gambattista 
Gelli, one of the first interpreters of the dialogue, read it as an actual defense of usury, 
perhaps reflecting the actual intention of Speroni.181 All the significant studies mentioned 
above are based on textual evidence but they do not give the same results, which proves 
that any of these pieces of evidence can ultimately prevail over the others. The only 
common result that these studies definitely share is an observation of Speroni’s 
contradictory authorship, or at least his tendency to confuse the reader about his actual 
intention. Indeed, even the label “paradoxical dialogues” is problematic, at least for the 
Dialogo della Discordia, as in his trattatello entitled Della pace, a serious draft for a 
political treatise, Speroni also argues supporting discord as an essential force for natural 
and human life.182 
The uncertainty about Speroni’s intention as an author may be frustrating and 
invites a shift in method and direction of investigation in studying the two dialogues on 
discord and usury. The following analysis does not aim anymore to understand Speroni’s 
actual intention, and the question “why?” will be replaced with “what?” What is actually 
expressed in the texts? In other words, it is possible to restart a productive investigation 
by changing the perspective of observation. It is necessary to leave aside the author’s 
statements on his works and directly explore their rhetorical aspects and sources. 
Furthermore, when an aporia does not allow a clear understanding of the author’s 
purpose, it is highly possible one is dealing with a sophistic product. Ambiguity, 
contradiction, and deceiving are, indeed, part of sophists’ procedures in writing. A major 
181 V. Cox. The Renaissance dialogue: literary dialogue in its social and political contexts, to Galileo. 
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 75. The letter is published in M. Pozzi 
and M. R. Loi. “Le lettere familiari di Sperone Speroni.” Giornale storico della letteratura italiana 163 
(1986): 386-387. 
182 Speroni. Opere. V. 437. 
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example is Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, where the purpose declared at the beginning 
seems serious: “I wish to free the accused from blame, and, revealing her detractors as 
liars and showing forth the truth, to free her from ignorance,” whereas the closure 
somehow suggests the opposite: “my purpose was to compose a speech as an encomium 
of Helen and an amusement for myself,” which makes it difficult to establish the actual 
intention of Gorgias, who leaves the reader confused about his aims. 183 
  
 
2.1. Dialogo della Discordia 
 
In the Dialogo della Discordia, the goddess Discordia defends her role in the human 
world against Jove's charges, performing rhetorical speeches and engaging in dialogues 
with Jove to justify her role in human life and affairs. Desiderius Erasmus’ Praise of 
Folly might have been a source of inspiration for Speroni’s work. Like Discordia, Folly 
defends herself against the accusations struck by her delegators and sophistry certainly 
has a major role in Erasmus’ work.184 Nevertheless, Speroni’s dialogue keeps its own 
originality, as we will see in the following analyzes of the text. Furthermore, a substantial 
difference between the two works is the language: Speroni wrote his Dialogo in 
vernacular as an attempt to create a modern version of a classical genre for a larger 
public.185 
183 Dillon and T. Gergel, eds. The Greek Sophists. 77 and 84. 
184 MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. 112-117. 
185 See the introduction of D. Erasmus. The Praise of Folly. Ed. C.H. Miller. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2003. 
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One has to go back to the early ancient Greek literature to find discord considered 
as a positive force. This is the case of Heraclitus’ idea of polemos as the origin of 
everything and a fundamental force allowing the continuity of life. 186  Except for 
Heraclitus and a few other authors, the Greek goddesses Enyo and Eris as well as the 
Latin Discordia had usually been negative figures in literature, and neither an encomium 
nor a praise of them has reached us either as a work or as a reference. This make 
Speroni’s dialogue a unique work with regard to the topic. In this sense the Dialogo della 
Discordia may be considered a case similar to his letter Contra la sobrietà – that we 
examined above - but in the opposite sense, for in the latter he argues against the queen of 
virtues, while in the former he praises what has been considered the personification of 
any natural and human destructiveness. The fact that the Dialogo della Discordia ends 
without any final verdict pronounced by Jove as a judge does not nullify the several 
arguments presented within the work. On the contrary, one may speculate that the 
conclusion of the dialogue, characterized by increasing conflict, is actually the final 
victory of the goddess. In either case, the following close reading does not speculate 
about the real winner in the Dialogo, but rather explores the rhetorical techniques 
displayed in the text, the ongoing discussion on the relativity of any argument, and the 
connection with sophistry in several regards.187 
The Dialogo begins with Discordia complaining about her bad reputation among 
186 See Heraclitus of Ephesus’ fragments: “It is necessary to realize that war is common, and strife is 
justice, and that everything happens in accordance with strife and necessity.” “War is father of all and king 
of all. Some he reveals has gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free” in R. Waterfield, ed. 
The First Philosophers. The Presocratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 40 
(F22, F23). 
187 A brief attempt to explore the role of sophistry in the dialogue is in R. Buranello. “The Identity of 
Discord: The Paradoxical Discourse of Sperone Speroni’s Dialogo della discordia.” Studi d’italianistica 
nell’Africa australe 12.2 (1999): 58-74. 73-74. 
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humans and gods: “parti Giove, che io, la quale produssi e conservo il mondo, degna sia 
di dover essere biasimanta e bestemmiata da ciascheduno?” 188  She claims to be the 
mother of the gods and to have permitted the rise of Jove’s power in universe through his 
conflict with Kronos: “Ricordati almeno d’aver avuto da me la signoria che tu tieni: con 
ciò sia cosa che la discordia, che fu tra te e tuo padre, ti fe’ signore dell’universo.”189 
Therefore, she asks Jove for an act of justice to give her the honor she deserves.  
At the beginning Jove is not willing to listen to Discordia’s arguments, fearing 
that somebody might see him talking with her, which would be considered inappropriate. 
After Discordia accepts to wear Ganymede’s clothes in order to hide her identity, Jove 
invites her to present her arguments: “parla e dimmi sicuramente le tue ragioni.”190 She 
begins to speak in order to move the king of gods by showing him her miserable state: 
 
Io parlerò Giove, a fine di farti pietoso alla mia miseria; non con animo d’esser 
lodata come eloquente. Muova il dolor la mia lingua, parta e dispona a suo modo 
le mie parole; e quale io il sento nel core, tale a te vegna agli orecchi: che senza 
essere altramente artificiosa ed ornata, assai ti persuaderà l’orazion mia a dolerti 
di me.191 
 
If Jove plays here the role of judge, then Discordia is breaking one of the first rules given 
by Aristotle’s Rhetoric, specifically that “speakers ought not to distract the judge by 
driving him to anger, envy or compassion” because “that would be rather as if one were 
188 Speroni. Opere. I. 133. 
189 Ibid. I. 133. 
190 Ibid. I. 136-137. 
191 Ibid. I. 137. 
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deliberately to make crooked a ruler that one was intending to use.” (1354a)192 
  Rather than the Stagirite, she seems to follow what Gorgias theorized in the third 
argument of his Encomium of Helen, where he explains how powerfully a well-crafted 
speech can affect the human soul: “speech is a powerful lord, who with the finest and 
most invisible body achieves the most divine works: it can stop fear and banish grief and 
can create joy and nurture pity.” 193 Gorgias’ Encomium was translated into Latin by 
Pietro Bembo and published by Aldo Manuzio in 1513 in a collection of works by 
ancient rhetoricians and orators. 194 Given Speroni’s interest in the art of rhetoric and 
practice of oratory and his consideration of Bembo as a mentor in those fields, it would 
not surprise if Gorgias’s words inspired Discordia’s incipit.  
In any case, Discordia declares that she is going to perform a short speech without 
any unnecessary elements to prove what she has stated from the beginning: “ogni mia 
operazione esser buona da sé.” 195 But rather than an oration, Discordia engages in a 
dialogue with Jove, in which she conducts the reasoning and the god confirms the 
correctness of the discourse, in the way Plato often presents his dialogues, where Socrates 
leads and the other characters follow his verbal stream. The climax of this similarity 
comes when Discordia deploys a maieutic approach posing questions to Jove:196 
  
Disc. Ora saltiamo, come se Teti, di cielo a basso, e discorriamo con lo intelletto 
192 Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric. Ed. H. Lawson-Tancred. Penguin Books: London, 1991. 67. 
193 The Greek Sophist, 79. 
194 P. Bembo. Gorgiae Leontini in Helenam laudatio. Ed. F. Donadi. Roma: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 1983. 
E. MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. 39. 
195 Speroni. Opere. I. 137. 
196 Pozzi briefly notes “un fitto dialogo ‘socratico’ e battute molto vivaci” in his “Nota introduttiva.” 
Trattatelli del Cincequento. 499. This aspect of the dialogue is mentioned in R. Buranello, “The Identity 
of Discord: The Paradoxical Discourse of Sperone Speroni’s Dialogo della discordia.” Studi 
d’italianistica nell’Africa australe 12.2 (1999): 58-74: 68 and 72. 
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per tutte quante le parti del mondo mortale, le quali (parlo le principali) quattro 
sono e non più: quelle come stanno di compagnia? Gio. In quella guisa che 
l’acqua si può dir compagna al fuoco, e l’aere della terra che sono contrari. Disc. 
Dimmi Giove, come produsse queste cose la nostra madre natura? Giov. Come 
conserva, così produsse. Disc. Or non conserva con lite? Gio. Con lite conserva. 
Disc. Dunque con lite produsse. Giov. Così pare. Disc. Che cosa è questa lite, con 
la qual la Natura produsse e conserva ogni cosa, così eterna come caduca? Tu non 
rispondi? Gio. Gran cosa è questa, che tu disideri di sapere. Disc. Anzi no: 
perocché niuno è sì cieco, che non veda me poverella esser quella, con la quale la 
nostra madre natura produsse e conserva ogni cosa.197 
 
Discordia concludes by stating that everyone can see she is the natural force that creates 
and conserves everything. The last words are also the beginning of the oration to move 
Jove that Discordia announced before. Then she presents herself as the first means 
created by Nature to give birth to everything else: “[Natura] fece dunque come far suole 
il fabbro, il qual dovendo fabbricar un coltello, forma primieramente il martello, onde il 
ferro si batta.” 198  Despite Discordia’s effort to convince Jove that she should be 
considered a necessary and beneficial goddess, at the end of the speech the king of gods 
considers her speech only a narration and not an oration, for she did not provide any 
proof: “finora la tua orazione è stata solamente narrazione, e non provasti nessuna 
cosa.”199 Jove thus invites her to produce a second oration to persuade everybody that 
197 Speroni. Opere. I. 138. 
198 Ibid. 138. 
199 Ibid. 139. 
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only one discord exists and this is a benefic force even though sometimes its effects seem 
evil. At the beginning Discordia complains about Jove’s request and points out that the 
hypothesis of a double discord would lead to a paradox: 
 
se altra Discordia sono io, ed altra colei, onde si deriva ogni cosa; ed ella ed io 
semo discordi tra noi; questo sarebbe non solamente duplicar le Discordie, ma 
triplicarle ancora, anzi moltiplicarle infinitamente. La qual cosa come è fuora 
d’ogni ragione, così è contraria all’esperienza.200 
 
Two discords would necessarily conflict giving birth to a third discord in conflict with the 
previous ones and so on. More than one discord, therefore, may not be admitted. Despite 
this strong argument, which may be called the ‘third discord argument’ – similar to the 
‘third man argument’ in Aristotle’s Metaphysics – Jove finds it not enough to prove 
before philosophers that good and evil things derive from the same discord. This 
reference causes a long invective by Discordia against philosophers who are accused of 
staying isolated in their ideal towers from which they pretend to understand the universe, 
whereas they are actually lazy, useless, despicable, and vicious people. They simulate a 
disdain for money, but they actually covet it. Furthermore, they reject the earthly world 
as if they were not made of flesh and blood. Moreover, they cheat common ignorant 
people in showing them they know what gods do. The following citation, which is the 
first part of the invective, might be a successful manifesto against any metaphysics. 
Remarkably, it could be subscribed by several ancient sophists, for it collects the most 
200 Ibid. 141. 
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common accusations usually directed against sophists and inverts them to strike the 
accusers: 
 
Disc. Questi filosofi, Giove, non sono altro che una certa maniera di gente oziosa 
e da poco, la quale non sa far bene e non ardisce far male; e perché questo misero 
modo tenuto da loro non sia schernito dalle persone, ma la loro viltà e bassezza 
d’animo sia riputata virtù, dispregiano tuttavia, con parole però, le ricchezze come 
cosa di veruno valore. Non si curano parimente né di onore né di vergogna; e tutti 
quanti i piaceri e le voluptà corporali hanno per nulla, e ne dicono male non 
altramente che se pure intelligienzie e non di carne e di ossa fussero stati formati. 
Danno, eziandio, ad intendere al vulgo ignorante che stando chiusi nelle lor 
camere la notte, quando altri dorme, vedono quello che fan li Dei.201  
 
According to the ancient sources, among the major charges, sophists were accused of 
being greedy in teaching and performing their art for money and honor (Plato, Hippias 
major 282a-e); of looking at the physical world as a source of knowledge and ethics 
(Plato, Theaetetus 151e-152e, 166d-167b, and Protagoras 333d-334c); of being skeptical 
about gods – an example is Protagoras’ statement referred by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of 
the Philosophers IX, 51 – and, in doing so, of menacing the political and civic order (see 
the reaction of the democratic leader Anytus in Plato, Meno 91c); and more generally of 
misleading people for their own interest. Discordia responds, in fact, by reversing the 
accusations: philosophers disregard money and honor to cover their cowardice, they 
201 Ibid. 142. 
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undervalue earthly life as a source of knowledge and ethics pretending they are pure 
intellects, they feign a preferential contact with gods, and in doing all this they deceive 
people about their identity, exploiting their ignorance. 
After the invective is concluded, Discordia announces her second oration, as 
requested by Jove, to prove that discord is singular and causes only good effects. Her 
speech focuses on demonstrating that conflict is an essential part of the cycle of life, even 
when it causes painful, destructive events.202 The oration may be persuasive, but because 
of its length and gravity, Jove falls asleep. A disappointed and desperate Discordia 
proposes reprising the whole oration in a dialogical form, to keep Jove focused on her 
reasoning. He agrees and, to insure the effect, requires she proceed with brief statements 
and questions: 
 
Disc. Ecco Giove, acciocché da qui innanzi tu sia più attento alle mie parole, e 
men t’incresca l’udire, non parlarò continuamente dal principio alla fine tutta 
l’intenzion mia; ma di parte in parte ti dimandarò e tu mi risponderai. Gio. Son 
contento, ma parla e chiedi con brevi parole. Disc. Volentieri.203 
 
For the second time Discordia and Jove engage in a Socratic dialogue, but unlike the first 
time now it aims to ensure the correct order of Jove’s reasoning rather than to find new 
results. They now imitate Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues when they 
review the part of argumentation already developed. This type of dialogue aims more to 
summarize and retell, possibly with different words, than to add new arguments. 
202 Ibid. 143-145. 
203 Ibid. 146. 
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The process is so efficient that after few exchanges Jove is able to provide long 
responses reproducing in his own words Discordia’s argumentation, while she continues 
to guide him by providing clarifications and examples to amplify any aspect of the 
subject. In this way Discordia brings Jove to acknowledge that war is necessary 
everywhere, even within each human being, where passion and reason constantly fight 
against each other so that each man carries an inner war (“ogni uomo porta la sua guerra 
con seco.”)204 
 But after this conciliatory first part, the tone of the dialogue changes. Indeed, 
Discordia and Jove start to disagree on certain aspects and for the first time Jove is 
seriously engaged in debating with Discordia. This new part of the dialogue is a 
dialectical agon between opponents who try to prevail over each other by demonstration, 
confutation, and other verbal techniques. 205 Finally Jove, exhausted by his indefatigable 
interlocutor, asks Discordia to address her arguments to the philosophers who blame her, 
which gives her the opportunity to add further arguments to the invective against 
philosophers she already performed: 
 
Gio. Perché non ne parli con questi filosofi, dai quali viene la tua roina, e mostri 
loro con tue ragioni chi sei? Disc. Oimé Giove, non me li nominar più: or credi tu 
che io sia stata indarno con loro? Mille volte ne avemo parlato di compagnia e 
disputato questa materia, ma tu non sai ancora come son fatti. Alcuni di loro non 
intendono la natura degli argomenti, altri fingono di non gli intendere, altri 
rispondono in guisa, che par che diano legge al cielo e alla terra. Per la qual cosa, 
204 Ibid. 150. 
205 Ibid. 150-159. 
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stanca di ragionare con esso loro, a te son ricorsa, come a quello il quale, 
conosciuta la verità mal da loro trattata, mi rendo certa che non gli lascierai 
impuniti.206 
  
According to Discordia, who says to know them very well, philosophers do not 
understand the matter or pretend not to, so that discussing with them is painful and 
unfruitful. Jove asks Mercury, as a messenger between gods and men, to bring 
Discordia’s arguments to the philosophers’ attention. He is willing to do this and wants to 
perform his oration for Discordia’s approval before going on earth. The specific goal of 
his mission is to persuade human beings to consider discord as a beneficial force in their 
life. In his speech, Mercury points out that the goddess is not to blame if desires and 
passions are the cause of individual and social conflicts, but even if this were the case, a 
positive effect would result, for someone’s death means life and prosperity for someone 
else. It is just a matter of perspective: “lei però non dovreste tutti affatto vituperare: con 
ciò sia cosa che morte e povertà d’alcuno di voi, sia vita e ricchezza dell’altro; e la 
distruzione dell’imperio di Roma sia stato accrescimento de’ barbari.” 207  Mercury 
stresses the fact that life is a matter of agonistic contest where every victory means ruin 
for someone else. The alternative would be a peaceful lack of movement or, in other 
terms, a permanent state of death. 
 But when everything seems to be in favor of Discordia’s cause, Jove states that 
her orations lack order and disposition, so that her arguments are confused. When she 
points out that her essential goal was to provide evidence to defend her dignity, Jove 
206 Ibid. 159-160. 
207 Ibid. 162. 
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begins to lecture her on the essential role of perspective in persuasive oratory. Indeed, he 
points out that order and disposition in arguing can be deceiving: “l’ordine e la 
disposizion delle cose variata in diverse maniere, fa parere quel che non è.” Since she did 
not give the order she had promised to her discourse – which was to prove, first, that 
discord is good and natural, and second, that there is only one discord – he fears she was 
misleading in showing true what is false and vice-versa: “non son sicuro di non esser 
gabbato da te, sicché il vero mi paia falso ed il falso vero: come anche un medesimo 
colore nel collo della colomba e dell’anitra diversamente disposto pare ora verde e ora 
giallo.”208 Therefore, Jove asks Discordia to reshape her reasoning properly. To convince 
her, Jove gives several examples that show how much disposition/order and perspective 
count in achieving results in warfare and painting, two arts that share features with 
oratory: 
 
un medesimo esercito disposto diversamente vince e perde la guerra; una faccia, 
un panno, una tela medesima, secondo che ella sarà collocate, bella e brutta ti 
parerà; una dipintura lunga una spanna, da traverso guardata sarà creduta di 
quattro braccia. Dunque volendo che io dia sentenzia finale, provedi che io oda le 
tue ragioni ordinatamente da principio a fine.209 
 
After this defense of relativism as a matter of fact in oratory, Jove asks Discordia to 
develop her speech from universal categories to particular things. This last implied 
reference to a philosophical process instigates a further polemic by Discordia with the 
208 Ibid. 163. 
209 Ibid. 164. 
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philosophers – called patricides (“filosofi parricidi”) because they refuse to recognize her 
sovereignty - and causes the goddess to identify herself with a modern Socrates 
condemned to be miserable forever. Another characteristic of the dialogue suggests a 
similarity with Socrates from the beginning of the dialogue: Discordia is a goddess, 
though a controversial one, hidden under the human clothes of the beautiful Ganymede, 
and Socrates was compared to a monstrous statue of Silenus (Plato, Symposium 215a-b) 
which hides inside a golden god; in both cases the real identity of the character is 
dissimulated, literally in the former, metaphorically in the latter. Like a roaming and 
isolated Socrates, Discordia opposes herself to the philosophers who are experts in 
syllogizing (“sillogizzare”) as well as to Jove who, as an unjust judge, prefers a 
convincing perspective rather than the strength of facts and evidence. Interestingly, as 
usual in Speroni’s dialogues, the debate between Discordia and Jove ends without any 
conclusion. At the end Jove is not satisfied by Discordia’s arguments and they leave each 
other without any agreement. 
The analysis of the major passages of the Dialogo has shown the connection with 
sophistry both in contents and style. However, a last reflection remains to be proposed on 
the Dialogo della Discordia as a whole. In fact, this work significantly collects a variety 
of literary genres and may be considered as a mise-en-scène of the possible techniques a 
speaker or orator can employ to argue and persuade. From this perspective, the reiteration 
of the same topic throughout the dialogue can be read as an exercise in the arts of speech, 
demonstrating in how many styles the same subject can be treated. In fact, Speroni 
displays three main genres: invective, oration, and dialogue. To be more specific, there 
are two different types of oration: the first is called narration (“narrazione”) – which does 
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not provide evidence – by Jove, while the second is an oration that attempts to persuade 
by proof. Furthermore, there are three types of dialogue: the first is heuristic in maieutic 
fashion, the second is still Socratic but aims to review and summarize rather than 
discover new paths, and the third is a dialectical strife without any positive conclusion. 
The entire Dialogo della Discordia may thus be considered an exhibition of different 
methods available to persuade and win in a verbal contest. Remarkably, the dialogues 
where the Socratic maieutic is employed are not considered superior. Evidence of this is 
that they ultimately do not help Discordia and Jove to reach any stable agreement. 
Moreover, the Socratic method is considered just one among other rhetorical techniques 
available to an interlocutor or orator. Finally, the vulnerability of any argument and 
position surfaces as a refrain of the entire Dialogo. The relativism and disregard of truth 
embodied in Jove’s defense of “ordine” and “disposizione” as the most important aspects 
of any argumentation is thus highly representative of the general sense of the work. 
 
 
2.2.  Dialogo dell’Usura 
 
Originally, the Dialogo dell’Usura between Usura, who presents herself as a goddess, 
and the comedian Ruzzante was essentially an oration by Usura to defend her legitimacy 
in human life. In the 1570s, after his works were condemned by the Catholic Inquisition, 
Speroni had to write a second part of the dialogue, in which Ruzzante accuses Usura of 
being a deceiver and produces a confutation of her oration.210  
210 The second part is in Speroni. Opere. I. 111-132. 
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Angelo Beolco (c. 1496-1542), better known as Ruzzante, was an Italian actor 
and playwright in Padua. His comedies in vernacular were appreciated in Padua, Venice, 
and Ferrara. He had the protection of Luigi Cornaro, who mentioned his sadness for the 
death of his close friend in the letter sent to Speroni in 1547, the same letter we discussed 
above and related to the two responses Contra la sobrietà and Per la sobrietà. Ruzzante 
died during the preparation of the mise-en-scène of the Canacee, the only play written by 
Speroni. Due to their reciprocal esteem and Ruzzante’s well-known eloquence, Speroni 
chose him for the role of respondent in the Dialogo dell’Usura. 
Scholars have usually paid more attention to Usura’s speech, in the first part of 
the work, because they were attracted by its paradoxical features.211 This investigation 
focuses instead on some passages in the counter-oration by Ruzzante, which was not 
supposed to be paradoxical, given that it was intended to allay any doubt about Speroni’s 
condemnation of Usura. The fact that Ruzzante’s response includes several relevant 
references to sophistry is evidence of Speroni’s continued interest in sophistic rhetoric – 
in a non-paradoxical fashion – in one of his last works. 
 A dialogical part follows Usura’s speech and then Ruzzante delivers his invective. 
To introduce his argumentation, he announces the three roles he will play to attack 
Usura’s arguments: 
 
Qual che io mi sia, di tre persone ordinatamente contra i tuoi detti farò l’officio. 
Farò in prima oratore, anzi retore, scoprendo l’arte da te usata contra te stessa nel 
tuo proemio: parlarò appresso come filosofo in più di un modo, ma grossamente; 
211 See Cammarosano. La vita e le opere di Sperone Speroni. 35-38, and Fournel. Les dialogues de Sperone 
Speroni. 73-91. 
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perché i poeti sono filosofi qualche volta, ma non del numero di quei fini: 
ultimamente farò officio di buon cristiano: e in tutte tre queste sette sarò cristian 
sempre mai.212 
 
He declares he is going to play three different roles to attack her speech: first the role of 
an orator, second, a philosopher, and third, a good Christian. The most interesting part is 
Ruzzante acting as an orator or more precisely – he clarifies – as a rhetorician. He claims 
that well-crafted orations have very short introduction, whereas Usura’s speech has a 
long one. The misleading practice of long introductions aims to confuse the listener in 
order to easily reach his or her soul and to persuade him or her in the speaker’s favor. 
Overwhelming the public with an excessive proem, the orator hides the turpitude of the 
subject of his or her speech, exactly what Usura attempted previously:  
 
nelle [orazioni] turpi, che sono brutte e fastidiose, sempre i proemi son lunghe 
ciance; acciocché quelle dissimulando ed ascondendo nel mucchio loro la 
turpitudine del subietto, con insinuazion frodolente passino al core delli auditori 
senza avvedersene alcun di loro, e di questi cotai proemi fu uno il tuo senza 
dubbio; ove grande ora di molte e varie tue parolette fu ingombrata la mente mia, 
prima che a nome ti palesassi.213 
 
According to Ruzzante, Usura performed a defective oratory and imperfectly copied the 
greatest ancient examples: 
212 Speroni. Opere. I. 115. 
213 Ibid. 116. 
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Anticamente scrisse Gorgia con qualcuno altro di quei sofisti sue orazioni 
dimostrative per Palamede e per Elena ed alcune altre ne fe’ Platon nel Convivio 
laudando Amore in diversi modi; e tutte intere e perfette: e nondimeno non son sì 
lunghe d’assai, come è il proemio di questa tua.214 
 
The three examples quoted in the passage are the orations Defense of Palamedes and 
Encomium of Helen by the sophist Gorgias, and the dialogue Symposium by Plato. All the 
three could be read in Latin translation. Gorgias’ works were published in the Aldine 
anthology entitled Orationes horum rhetorum (or Oratores Graeci) in 1513. Plato’s 
dialogue was published in Marsilio Ficino’s edition of the complete works of Plato in 
1484.215 Plato’s Symposium, as Ruzzante suggests, is particular because the same subject 
is treated in different ways, so that the same work gathers a plurality of perspectives. In 
fact, Plato presents a sequence of speeches that praise Love even from opposite points of 
views; the final speech, by Socrates, is supposed to be the best as a revelation of Love’s 
true nature and function. Nevertheless, Ruzzante only mentions the subject of the 
Symposium and does not cite Socrates’ speech as superior; rather he sees perfection in all 
the orations. 
Ruzzante disregards the contents of the speeches because he is interested instead 
in proportion, highlighting that the ancient examples he brought are shorter than the 
introduction of Usura’s speech. She is certainly guilty for having defended a vice, but 
Ruzzante points out above all the defective form of her speech: “Essendo adunque 
214 Ibid. 
215 MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. 39-40. 
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disonestissima la tua causa, e non sappiendo nel tuo proemio dissimular la disonestà, né 
simular di dissimularla; men mal facevi per onor tuo a tacere, che non hai fatto a 
parlare.”216 Usura was unable to hide her dishonesty even with a perfect discourse. Her 
oratory has no power of persuasion and actually becomes her worst enemy. 
The dialogue ends with the victory of Ruzzante, who thanks God and acts as a 
good Christian. Speroni finds the perfect closure to satisfy the inquisitors: “Io non ho a 
fare altro, che andar in chiesa alla messa e ringraziar Gesù Cristo della vittoria che mi ha 
donata: poi questa mia cameretta far benedire dal sacerdote con acqua santa ed orazioni: e 
così farò.” 217  This conclusion has no specific interest for our subject and Speroni 
probably wrote it more to play the role of the good Christian than for any other reason. 
Despite the flat finale, Ruzzante’s speech represents an intriguing as well as 
revolutionary interpretation of the ancient conflict between rhetoric and philosophy.    
Although Gorgias and Plato represented the two opposite sides of one of the 
major conflicts in the Western culture, Ruzzante does not hesitate to present them in the 
same category. In only a few lines Ruzzante implicitly reduces the titanic debate 
developed in Plato’s Gorgias to a verbal exercise between people of the same type. The 
opposition between rhetoric and philosophy, raised by Plato in the first place and still 
alive in the Renaissance, is erased, and the most metaphysical of Socrates’ pupils is now 
considered as an author of perfect speeches to emulate as well as those of the sophist 
Gorgias.  
216 Speroni. Opere. I. 116. 
217 Ibid. 132. 
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Chapter IV 
 
The debate on Dante and sophistic poetry 
 
If appearance is to be admitted as the criterion, 
either we must say that every appearance is true, as Protagoras said, 
 or that every one is false, as Xeniades of Corinth said 
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I 
 
 
During the 1570s, a broad debate on the value of Dante’s poetry, especially the Divine 
Comedy, burst onto the scene of the Italian milieu and involved several authors, such as 
Rodolfo Castravilla, Belisario Bulgarini (1539-c. 1619), Sperone Speroni, Jacopo 
Mazzoni, and Torquato Tasso, to mention the most renowned. While this matter has been 
a major scholarly subject since Michele Barbi published his Dante nel Cinquecento 
(1890), only in the most recent decades have a handful of scholars started working on 
topics strictly connected to this subject. These examples of scholarship include Mazzoni’s 
interpretation of poetry as a kind of sophistry in his defense of Dante published in 1587, 
Tasso’s response in the last version of his Discorsi del poema eroico published in 1594, 
and the potential legacy of this for the Baroque literary culture.218 
218 See the work of C. Scarpati. “Iacopo Mazzoni tra Tasso e Marino.” Aevum 59 (1985): 433-458; E. 
Russo. “Il rifiuto della sofistica nelle postille tassiane a Jacopo Mazzoni.” La cultura 38 (2000): 279-318; 
Id. “La risposta al Mazzoni nei Discorsi del poema eroico.” Id., L’ordine, la fantasia e l’arte. Ricerche 
per un quinquennio tassiano (1588-1592). Roma: Bulzoni, 2002. 178-199. 
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 Although scholars have reached important results, there is as yet no study that 
connects the sixteenth-century debate on Dante and poetry with the rehabilitation of 
ancient sophistry proposed by Speroni nor with the broader rebirth of sophistry that took 
place, in several forms, since the beginning of the fifteenth century, as shown in the 
previous chapter. 
 This chapter aims to fill the gap in international scholarship by analyzing the role 
of the debate on Dante within the broader history of the Italian interpretation of the 
sophistic movement as a positive force enhancing public life. More specifically, this 
chapter will address the following main points, which have not yet received the attention 
they deserve. Firstly, Speroni anticipated the connection between poetry and sophistry in 
his works and provided an important part of the theoretical foundation for the debate that 
began in the 1570s. Secondly, there is a virtual dialogue between the protagonists of this 
debate and Ficino’s commentary and interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. Thirdly, the link 
between poetry and rhetoric in political life is most highly relevant and reveals the strong 
connection with the ideal of a new sophistry for the city. Fourthly, Mazzoni’s discourse 
on poetry as a kind of sophistry started much earlier than the 1580s; it began in 1573 to 
be precise, when he published his first defense of Dante. Last but not least, the 
association of poetry and sophistry is most scandalous because it essentially affirms that 
not-being can be thought and articulated, which infringes on one of the fundamental rules 
of Western culture since the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides of Elea. 
 
 
1. Tasso’s concern about poetry: an overview of the late Cinquecento 
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If we are looking for a sixteenth-century text from which one can have a broad overview 
of our subject, as one would have from a high peak over a landscape, then the 1594 
edition of Tasso’s Discorsi del poema eroico is the best place to start. In fact, Tasso 
summarizes and discusses the whole matter of the relationship between poetry and 
sophistic art in the second book of his Discorsi and provides the names and arguments of 
the main protagonists in the debate. Above all, Tasso elaborates his response to Jacopo 
Mazzoni, whom he considers the most dangerous of his adversaries.219 
 Starting from both a Platonic and Aristotelian background, Tasso argues that if 
poets are imitators then they are supposed to imitate truth, since falsehood does not exist, 
and what does not exist cannot be imitated. Tasso then describes the territory of poetry 
and defines the terms of the conflict between those who consider poetry as an art dealing 
with true realities, either physical or metaphysical, and those who associate poetry with 
sophistry, thereby implicitly admitting not-being as a subject of speech. In a sort of epic 
agon that involves the major figures of the Italian Cinquecento, Tasso leads the first 
group against the dangerous offenders led by Mazzoni. Their competition is not just 
about the value of Dante’s Comedy, nor is it related solely to the nature of poetry, but 
rather is an expression of two opposite opinions about language as an autonomous tool 
that is legitimate to create new poetic universes, private and public values, and myths and 
traditions shared by a community. As Claudio Scarpati pointed out, this conflict 
represents the dawn of the Baroque; that is, the age of Giambattista Marino and its 
practice of poetic language as an auto-referential device conceived with the main purpose 
219 T. Tasso. Discorsi dell’arte poetica e del poema eroico. Ed. L. Poma. Bari: Laterza,1964. 78-115. 
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of impressing the audience. In the same period, between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, an epistemological revolution occurs resulting in the birth of modern science. As 
a result, one might argue that the debate on sophistic poetry was one of the causes for a 
cultural revolution in the relationship between res and verba, which affected the liberal 
arts as much as science.220 
 The first author that Tasso opposes is Francesco Robortello who considered the 
falsehood as the matter of poems while, according to Plato and Aristotle, the falsehood is 
the matter of the sophist, who works with what is not.221 Robortello was one of the first 
significant commentators of Aristotle’s Poetics of the century and in his In librum 
Aristotelis de arte poetica explicationes, published in 1548, he argues that poetry differs 
from the other arts of discourse by having the false as its proper matter: 
 
Since, then, poetics has as its subject matter fictitious and fictional discourse, it is 
clear that the function of poetics is to invent in a proper way its fiction and its 
untruth; to no other art is it more fitting than to this one to intermingle lies […] In 
the lies used by the poetic art, false elements are taken as true, and from them true 
conclusions are derived.222 
 
Objecting this position, Tasso states that the matter of poems is verisimilitude, which is 
close to truth. Robortello’s passage does not mention any connections with sophistic art - 
220 Scarpati. “Iacopo Mazzoni tra Tasso e Marino.” 444 and passim. 
221 Tasso. Discorsi dell’arte poetica e del poema eroico. 86. 
222 Quoted from B. Weinberg. A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance. 2 vols. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1961. I. 391: “Cum igitur poetice subiectam sibi habeat pro materie 
orationem fictam et fabulosam; patet ad poeticen pertinere, ut fabulam et mendacium apte confingat; 
nulliusque alterius artis proprium magis esse; mendacia comminisci, quam huius […] in poeticis 
mendaciis principia falsa pro veris assumuntur, atque ex his verae eliciuntur conclusiones.” 
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though any reader could perceive it as implied in the discourse - but it does anticipate the 
broader and more dangerous poetics that Jacopo Mazzoni presented in the first volume of 
his two-volume work Difesa della Commedia di Dante (“Defense of Dante’s Comedy”) 
published in 1587.223 
Tasso found Mazzoni’s ideas so unacceptable that he felt the need to publish a 
revised version of his Discorsi in 1594 with an extended response to Mazzoni’s work. 
This new edition encompasses an analysis of Mazzoni’s poetics immediately after the 
discussion of Robortello. Essentially, Tasso refuses Mazzoni’s definition of poetry as a 
sophistic art that employs fantasy to craft images of non-existent things. Instead, Tasso 
claims that poetry is a dialectical art, and as such it deals with real or probable things. 
Indeed, the most perfect poetry imitates things that are, were, or may be, such as 
Achilles’ wrath, Aeneas’ piety, and the battles engaged by the Trojans and Latins. 
 
Nondimeno la perfettissima imitazione, o la propriissima specie de la poesia, non 
si ripone sotto la sofistica, o nuova o antica ch’ella sia, ma sotto la dialettica. 
Molto meno è vero quel che dice il Mazzone, che la perfettissima poesia è la 
fantastica imitazione: perché sì fatta imitazione è de le cose che non sono e non 
furono già mai; ma la perfettissima poesia imita le cose che sono, che furono o 
che possono essere: come fu la guerra di Troia, e l’ira d’Achille, e la pietà d’Enea, 
e le battaglie fra Troiani e Latini, e l’altre che furono o possono essersi fatte.224 
 
223 The second volume of the same work was published posthumously in 1688. 
224 Tasso. Discorsi dell’arte poetica e del poema eroico. 88. 
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Tasso criticizes all the poets who agreed with Mazzoni’s poetics, including the Tuscan 
poets for having been sophists in writing their amorous verses. Although Tasso does not 
provide proper names, he is addressing Guido Cavalcanti, the poets of the “dolce stil 
novo,” and perhaps also the Dante of the Vita nova, among others. 
 Though Tasso’s response is articulate and clarifies the reasons for his rejection of 
Mazzoni’s theory, the Discorsi do not provide a full understanding of the revolutionary 
conception of poetry in the Difesa of 1587. Mazzoni’s discourse is more an ensemble of 
different possible perspectives with a long list of quotes supporting them than a 
consistent treatise. The richness in the variety of authors cited and theoretical paths that 
stem from them, the lack of a core structure in the essay, and the repetitions within the 
hundreds of pages have left different impressions on all of the scholars who have 
approached this work. Weinberg, a true pioneer in the attempt to provide a complete 
summary of Mazzoni’s work, defines it as a  “vastly erudite study, with hundreds of 
authors cited and innumerable texts; it goes into almost interminable theoretical 
backgrounds for each of the defenses.”225 On the other hand, Baxter Hathaway called the 
Difesa “the greatest burst of aesthetic speculation in sixteenth-century Italy.”226 Twenty 
years later, Enrico Musacchio and Gigino Pellegrini, authors of an edition of the 
Introduzione of the volume published in 1587, noticed the coexistence of different points 
of view on poetry that struggle to agree. 227 In summary, the strongest impression in 
reading Mazzoni’s work is that it is designed as a plurality of discourses nourished by a 
225 Weinberg. A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance. II. 883 (for a summary of the main 
points of Mazzoni’s work: 635-646; 877-883).  
226 B. Hathaway. The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1962. 5. 
227 J. Mazzoni. Introduzione alla Difesa della Commedia di Dante. Eds. E. Musacchio and G. Pellegrini. 
Bologna: Cappelli, 1982. 15-16. 
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broad range of traditions, all generated from the same concern – the defense of Dante and 
the sophistic poetry – but following different and parallel directions; not at all an easy 
textbook for a hypothetical course of poetics.  
Despite the difficulty of his writing, Mazzoni was a very successful professor in 
all the universities in which he taught. This information comes from the scholar Pier 
Antonio Serassi who, after publishing a biography of Torquato Tasso in 1785, decided to 
also write about his opponent. In his La vita di Jacopo Mazzoni (1790), Serassi reports 
evidence of Mazzoni’s excellence in addressing students and connects this to his peculiar 
mind that contemporaries admired as a wonder. For example, Serassi quotes an oration 
written by Pier Segni, a member of the “Accademia della Crusca,” to honor Mazzoni 
when he died. Mazzoni’s mind is depicted as a beautiful garden where the plurality and 
order of diverse plants amazes everybody: 
 
quel suo felicissimo ingegno si poteva agguagliare ad un ben coltivato giardino, 
nel quale siccome la moltitudine e varietà delle piante e l’ordine del loro 
scompartimento porge molto diletto a chi lo rimira, così il fertilissimo ingegno 
con la varietà delle scienze e col bell’ordine […] maraviglioso diletto porgevano a 
ciascheduno.228 
 
One may comment that such a garden would be enjoyable at first glance, while 
Mazzoni’s Difesa, although a result of this flourishing mind, requires a reader’s patience 
to be appreciated. However, we do not aim at exploring this work as a whole. On the 
228 P. Serassi. La vita di Jacopo Mazzoni. Roma: Pagliarini, 1790. 90-91. 
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contrary, the next part of this chapter is dedicated to pointing out specific passages that 
most closely concern our main subject: the relationship of poetry with sophistry as well 
as with the political life of the city. 
 
 
2. Crafting idols: Jacopo Mazzoni’s poetics 
  
In the Introduzione e sommario of his Difesa della Commedia di Dante, Mazzoni 
addresses the whole poetical art and aims to define its proper object. The most relevant 
source for this work is Plato’s Sophist that Mazzoni could have read in the Latin 
translation with commentary provided by Marsilio Ficino.  
As discussed in the first chapter, Plato presented two kinds of image-making arts 
with the purpose of unmasking the sophist. Plato calls “icastic” the art that makes a 
likeness and “fantastic” the art that makes semblance. Both the arts produce images, or 
“idols” (“idoli” in Ficino’s translation):  “icastic idols” in the former case and “fantastic 
idols” in the latter. Plato, followed by Ficino, condemned sophistry as a type of 
“fantastic” art and its products as persuasive as well as dangerous illusions. 
Mazzoni retains the Platonic distinction, but he attributes a positive value to the 
fantastic art and proposes its idols as its most valuable results. After a discourse about the 
different meanings of the word idol, he proposes that poetry, like painting and sculpture, 
imitates what man can voluntarily conceive with his fantasy. According to Mazzoni, 
Aristotle’s Poetics also addresses this object of imitation: 
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Concludo dunque che questa specie d'idolo è quella, ch'è adeguato oggetto 
dell'imitatione humana e che quando Aristotele disse nel principio della Poetica 
che tutte le specie di poesia erano imitatione, intese quella imitatione c'ha per 
oggetto l'idolo che nasce totalmente dall'artificio humano nel modo che si è 
dichiarato.229 
 
Mazzoni is comfortable interpreting the beginning of Aristotle’s Poetics in a way that 
supports his own position by arguing that his own conclusions complete and go beyond 
Aristotle’s. 
Despite the fact that the “idolo phantastico” (“fantastic idol”), as an image of non-
existing objects, is the most proper matter for poetry, Mazzoni concedes that sometimes 
truth may play this role. He then argues that the “incredible” (“unbelievable”) would 
completely destroy the poetical art, and thereby a fair conclusion would be that the 
specific poetical object is not the true or the false, but rather the “credibile” that may be 
either true or false. What is credible is persuasive and persuasion is poetry’s goal. 
Mazzoni then introduce a new term connected to belief, the objective correlative 
(“oggetto correlativo”):  
 
È dunque stimato il credibile oggetto correlativo della credenza, o vogliamo dire 
persuasione, o fede. E la credenza un habito (largamente parlando) della 
conclusione, come anchora è l'opinione e la scienza. Ma la scienza viene prodotta 
229 J. Mazzoni. Della difesa della Comedia di Dante, distinta in sette libri, nella quale si risponde alle 
oppositioni fatte al Discorso di M. Iacopo Mazzoni, e si tratta pienamente dell'arte poetica [...] parte 
prima, che contiene li primi tre libri. Cesena: Appresso B. Raverij, 1587. sec. 15. 
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da cagione necessaria, il che non si può dire della opinione, ne della fede, c’hanno 
cagioni contingenti.230  
 
The relationship that Mazzoni proposes between the credible and belief as habit 
introduces the public dimension of poetry in the discourse, while the noteworthy mention 
of an objective correlative anticipates the poetics of Thomas Stearns Eliot and Eugenio 
Montale, in which particular objects or literary images are predisposed to evoke specific 
emotions in the reader.231  However, in Mazzoni’s version, the “oggetto correlativo,” 
which is credible imaginative material, is related to the ethical sphere of public life. 
Remarkably, persuasion, instead of truth, is responsible for creating and stabilizing public 
belief. In other words, it does not matter if poetry shapes the habits of a community upon 
true or false idols as long as the poet is able to persuade his public to follow his credible 
creation. The imaginative world of the poet structures the social dimension, which was 
one of the functions of Homeric poetry in ancient Greece. 
This is a crucial step in Mazzoni’s exploration of the matter, for poetry is now 
connected to rhetoric and sophistic art not only because of the definition of “idolo” but 
also through its relation to the public. The credible is used to persuade and differs from 
opinion because it is about particulars and not universals, and it addresses not only 
people’s intellect but also their needs and desires (“appetito”).232 In Mazzoni’s discourse, 
the public sphere is an essential part of the process of creating effective poetry. The 
230Ibid. sec. 48. 
231 See the literary theory first set forth by T.S. Eliot in the essay “Hamlet and His Problems” and published 
in The Sacred Wood (1920). 
232 J. Mazzoni. Della difesa della Comedia di Dante, distinta in sette libri, nella quale si risponde alle 
oppositioni fatte al Discorso di M. Iacopo Mazzoni, e si tratta pienamente dell'arte poetica [...] parte 
prima, che contiene li primi tre libri. Cesena: Appresso B. Raverij, 1587. sec. 50. 
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credible must be conveyed by aesthetic means and speech strategies, such as comparisons 
and parables, because the poet must speak to any kind of people, including rude and 
uneducated men: “perché il poeta deve ragionare col popolo, nel quale sono molti 
huomini rozi e poco intendenti.”233  
The poet has to communicate even intellectual and abstract realities in a way that 
ordinary people are equipped to understand. He treats his subjects in a credible mode, 
employing comparisons and similitudes taken from sensible things, so that people who 
understand that truth resides in sensible things in a way that is revealed by the poet can 
easily believe that the same is true of intelligible things:  
 
E per questo ne tratta egli col modo credibile, cio è insegnadole per mezzo di 
comparationi e similitudini prese dalle cose sensibili, e il popolo, che conosce che 
nelle cose sensibili la verità sta nel modo  che li vien mostrata dal poeta, crede per 
questo facilmente che così anchora sia nelle cose intelligibili.234  
 
In this way, the poet can covey the highest registers of content to unlearned men. 
According to Mazzoni, Dante embodied the ideal poet, and had Plato read his Paradiso, 
he would have changed his mind about the value of poets’ art. 
Looking at the well-known myth of the cave in Plato’s Republic VII - likely one 
of the first references in Mazzoni’s mind considering the commentary on the Republic he 
wrote around 1577 - we can appreciate the revolutionary idea of poetry expressed in the 
Difesa of 1587. Most of the scholarship on this topic has concerned Mazzoni’s inclusion 
233 Ibid. sec. 52. 
234 Ibid. sec. 52. 
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of poetry in the genre of sophistical art with regard to crafting false idols, while the 
connection with the addressee and the social context has been neglected. The reference to 
the myth of the cave, even if not mentioned in Mazzoni’s text, can help in understanding 
his new approach to poetry in the appropriate context of the city. Indeed, the figure that 
he names “poet” actually simultaneously possesses the characteristics of the epic poet, 
sophistic rhetorician, and public mentor. This kind of poet lives, metaphorically speaking, 
in the Platonic cave among the shadows that he contributes to create in order to teach, 
lead and entertain the people. At the same time, the cave is no longer a place from which 
to escape, for it is the normal condition of human existence, and the men inside are no 
longer slaves, but rather citizens of a Renaissance state, such as Venice the Serenissima 
or any other place where the middle class has a major role in public life. This type of 
state is closer to the Athens of Pericles, Gorgias and Protagoras, than to the Platonic ideal 
republic. 
Mazzoni clearly perceives that he is proposing a connection between two arts, 
poetry and sophistry, that others – such as Torquato Tasso - considered completely 
different and even opposite in nature; this is why he argues for a defense of sophistical 
art:  
 
ma io m’accorgo d’haver alterati gli animi de’ poeti, ponendo all’arte loro riputata 
fin’hora divina, il nome di sophistica che viene stimato brutto e infame. E però 
per consolarli in qualche modo, mi voglio fermare alquanto sopra quest’arte de’ 
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sophisti e insieme dimostrare com’ella habbia e non habbia buono o cattivo 
sentimento.235  
 
For clarification of the true nature and role of sophistry, Mazzoni relies on Lucius Flavius 
Philostratus, a Greek sophist who lived between the second and third century A.D. and 
wrote the Lives of the Sophists, which is supposed to be an authoritative voice that 
balances Plato’s condemnation. Mazzoni recalls that, according to Philostratus, sophistry 
must be called philosophical rhetoric, since it argues the same things treated by 
philosophers but in a different way: “Sono dunque parole di Philostrato: bisogna nomare 
l’antica sophistica una rhetorica philosophante, essendo ch’ella disputasse delle 
medesime cose delle quali trattavano ancora li philosophi.”236  
Sophistry is what treats everything rhetorically, that is credibly: “sophistica era 
quella che parlava di tutte le cose rhetoricamente, cioè credibilmente”.237 If the credible is 
substantially the matter shaped by both sophistry and poetry, then the two arts are closely 
related. And in fact they are, according to Mazzoni’s original idea of poetry as a kind of 
sophistry.  
Mazzoni claims for a superiority of what he calls “sophistica antica” (“ancient 
sophistry”) that did not aim to corrupt minds with twisted ideas. According to Mazzoni, 
poetry is close to that type of sophistry. He attempts to define the specific nature of 
poetry in different manners, and in one of the most clear definitions he claims that poetry 
235 Ibid. sec. 54. 
236 Ibid. sec. 54. 
237 Ibid. sec. 55. 
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is a sophistic art because it imitates and has the credible as its subject and delight for its 
aim. 
 
conclude adunque risolutamente, che la poesia è arte sophistica e per l’imitazione, 
che è il suo genere proprio, e lo credibile, che è il suo soggetto, e per lo diletto, 
che è il suo fine; poiché per essere sotto quel genere, per essere intorno a quel 
soggetto, e per rimirare quel fine, viene astretta molte volte a dar luogo al falso.238 
 
The involvement of the poetic art in political life is explicitly stated when Mazzoni 
proposes to consider poetry as a part of the “facoltà civile” (“civil sphere”) along with 
political art. 
 
parmi che ragionevolmente si possa dire che la facoltà civile si deva dividere in 
due principalissime parti l’una delle quali considera la rettitudine dell’operationi e 
fu nomata col nome generale politica, cioè civile. L’altra considera la rettitudine 
della cessazione o la rettitudine delle operationi de’ giochi e fu nomata poetica. E 
per questo io stimo che la Poetica sia il nono libro della Politica [d’Aristotele].239 
 
The inclusion of Aristotle’s Poetics as a part of his Politics is an original perspective that 
allows Mazzoni to present his theory as consistent with Aristotelianism, a tradition closer 
to the Counter-Reformation and hence acceptable to the Catholic Church. In the 
regulation of public life, poetics rules recreational time, or time of cessation, in which 
238 Ibid. sec. 60. 
239 Ibid. sec. 66-67. 
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citizens may attend spectacles such as tragedies, comedies, declamations, and other types 
of performance. In so doing, poetics plays a fundamental role in balancing the activities 
ruled by the political art. 
The following passage clarifies the relationship among politics, poetics, and 
poetry. As part of the civil sphere, poetics prescribes the standards, rules, and laws of the 
idols in poetry, so that poetics deals with the idea of the idol and poetry with the making 
of it. Poetics is, though, a ruling art that uses the idol made by poets for the public needs 
mentioned above. 
 
È dunque la poetica parte della facoltà civile e è quella che prescrive la norma, la 
regola, e le leggi dell’idolo poetico alla poesia. Di maniera che si può dire che la 
poetica consideri l’idea dell’idolo e la poesia lo faccia. Onde la poetica sarà nel 
suo genere arte commandante e usante l’idolo fatto da’ poeti […] e la poesia sarà 
nel suo genere arte fabbricante e facitrice dell’idolo che ha poi da essere usato 
dalla poetica e dalla facoltà civile.240 
 
Afterwards, Mazzoni claims that if we consider “diletto” one of the goals of poetry and 
poetry as a part of sophistry, then we may conclude that Plato rejects from his ideal 
republic only the kind of poetry and sophistry that aim for “diletto” alone because it ruins 
the city. It results that there exists a commendable sophistry that is welcome in the 
city.241 Furthermore, poetry is comparable with medicine since it cures the citizens and 
240 Ibid. sec. 67. On the role of the sophistic poetry in civil life, see G. Giglioni. “The Matter of the 
Imagination. The Renaissance Debate over Icastic and Fantastic Imagination,” Camenae 8 (2010): 1-21. 
7-8. 
241 Mazzoni. Della difesa della Comedia di Dante. sec. 73. 
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provides pleasant learning for people who are under the influence of passions and unable 
to control their lives through reason.  
Mazzoni reverses the Platonic perspective by claiming that his interpretation 
reveals the real intention of Plato. At the climax of this move, he argues that Plato 
conceived one of the three genres of poetry, tragedy, as a means for the education of 
magistrates and philosopher-kings. Representing the dreadful and terrible downfall of 
great persons, tragedy principally serves princes, magistrates, and powerful citizens, for it 
keeps them always under the justice of the laws and moderates – so to speak - the 
magnitude of their fortune. 
 
la tragedia rimirò principalmente l’utile e il giovamento de’ principi, de’ 
magistrati e de’ potenti, e per questo, per tenerli sottoposti sempre alla giustitia 
delle leggi, rappresenta sempre gli horribili e atroci casi delle persone grandi, il 
che viene ad essere quasi un freno che rattempera e modera la grandezza della 
fortuna loro.242 
 
By blending an Aristotelian cathartic function of tragedy, a Platonic division of social 
classes, and a Christian mortification of vanity, Mazzoni not only reintroduces poetry as a 
sophistic art in the city, but he also honors it with the supreme role of educating the 
rulers. Understandably, one hardly recognizes the original Plato in Mazzoni’s words. This 
aspect of the Introduzione e sommario, along with the others examined above, is the 
measure of the revolutionary interpretation provided in the Difesa della Comedia di 
242 Ibid. sec. 80. 
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Dante. Some of those aspects are anticipated in a previous Difesa published in 1573, a 
much more concise work in which Mazzoni joins sophists and skeptics to defend Dante 
from Castravilla, Bulgarini, and the other detractors in the quarrel that occurred in the 
second half of the Cinquecento.  
 
  
3. Dante among sophists and skeptics 
 
The debate over Dante’s poetry, which for several years involved the major figures of the 
Italian Cinquecento, began in 1572. In this year a manuscript titled Discorso di M. 
Ridolfo Castravilla nel quale si mostra l'imperfettione della Commedia di Dante contro 
al Dialogo delle lingue del Varchi circulated as a response to Benedetto Varchi’s work 
from the intellectual milieu of Siena. Castravilla is probably a pseudonym, and the real 
identity of the author is still unknown.  Bellisario Bulgarini, who had an important role in 
the quarrel on Dante, probably had a part in the composition or revision of the Discorso. 
Castavilla’s work aims to argue against Varchi’s theory that Dante was superior to 
Homer. Castravilla’s principle argument is that Dante’s Comedy does not follow the rules 
stated in Aristotle’s Poetics and therefore is necessarily defective. 
 The quarrel gave Mazzoni the opportunity to write his first contribution for the 
exegesis of Dante’s work fifteen years before the publication of the Difesa of 1587 
examined above. In fact, in 1573, Mazzoni entered the dispute by publishing a Discorso 
in difesa della Commedia del divino poeta Dante which elicited a response from 
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Bulgarini who read Mazzoni’s work in 1576 and wrote his Considerazioni, eventually 
published in 1583, to defend Castravilla’s work.  
Mazzoni’s Discorso presents an interesting perspective on Dante, never pointed 
out by scholars, that confirms the originality of its author and proves that sophistry along 
with skepticism can offer a tool to defend Dante. In other words, Jacopo Mazzoni 
challenged the detractors of Dante by defending the agreement of the Comedy with 
Aristotle’s Poetics from a point of view that was at the intersection of Aristotelianism, 
sophistry, and skepticism. Whether or not Mazzoni succeeded may be a matter of debate, 
but for our purposes we are mostly interested in the articulation of sophistry and 
skepticism applied in the Discorso of 1573. 
 Mazzoni’s Discorso is a treatise made of ten “particelle” (“particles”), or 
chapters, that are introduced by a short abstract describing the main issue treated in each 
one. The first two “particelle” address poetry in general and have the function of 
introducing the discussion that follows. Mazzoni introduces the first chapter by arguing 
that poetry is an appropriate matter of discussion for a philosopher and that Dante 
especially deserves a philosophical approach since he mentioned in his Comedy all the 
philosophical traditions and arts. Dante’s poem, as a result, becomes an eclectic 
encyclopedia in verse.243 In chapters three through ten, Mazzoni considers whether or not 
the plot of the Comedy is an imitation of a real voyage, whether or not Dante is a good 
author of comedy, and in which specific aspect he demonstrates the characteristics that 
make him a good author. 
243 G. Mazzoni. Discorso in difesa della Commedia del divino poeta Dante. Ed. M. Rossi. Città di Castello: 
S. Lapi, 1898. 11. 
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 Chapter three is the most interesting for our purposes. It addresses the question of 
the truthfulness of the voyage described in Dante’s poem: “che nel poema di Dante vi è 
vera imitazione d’attione, e non semplice narratione d’un sogno, come molti hanno 
creduto.”244 Mazzoni argues that even though some verses in the Comedy could imply 
that Dante means to narrate a dream, a higher number of extended passages clearly prove 
the contrary. Intending to avoid a long, boring discussion (“noiosa lunghezza”), Mazzoni 
highlights what he indicates as the focus of the issue discussed in the chapter. This is the 
term “fantasia” used by Dante in Paradiso XXXIII, 140-142 and Purgatorio XVII, 25 to 
describe the activity of the mind in either wakefulness or sleep. Mazzoni commences his 
line of argumentation by opposing Giovanni Boccaccio, one of the first interpreters of the 
Comedy, to Aristotle. Mazzoni argues that although in his Corbaccio, or Laberinto 
d’Amore, Boccaccio presents fantasy as a faculty that produces dreams, Aristotle’s De 
anima II defines fantasy as a faculty that we consciously use to craft false images, which 
is exactly what poets do in their poems. 245  As a result, Dante is included in the 
Aristotelian tradition as the most excellent example of a poet. To help the reader 
understand the correct meaning of “fantasia”, Mazzoni provides an interesting 
interpretation of the verse “a l’alta fantasia mancò possa” (Paradiso XXXIII, 142) 
rephrased as “all’alto mio concetto poetico qui mancò forza” (“my high poetical concept 
did not have enough strength”).246 In his verses, Dante refers to the limit of his mind to 
understand and of his imagination to represent the nature of God. Although Mazzoni does 
not explicate the reason for his interpretation of “fantasia” as “concetto poetico,” one can 
244 Ibid. 61. 
245 Ibid. 64-65. 
246 Ibid. 65. 
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notice the attempt to ennoble imagination, or fantasy, while the use of the term 
“concetto” implied the Aristotelian interpretation of Dante’s poetry. Furthemore, it is 
noteworthy that Mazzoni avoids mentioning any Platonic or Neoplatonic sources related 
to the interpretation of “fantasia” in Dante’s work. When he published his work in 1573, 
Mazzoni was certainly aware of the very well-known commentaries of Marsilio Ficino on 
Plato, Plotinus and the other Neo-Platonists in which fantasy is a central activity of the 
soul in many contexts, including love, medicine, magic, and demonology. Ficino’s 
interpretation of the power of fantasy in the physical and spiritual spheres had an 
extended influence in the Renaissance that is well documented by international 
scholarship, which resists summary because of the extent of the subject. Nevertheless, 
given the relation with the topics treated in this dissertation, it is worth mentioning the 
fact that in Ficino’s commentary to the Sophist, the nature and function of fantasy and 
imagination play a major role, as Michael J. B. Allen demonstrated in his introductory 
studies, much more than what Plato’s dialogue suggests. 247  One may conclude that 
Mazzoni avoided mentioning Platonism and Neo-Platonism and that he used the 
Aristotelian term “concetto” to stengthen the defense of Dante as an Aristotelian. 
 Although the issue seems to be clarified, Mazzoni presents a further argument that 
complicates the matter, thereby suggesting a very interesting interpretation of Dante’s 
Comedy. Assuming that Dante sometimes used dreaming as a metaphor for his poetry, 
Mazzoni defends the legitimacy of this choice because dreaming and crafting poems 
share fantasy as a tool to create unreal worlds:  “il sogno e la poesia sono fondati in una 
247 M. J. B. Allen. Icastes: Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1989. 117-204. 
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medesima potentia dell’anima, perciò che e l’uno e l’altro ha per suggetto la fantasia”.248 
Any learned reader could find Aristotle’s De anima III (428a-429a) to be a source for this 
argument. Furthermore, Mazzoni argues that Dante, following a type of metaphor 
presented in Aristotle’s Poetics, claims that poetry and dreaming are similar activities: “la 
poesia era un sogno d’huomini desti, e ‘l sonno era la poesia d’huomini dormentati.”249 
Moreover, Petrarca followed Dante in several of his verses when he wanted to show the 
futility of pleasures, for example at the beginning of his Canzoniere: “quanto piace al 
mondo è breve sogno.” Then Mazzoni extends this discussion to a generic category of 
ancient authors, both poets and philosophers, who support Dante’s use of the word dream 
as a metaphor; in fact, they argued that all kinds of arts and sciences produce anything 
but dreams: “gli antichi, più arditamente, dissero che non solamente la poesia, ma tutte 
l’arti e tutte le scienze che facciano habito nell’intelletto possibile o pratico o 
contemplativo, ch’egli si sia, erano sogni.”250 Mazzoni quotes Homer, Plautus and Virgil 
as witnesses and concludes:  
 
sì che da tutto questo può apparire che se bene havesse Dante chiamato il suo 
poema sogno metaforicamente, che nondimeno, per le ragioni dette di sopra, non 
meritarebbe esser ripreso; poi che gli antichi alcuna volta usaro metafore parlando 
de’ suoi [their] poemi, e ‘l sogno abbracciando, secondo l’oppenione de gli 
antichi, metaforicamente tutte l’arti e tutte le scienze, fu nondimeno fra tutte 
l’altre cose reputato molto simile alla poesia.251 
248 Mazzoni. Discorso in difesa della Commedia del divino poeta Dante. 68. 
249 Ibid. 68. 
250 Ibid. 69. 
251 Ibid. 69-70. 
 146 
                                                        
 
Promoting something of a Copernican revolution in the system of arts and sciences, 
Mazzoni places poetry as a new center of human knowledge. Poetry becomes a broader 
genre in which contemplative and practical disciplines are included. No sophist or skeptic 
has been mentioned so far, but any knowledgeable reader could guess that Mazzoni was 
preparing to elucidate their role as defenders of the new vast realm of poetry. Indeed, the 
occasion to introduce them is given by the verb “parere” that Dante often employs as a 
synonym for perceiving: 
 
Alla voce parea, usata spesso da Dante, dico che noi non dovemo per questo 
lasciarci indurre a credere ch’egli sognasse, perciò che non è dubbio ch’ancora a’ 
desti ponno parere molte cose; anzi molti filosofi antichi, come Senofane, 
Seniade, Anacharsi, Dionisiodoro, Gorgia, Metrodoro, Protagora, Eutidemo, 
Arcesilao, Carneade, Pirrone, Sesto Empirico e molti altri dissero che tutte le cose 
parevano, e per tanto niente potersi intendere nel modo che è, ma si bene nel 
modo che appare.252 
 
Most of the names quoted above were well known at the time of Mazzoni’s work. Plato 
entitled three of his dialogues after Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus. In the latter, 
Dionysodorus is one of the main characters. They are all sophists, although the first two 
are the most popular and particularly affiliated with skepticism. For example, Seneca 
classifies Protagoras as a skeptic in his Moral Epistles 88, while Sextus Empiricus’ 
252 Ibid. 70. 
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Against the Logicians summarizes Gorgias’ work On Non-Being to support a skeptical 
approach to knowledge and communication.253 Besides Sextus, Pyrrho represents one of 
the main streams of ancient skepticism, while Arcesilaus initiated the skeptical phase of 
the Platonic Academy and Carneades led the so-called New Academy following 
Archesilaus’ teaching. Despite the fact that several authors quoted in the passage above 
were considered among the worst enemies of both Platonism and Aristotelianism, 
Mazzoni presents them as valuable sources for defending Dante and promoting poetry. 
All of the aforementioned philosophers share a theory of knowledge that 
essentially rehabilitates the uncertain nature of perception as a primary source of 
knowledge. According to Aristotle, everything we know is perceived before being 
processed as a concept, notion, idea, or whatever one wants to call the intelligible 
contents; but since, according to skeptics and some sophists, sensibility cannot grasp the 
real nature of any object, the only reality with which we can be in contact is illusory. If 
this is true, then poetry is mankind’s natural way to approach the world, even when we 
deceive ourselves by considering our intellect as a source of certainty. Remarkably, 
Mazzoni’s poetics agrees with the closure of the third part of Speroni’s Apologia dei 
dialoghi; specifically, the speech of Cardinale Amulio on the essential weakness of 
human knowledge. 254 The main difference is that Mazzoni believes poetry to be the 
broader category subsuming other forms of knowledge, while the character Amulio 
considers any kind of knowledge as a form of sophistry. In both cases, appearance has a 
central role.   
253 MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. 25. 
254  Speroni.  Opere. I. 390. 
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Perhaps the convergence mentioned above is not a mere coincidence but rather an 
example of a tendency of the cultural milieu that the two authors shared and promoted. 
Both Speroni and Mazzoni, like their contemporaries in the same area, were educated and 
wrote their works under the influence of a heterodox Aristotelianism. Because of geo-
political reasons, the northeastern area, which approximately included Cesena, Bologna, 
Padua, and Venice, was independent from Rome’s influence, not only politically, but also 
intellectually in the way to interpret Aristotle. As several scholars have proven, from the 
second half of the Cinquecento to the beginning of the Seicento, the universities and 
academies of the area were often animated by philosophers who accepted and practiced 
skepticism as a tool to avoid a dogmatic version of Aristotelianism.255 The translation of 
Sextus Empiricus’ works in Latin by Henri Estienne in 1562 increased the popularity of 
skeptic thought, but the skeptical Aristotelianism, or Aristotelian skepticism, was already 
initiated by Pietro Pomponazzi at the University of Padua and then Bologna decades 
before Estienne’s translation. In fact, Pomponazzi, often called “Peretto,” was the mentor 
of a generation of Aristotelians, Speroni among them, that considered Aristotle’s 
philosophy as a perfectible tool and skepticism as a necessary antidote against all 
dogmatism. The increasing diffusion of skeptical tendencies in the later Cinquecento 
found in the Venitian milieu, so resistant to the Counter-Reformation Aristotelianism of 
Rome, an ideal place to proliferate. 
255 cfr. Ch. B. Schmitt. “The rediscovery of ancient skepticism in modern times.” The Skeptical Tradition. 
Ed. M. F. Burnyeat. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983; R. H. Popkin. The History of 
Scepticism. From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford (UK) and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; A. 
De Pace. Noetica e scetticismo. Mazzoni versus Castellani. “Accademia” Cahiers. Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres, 2006. It should be noted that Gianfrancesco Pico’s Examen Vanitatis, published in Mirandola in 
1520, had already given a relevant contribution for the knowledge of Sextus Empiricus’s works (see G. M. 
Cao. Scepticism and Orthodoxy: Gianfrancesco Pico as a Reader of Sextus Empiricus. With a Facing Text 
of Pico's Quotations from Sextus. Pisa: F. Serra, 2007).  
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Cesare Cremonini is an emblematic example of a skeptical Aristotelian engaged 
in a cultural war against the Jesuits’ attempt to compete with the University of Padua by 
taking over the higher education in the area. After teaching for three decades at Ferrara, 
Cremonini moved to the University of Padua in the 1590s and taught in there as his friend 
and rival Galileo Galilei. Sharing part of Galilei’s vicissitudes, Cremonini was accused 
by the Inquisition of using philosophy against theology for personal and evil purposes. 
Cremonini did not become a martyr of free speech like Galileo, but his legacy is evident 
in the fact that his students founded the Accademia degli Incogniti in Venice in 1630 with 
a clear disposition towards the practice of utilizing doubt as a tool in investigating 
physical as well as moral issues.256  
While scholars have investigated how skepticism affected Aristotelianism in the 
Italian Renaissance, there is no study on how sophistry, interconnected with skeptic 
thought, affected the same cultural environment. Considering the proximity of skepticism 
and sophistry, which has led them to cross paths in many times and ways since antiquity, 
it is highly possible that ancient sophists played some role in the Venetian area between 
the Cinquecento and Seicento beyond Speroni and Mazzoni. 
Speroni argued for the rehabilitation of sophistry as a comprehensive approach to 
the human world, while Mazzoni focused on poetry as a kind of sophistry and classified 
sophists and skeptics in the same group of philosophers. Given the notoriety of these two 
Renaissance authors, it is hardly possible that their ideas remained isolated. On the 
contrary, they must have generated long-lasting debates among their contemporaries, 
thereby significantly influencing their intellectual world. Furthermore, Speroni and 
256 E. Muir. The Culture Wars of the Late Renaissance. Skeptics, Libertines, and Opera. Cambridge, MA 
and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2007. 15-59. 
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Mazzoni shared the metaphor of poetry as an art of painting. The well-known Latin 
phrase ut pictura poesis was a topos initiated by Horace’s Ars poetica, but they used it in 
an original way by connecting poetry with sophistry and skepticism. The final part of this 
chapter proposes an exploration of this connection within various authors and fields. 
 
 
4. Ut pictura poesis: Mazzoni, Speroni, Comanini 
 
Attracted by other aspects of his personality and oeuvre, scholars have neglected 
Speroni’s discourse on poetics and poetry. A complete study of his theories and 
perspective would need much more space and attention than can be provided in this 
chapter, but one reference has to be mentioned to introduce this chapter’s core. What is 
quoted below is the incipit of the Sommario in difesa della casa del Petrarca (“Summary 
in Defense of Petrarch’s House”), a draft with personal notes for a possible oration that 
may actually have been declaimed. Speroni started by recalling the first argument that has 
to be presented, which is a praise of poetry: 
 
Laudar prima la poesia una delle discipline liberali e che tegna del divino. Però gli 
antichi fanno i poeti sotto la tutela di Febo e delle Muse. Ed è adiutorio della 
rettorica, la quale dalla poesia tolle i numeri e la gentilezza delle parole. Ciceron 
fu poeta. Qui vedi Platone, Aristotele […] Marsilio Ficino. In quanta riverenza 
fussero anticamente i poeti appare perché soli essi erano riputati sapienti. Tali 
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furono Museo, Orfeo, […] Esiodo, ma innanzi tutti coloro Moisè e i suoi coetanei: 
David, Salomone e colui che fece Job.257 
 
Later in the text, Speroni claims “la poesia è cosa commune a’ filosofi” and “da uno 
stesso fonte [la poesia] nasce con la medicina, che Febo è medico e poeta.”258 Despite its 
lack of originality, Speroni’s discourse provides evidence of the author’s high esteem of 
poetry, which he conceives as a divine liberal art tightly connected to rhetoric. He claims 
that in antiquity poets were considered wise men, and he points out highly-esteemed 
popular mythological characters as well as biblical figures in the same fashion in which 
Marsilio Ficino built a chain of ancient sages (theologi veteres) in his Platonic Theology 
published in 1482 – as  already discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
Speroni counted Dante Alighieri among the wisest poets of all time, even superior 
to Virgil. Sometime within the span of the first ten-year quarrel over Dante, Speroni 
wrote his two Discorsi sopra Dante (“Discourses on Dante”) to defend the Florentine 
poet from Belisario Bulgarini and the other “senesi” involved in the dispute. As the 
Sommario in difesa della casa del Petrarca quoted above, Speroni’s Discorsi are among 
the so-called trattatelli published for the first time in 1740 and do not provide, 
unfortunately, any hint that allows them to be dated with certainty.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to say whether Mazzoni’s 1573 Difesa depends on Speroni’s Discorsi or vice-
versa, although a letter that Mazzoni sent to Speroni in 1572 proves that the latter 
considered the former as an established authority whose guidance he wanted to follow in 
his philosophical investigation.  
257 Speroni. Opere. V. 559. 
258 Ibid. 560. 
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In his letter, Mazzoni recalls that Speroni was willing to share his thoughts on the 
three thousand philosophical conclusions that he wrote with the intention of discussing 
them in a public meeting. At the time of the letter, Mazzoni had already started 
publishing his conclusions, but before proceeding, he wanted Speroni’s advice on two 
specific issues. The first issue regards the correct place that rhetoric should have in the 
system of disciplines, while the second concerns the most suitable form of 
government.259 The letter does not mention the poetic debate that exploded during that 
same year. Given Mazzoni’s high esteem of Speroni, one may suppose that his poetic 
theories were also affected by Speroni’s ideas, but claiming a direct influence of 
Speroni’s Discorsi on Mazzoni’s Difesa is hardly sustainable. On the other hand, it would 
be possible to argue the opposite, since Mazzoni is quoted in Speroni’s work along with 
other contemporaries, including Capponi, Castravilla, Castelvetro, Tomitano, Las Casas, 
and Bembo. In either case, Speroni’s intervention in the debate on Dante has an important 
part in the recovery of the trope ut pictura poesis and its role in the Italian Renaissance of 
sophistry. 
Speroni’s first Discorso sopra Dante is a commentary on several passages of the 
Comedy and does not provide any particularly original insight, while the second Discorso 
presents an actual defense of Dante introduced by a polemical argument that states the 
futility of Bellisario Bugarini’s attack: 
 
Innanzi che io cominci a defender Dante dalle calunnie di chi biasima la sua 
Commedia, è ragionevole cosa che si consideri qual sia stata la intenzion sua in 
259 Ibid. 355-356. On Mazzoni’s letter see P. G. Fabbri. “La políteia di Jacopo Mazzoni.” Il pensiero 
politico 22 (1989): 3-18. 16. 
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quella sua opra, e secondo che ella è buona o rea, e bene o male scritta, laudarlo o 
vituperarlo. La qual cosa se fusse stata considerata dal Bulgarini e da quelli altri 
che cominciarono a dirne male, ed onde si è fatto bello il sig. Bellisario, né elli 
indarno e con lor vergogna ne ragionavano, né io adesso mi metterei a parlarne.260 
 
Speroni describes Bulgarini’s attack as nonsense and accuses it of beginning a quarrel 
that should not have occurred. Like Mazzoni, Speroni considers Dante as the model for 
all poets and his Comedy as a masterpiece shaped in accordance with the rules of 
Aristotle. Indeed, Dante’s poem has one subject and action; therefore, those who argue 
the opposite do so in vain, and Bulgarini behaves like a beast: “’l poema di Dante ha un 
solo subietto e sola azione: cianci poi chi non lo ‘ntende,” and “il senese [i.e. Bulgarini] 
parla da bestia.”261 
 I do not aim to follow all the arguments of Speroni’s second Discorso; instead I 
will focus on the passages addressing poetry as painting while highlighting the similarity 
with passages in other works of Speroni and his contemporaries. 
 In a passage that anticipates Tasso’s theory of the poem as an artificial world 
created by an author, Speroni describes the poet as the ruler of his own creation, which 
creation is the result of an act of imitation using figures of speech. The ideal poet must 
have complete control on linguistic devices and strategies and must be knowledgeable 
enough in every field so he can easily disguise his art and deceive his reader. 
 
260 Speroni. Opere. V. 504. 
261 Ibid. 515. 
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Poeta è sovranissimo nello imitare, imitando sempre o con le persone introdotte, 
le quali sempre fa parlare, o parlando egli stesso come poeta ed introduttore di 
esse persone, nelle quali parlando sempre imita, o con metafore, o con epiteti, o 
con comparazioni e similitudini da lui dette in tante maniere, che è una 
meraviglia, e dette in modi tali che uom non si avverte che siano similitudini: il 
ché è sommo artificio, come è sommo ingegno e sapere il trovarle perché ciò è da 
uomo che molto sappia e delle scienze  e del mondo; del quale egli come esperto 
d’ogni cosa moderna e conoscitor delle istorie antiche, parla benissimo: 
conoscitor de’ costumi de’ principi, delle cittadi, e delle nazioni.262 
 
This passage presents a portrait of the perfect poet reminiscent of the perfect orator as  
described in the Ciceronian De Oratore: a man who is able to speak on everything, 
especially topics related to ethics, costums, and political life. But Speroni goes further in 
connecting this to the ability of imitating and recreating a cosmos in words. The skillful 
poet, as an illusionist, leads the reader to forget the figures of speech actually employed 
in creating the poem. The so-called “sommo artificio” may suggest several ideas that 
Speroni, as a knowledgeable author, must have had as references: the Socratic irony in 
debating, the Horatian mediocritas in writing poems, Baldassarre Castiglione’s (1478-
1529) sprezzatura in the social dimension, and Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) 
dissimulation in leading political affairs. Like all of them, Speroni’s “sommo artificio” is 
a procedure which hides itself in order to be persuasive and therefore successful. In 
performing and presenting his fictional world as a natural creation, the poet has to assume 
262 Ibid. 509. 
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a variety of identities, as many as the characters that he introduces in his poem, so that 
the art of writing poems is also a sort of dramatic art as the author plays different roles on 
stage.  
 Descriptions and similitudes are the main tools utilized in creating a poem: “nella 
quali descrizioni e similitudini [l’autore] imita sì che si può dire che dipinga e 
scolpisca.” 263  By deploying these tools, Dante makes possible the impossible in his 
Comedy, as in Inferno 13, in which Pier Delle Vigne is changed into a speaking tree, and 
in Inferno 26, in which Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro are presented as flames that are 
able to talk (to mention only two of the many examples found in the Commedia). 
 The theme of the poet as a master at imitating also appears later in the text:  
 
solo dirò parlando della imitazione che ‘l poeta imita principalmente introducendo 
a parlare le persone che nel poema intravengono, e questa è imitazione principale, 
la quale usa Dante introducendo a parlare Virgilio, Stazio, Beatrice e se stesso, 
dando ad ognuna di queste persone il suo proprio officio nel suo poema: onde 
Dante nel suo poema abbia due officii, l’uno di poeta ed imitatore, l’altro di 
persona ed imitato, dipintore e dipinto.264 
 
Speroni exploits the metaphor of painting to explain the multiplicity of characters in the 
Comedy. As is expected of an ideal poet, Dante introduces and plays a variety of 
characters, called personae in the Latin theater, and he acts as a painter of all of them. In 
Speroni’s evocative metaphor, Dante is simultaneously both the painter and the painting 
263 Ibid. 509. 
264 Ibid. 516. 
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– the author and the work - as in the canvas of Diego Velázquez entitled Las Meninas in 
which the painter portrays himself as a character among others. If this painting marks the 
beginning of the modern awareness of the self in representing itself - as Michel Foucault 
suggested in his Le mots et les choses (1966) - then Speroni is stressing the modernity of 
Dante’s poetry with remarkable insight.  
Even when narrowing one’s focus to the field of literary criticism, one can 
recognize Speroni’s originality. In fact, if the core of his intuition is Dante as a creator 
and artifact at the same time, then Speroni anticipates twentieth-century scholarship that 
focuses on the unusual autobiographical style of the Comedy in the Middle Ages, when 
the public dimension prevails over the sphere of the self-conscious individual.265 The 
metaphor of the painter who represents himself in his work is an elegant trope for 
summarizing twentieth-century scholarship’s conclusion regarding one of the most 
original aspects of the Divine Comedy. 
 Speroni’s Discorso is connected to several passages on imitation and painting in 
other works that Speroni wrote before and after his defense of Dante. The most important 
ones are already examined in the previous chapters, but it bears recalling them briefly 
here.  
 In his Dialogo della Discordia, Jove uses the metaphor of a painting in order to 
instruct the goddess on how to make her arguments persuasive to the public. He suggests 
that the skillful orator, as a good painter, knows how to show his subject from the most 
convincing perspective, without regarding the truth.266 More expansively, the “pictural 
265 See the related bibliography in A. Battistini and E. Raimondi. Le figure della retorica. Torino: Einaudi, 
1984. 54-55. 
266 Speroni. Opere. 64. 
 157 
                                                        
paradigm,” to employ the expression proposed in Malhomme’s article, is a leitmotif of 
the Dialogo della retorica, in which Speroni uses the metaphor of the orator as a painter 
to explain the power of rhetoric in producing persuasive images of the truth.267  
 Remarkably, both Speroni and Mazzoni employ the metaphor ut pictura poesis in 
a sense that goes beyond the Horatian topos, for poetry shares its features with dramatic 
art and oratory. In fact, all those arts perform verbally and create artificial worlds 
addressing an audience that has to be persuaded. As was shown previously in this 
chapter, Mazzoni interprets poetry as a pictorial art that uses fantasy as a tool, for poets 
are able to reproduce fantastic idols while crafting poems. To Speroni and Mazzoni, the 
term poesia, from the Latin poesis, is connected to the Aristotelian meaning of poiesis 
(production, composition) - from the verb poiein (to make, to craft) – as with the ability 
of creating artificial products, such as paintings, statues, speeches, and poems, that are 
not already present in the natural environment. As is well known, the Greek term poiesis 
has a broader meaning than the modern term ‘poetry’ and was not related to artistic 
creation as it has been understood since the Renaissance. Combining the Aristotelian 
poiesis with the Renaissance ennobled meaning of poetry, Speroni and Mazzoni extend 
the power of the poetic art perhaps further than any other early modern author. 
 The emphasis on the analogy of the poetic art with the pictorial art had important 
consequences. One example of these consequences emerges in the theory proposed by 
Gregorio Comanini in his dialogue Il Figino, ovvero del fine della pittura (“The Figino, 
or on the Purpose of Painting”) published in Mantova in 1591. Before analyzing the case 
of Comanini, one benefits from a brief return to Tasso’s Discorsi del poema eroico, in 
267 F. Malhomme. “La rhétorique et les arts chez Sperone Speroni.” Rhetoric 29.2 (2011): 151-193. 
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which Tasso mentions Comanini along with Mazzoni and argues the distance of their 
common theory from Aristotelianism. 268  According to Tasso, Comanini, excellent in 
eloquence and a friend of his, follows Mazzoni by considering the poet as an imitator of 
fantastic idols. Indeed, as Carlo Ossola and then Claudio Scarpati argued, Comanini 
applies to painting the ideas developed in the two defenses of Dante that Mazzoni 
published in 1573 and 1587, previously examined in this chapter.269 
 The Figino is a dialogue among three characters, Ambrogio Figino, Stefano 
Guazzo, and Ascanio Martinengo, who play respectively a poet, a painter, and a prelate. 
Guazzo defends the theory that art has pleasure as its goal, while Martinengo argues that 
art must instruct people in a moral sense, and Figino is a practitioner with a didactic 
tendency in his painting who offers comments from his point of view. Comanini’s work 
is affected by the Counter-Reformation climate, but it also offers a plurality of 
perspectives that are not confined to the narrow path of Tridentine doctrine. The dialogue 
explores a variety of aesthetic issues related to imitation and pleasure with regard to both 
Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. Another major topic is the analogy of arts and games 
and the role of entertainment in social life. It is easy to recognize the influence of major 
sixteenth-century authors, including Castiglione, Tasso, and most of all Mazzoni, who is 
clearly the source of the discussion on the icastic versus fantastic imitation, a distinction 
that Mazzoni took from Plato’s Sophist.270 
268 T. Tasso. Discorsi dell’arte poetica e del poema eroico. Ed. L. Poma. Bari: Laterza,1964. 90-91. 
269 C. Scarpati. “Iacopo Mazzoni tra Tasso e Marino.” Aevum 59 (1985): 433-458. 452-453; C. Ossola. 
Autunno del Rinascimento. “Idea del Tempio” dell’arte nell’ultmo Cinquecento. Firenze: Olschki, 1971. 
100-111. 
270 For an introduction to Comanini and his work, see Trattati d’arte del cinquecento fra manierismo e 
controriforma, vol. III. Ed. P. Barocchi. Bari: Laterza, 1962. 397-402. A. Pupillo Ferrari-Bravo. “Il 
Figino” del Comanini. Teoria della pittura di fine ’500. Roma: Bulzoni editore, 1975. G. Comanini. The 
Figino, or On the Purpose of Painting. Art Theory in the Late Renaissance. Eds. A. Doyle-Anderson and 
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As scholars have highlighted, although the two types of imitation derive from 
Plato’s Sophist, it was Mazzoni’s Difesa of 1587 that inspired Comanini to emphasize the 
fantastic form of imitation, since this was not Plato’s purpose.271 According to Comanini, 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo, who is often mentioned in the Figino, offers the most fitting 
example of a fantastic painter who imitates forms that exist only in his mind, such as his 
capricci in which Arcimboldo portrays the products of an original composition of 
vegetables and fruits. Besides this Cinquecento production, Comanini shows a particular 
connection with Marsilio Ficino and his syncretistic approach, which is evident in the 
parts of the dialogue dedicated to Neoplatonic themes such as love, demonology, and 
magic. Indeed, Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Sophist played a major role in the 
discussion on the nature and function of idols. 
 In addressing the distinction between icastic and fantastic art and the related 
analogy between painting and poetry, Comanini compares diverse authors of different 
ages. First, Martinengo refers to Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between simulacrum and 
idol in an attempt to clarify the terminological aspect of the dispute. He explains that the 
simulacrum is a representation of something that has existed, or that still exists; whereas 
an idol is an image that is not similar to anything that has ever existed: 
 
il simolacro è qualche cosa e l'idolo non è alcuna cosa, essendo simolacro quella 
immagine la quale è fatta a similitudine di cosa stata, che mai sia stata, overo che 
G. Maiorino. Toronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press, 2001. x-xxi. 
271 See Comanini. The Figino. xii. 
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sia; come sarebbe se altri ritrahesse il monstro descritto da Horatio nel principio 
dell'Arte poetica.272 
 
The last quote is from the very beginning of Horatius’ Ars poetica (“Poetic Art”), shortly 
preceding the formulation of the analogy between painting and poetry, and it offers an 
example of an idol, which would be the portrayal made by a painter who imitates the 
monster that Horace describes in the first verses of his work. 
Martinengo’s claim instigates Guazzo’s response, wherein he proposes a different 
terminological setting relying on different sources. In fact, Guazzo states that he bases his 
argument on the terms proposed in Plato’s Sophist and Ficino’s commentary: 
 
l'imitatione sappiamo essere di due sorti: una chiamata da lui [i.e. Plato] nel 
Sofista rassomigliatrice, overo icastica, e l'altra pur dal medesimo e nell'istesso 
dialogo, detta fantastica. La prima è quella che imita le cose le quali sono, la 
seconda è quella che finge cose non essistenti; e di questa, si come di quella, dice 
essere il proprio oggetto l'idolo, che simolacro è stato detto da Marsilio Ficino 
nella sua traslatione. Per l'autiorità del qual Ficino voi vedete che ancora questa 
parola simolacro è generale e commune a significare imagine di cosa sussistente 
(concedetemi questa voce) e non sussistente altresi.273 
 
272 G. Comanini. Figino, overo del fine della pittura. Mantova: per Francesco Osanna, 1591. 27. 
273 Ibid. 28-29. On this distinction, also see E. Panofsky. Idea. A Concept in Art Theory. Tr. J. J. S. Peake. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. 215. 
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According to Guazzo, both types of simulacrum are appropriate to both painting and 
poetry, so that painters and poets who reproduce something formed by nature perform 
icastic imitation while those who create images on their own perform fantastic imitation. 
All of them deal with simulacra. To clarify the coexistence of the two types of art, 
Guazzo reports the major examples from Antiquity to his time. Virgil, Ariosto, and Tasso 
would be icastic poets when they represent Aeneas, Orlando, who really existed; 
however, when they write about Acate, Rodomonte, and Argante, the same poets should 
be called fantastic because they represent men who have no existence outside the mind: 
 
Onde Virgilio nella persona di Enea, l'Ariosto nella persona d'Orlando, e 'l Tasso 
in quella di Goffredo, saranno poeti icastici come rappresentatori d'huomini che 
veramente sono stati; ma i medesimi nella persona d'Acate, di Rodomonte, e 
d'Argante, perché hanno finto huomini che mai non furono, poeti fantastici 
devono essere appellati e formatori d'idoli rappresentanti cose che non hanno 
l'essere fuori dalla mente.274 
 
It results that the same poet may be both icastic and fantastic depending on the character 
he/she chooses to depict in verse.  
Tasso, of course, must not have appreciated Comanini’s interpretation of his 
Gerusalemme liberata as a hybrid product (half icastic and half fantastic). Still one ought 
to admit that Guazzo presents a very inclusive and tolerant definition of art - perhaps 
even too inclusive from a Counter-Reformation point of view. 
274 Comanini. Figino, overo del fine della pittura. 29. 
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 The analogy between pictorial and poetic art recurs later in the dialogue, when the 
discussion addresses the artist’s ability to shape himself and his creations in different 
forms. Guazzo and Martinengo agree on this matter, which is related to sophistry because 
of the classical allegory employed here: 
 
Gua. [...] Conosco esser vero che non meno al buon pittore che al buon poeta fa 
bisogno d'una certa universale letteratura con cui possa, a guisa d'un altro Proteo, 
trasformarsi in diverse forme e servirsi degli abiti altrui quanto ad imitator 
conviene. 
Mar. Né io sono dal vostro parere discordante. Benché ostinatamente difendano 
alcuni il contrario e vogliano che infino al poeta non sia lecito far imitatione di 
cose scientifiche o d'arti. Onde ardiscono di biasimare non solo il Pontano, perché 
abbia in un suo poema cantato le cose del cielo, ma Virgilio ancora, che trattò 
dell'agricoltura nella Georgica.275 
 
Proteus, the mythological protagonist of one of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, is the key term of 
this exchange. This character is ambiguous because of the double meaning it acquired 
during the long span of time between antiquity and the Renaissance. On the one hand, 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola made Proteus the allegory of the man who can become 
whatever he wants because he does not have a specific nature, so he is able either to reach 
God or fall into the darkness of the lowest world. Thus is the theory of the human being 
as a magnum miraculum that Pico argues in his never-performed speech now known as 
275 Ibid. 48 
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De dignitate hominis (“On the Dignity of Man”) (1487). On the other hand, Plato uses 
Proteus as a metaphor of a sophist who is able to imitate whatever he wants and pretends 
to be wise without actually possessing any knowledge. Speroni originally revised the two 
meanings and proposed a different version, a positive one rich in consequences. In his 
Apologia dei dialoghi III, as was discussed in chapter two, Proteus represents the poet as 
well as the rhetorician who is able to be a variety of personae, or characters, and to create 
a well-ordered world in which he assumes the identity most appropriate for the moment. 
In his Discorso sopra Dante, Speroni presents Dante as an excellent example of a painter 
who portrays the world of his poem as well as himself as a character in it. Indeed, 
Speroni’s works suggest that poets and rhetoricians are similar not only to the 
mythological Proteus but also to the Platonic demiurge.  
The two characters in Comanini’s Figino support a position that avoids Pico’s 
exaltation of the human being and overcomes Plato’s condemnation of the sophist. 
Indeed, Comanini seems to depend on Speroni’s version of the metaphorical meaning of 
Proteus. A further idea expressed by Guazzo and Martinengo agrees with what Speroni 
writes in his second Discorso sopra Dante. The two characters say that the poet ought to 
possess as broad a realm of knowledge as possible (“universal letteratura”), which is an 
essential condition for being a good imitator, although some critics would condemn this 
position and attack such a kind of poet, as is evident in the accusation against Giovanni 
Pontano’s Urania and Meteororum liber as well as Virgil’s poem on the agricultural life. 
 While the topos of the similarity between painting and poetry is strictly related to 
the larger debate on the value of Dante’s poem, the same topos and debate are strongly 
affected by the rebirth of ancient sophistry in the vernacular works that started in some of 
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Speroni’s earlier dialogues (published in 1542) and continued into some of his later 
works in the ‘70s. As a result, when Mazzoni and the other defenders of Dante responded 
to Ridolfo Castravilla, Belisario Bulgarini, and other detractors, their arguments benefited 
from the rediscovery of sophistic art. In these respects, the major lack of understanding in 
scholarly studies so far surrounds the fundamental role of Speroni’s rehabilitation of 
sophists, which took place between Ficino’s translation of Plato’s dialogues and the 
controversial interpretation of poetry as a fantastic art in Mazzoni and his followers, such 
as Comanini. In fact, no study of Mazzoni’s original theory has connected this segment of 
sixteenth-century literature with the Italian vernacular rebirth of sophistry. 
 There is one last aspect that has emerged several times throughout this 
dissertation and especially in the last part of this chapter: the long-lasting rejection of not-
being as a dangerous dimension where elusiveness and transformation rule, possibly to 
the detriment of the human sphere, including social life and poetic art. We cannot even 
summarize the history of the opposition of being and not-being as two distinct 
dimensions, which started in the early Greek philosophy, but it is important to highlight 
that this dissertation has also aimed at demonstrating that Italian Renaissance literature 
plays a part in this history, a history that interestingly begins in the fifth century B.C., 
already across poetry and philosophical thought, with the fragmented verses of the poem 
On Nature of Parmenides of Elea. Indeed, Parmenides forbade travelling, metaphorically 
speaking, on the way of not-being, which cannot even be thought: “that [i.e. not-being], I 
point out to you, is a path wholly unthinkable, for neither could you know what-is-not 
(for that is impossible), nor could you point it out.”276 Plato’s Sophist and Parmenides 
276 R. Waterfield, ed. The First Philosophers. The Presocratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University 
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stand as the paramount first attempt to overcome the rigidity of the rule established by 
Parmenides, while the allegory of the opposition of light (being) and darkness (not-
being), posed in the poem On Nature, has always been presented as a major trope since 
Platonism until now; and literature makes no exception.  
The opposition of being and not-being, truth and falsehood, or light and darkness 
re-emerges in the Renaissance also thanks to the rebirth of sophistry in the same age. 
Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the sophistic art represented a valuable 
resource for rhetoric and poetry, but the fear of its dark side still remained. Tasso’s 
refusal of the possibility of making poetry predicated on not-being, or falsehood, is quite 
explicit in this respect, since allowing the poet to write about non-inexistent things would 
suggest that the not-being can be imagined and said, with a consequent confusion 
between being and not-being, the true and the false, light and darkness. One can hear the 
echo of Parmenides’ verses and their aftermath in the dialogue between the Segretario 
and Forestiero, the two characters of Tasso’s Apologia in difesa della Gerusalemme 
liberata published in 1586:  
 
Forestiero: Mi sovviene d'aver letto: quel che è e quello che non è ritrovarsi per 
tutte le cose congiunti insieme quasi con fibbie e con uncini: laonde di molte di 
quelle che diciamo non essere, non si può dire che non siano semplicemente; ma 
in qualche modo sono, in qualche modo non sono. 
Segretario: Così stimo. 
Forestiero: Ma l'invenzione è delle cose, in quanto elle sono, non in quanto elle 
Press, 2000. 52. 
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non sono. 
Segretario: A mio parere. 
Forestiero: Perché in quanto elle non sono, stanno ascose e ricoperte nelle tenebre 
e nella caligine di quel che non è: lì dove suol rifuggire il sofista, e circondarsi di 
molti argini e di molti ripari, perché sia malagevole il cavarnelo: e quivi suol 
ricercarle il poeta fantastico, il quale è l'istesso che 'l sofistico; ma ricercandone, è 
gran pericolo che perda se stesso. Però consiglierei ciascuno che più tosto dovesse 
cercarne nella luce e nello splendore di quel che è veramente.277 
 
The Forestiero argues that although the relationship of being and not-being, connected 
with buckles and hooks  (“con fibbie e con uncini”), is partially valid, poetry should not 
treat the not-being as its matter, and the poet should not lose himself in the dark land of 
shadows where the sophist lives, hiding his/her identity. Tasso’s position on poetry 
clearly results from a long-lasting philosophical dispute that dates to antiquity, and it 
testifies to the ancient roots of an important literary debate during the Italian Renaissance. 
277 T. Tasso.  “Apologia in difesa della Gerusalemme liberata.” Id. Prose diverse. Ed. C. Guasti. Vol. I. 
Firenze: Le Monnier, 1875. 334-335. 
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Conclusions and possible aftermath 
 
According to Speroni, the human world is a place in which rhetoric plays a central role in 
coordinating and guiding citizens toward the common good. This focus on the unstable 
world of human affairs not only stands in opposition to Plato’s political model but also 
evokes the division between the two archetypical cities in Augustine of Hippo’s (354-
430) De Civitate Dei. Inverting Augustine’s perspective on the antagonistic relationship 
between the human and metaphysical sphere, Speroni gives to the “city of men” an 
undeniable value independent of any kind of metaphysical or religious point of view. 
According to Speroni’s argument, there is no place for essences and Platonic ideas in 
public and political life, and it is unreasonable to judge earthly values from a 
metaphysical sphere. If political and civil life depend on opinions, compromises, and 
changeable values, then sophistic rhetoric is the most appropriate practice to create the 
best public life for each particular community.  
Although fifteenth-century authors engaged in the broad work of translation and 
interpretation of the ancient sophistic tradition, Speroni’s project was the very first 
attempt in the Italian Renaissance to explicitly suggest that sophistic rhetoric and cultural 
perspective deserved a central role at his time. Furthermore, it was the first time in 
Europe that an author had proposed a sophistic Renaissance in vernacular with the 
specific objective of reaching a broader public. In Italy, the vernacular debate over 
sophistry spread among Mazzoni, Tasso and the other actual and virtual interlocutors 
after the publication and diffusion of Speroni’s works: his dialogues - published in 1542 - 
trattatelli, and Apologia dei dialoghi. The exploration conducted in this dissertation has 
not only brought to the surface the originality of Speroni’s discourse on sophistic arts, but 
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has also connected all parts of the Italian sophistic Renaissance, spanning two centuries, 
first in Latin and than in Italian, for the first time. 
None of the scholarly traditions on either side of the Atlantic have considered the 
relevance of the impact of sophists on early modern philosophy and literature, from 
Leonardo Bruni to Torquato Tasso. Even Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller, two 
of the most productive scholars, did not present the early modern sophistic rebirth as a 
subject deserving specific attention. One might wonder what accounts for this lack in the 
field of Renaissance Studies. Two precedents might be quoted. The first is the modern 
discovery of Hermeticism as a central strain in the early-modern era, thanks to the works 
of Eugenio Garin, Aby Warburg, and Frances Yates. The second, much more recent, is 
the discovery of the massive presence of a vernacular Aristotelianism on which 
international teams in the UK and Italy are currently working. 278  In both cases, a 
prejudice has prevented international scholarship from perceiving the significance of 
these cultural phenomena. In the first case, before the twentieth-century attempt to 
recover the hermetic tradition, no scholar would have imagined that the hermetic texts, 
considered obscure, confused, and of uncertain origin, could have played an important 
role in the Renaissance, seen as this movement was as a preparation for the modern 
Enlightenment. In the second case, before the recent international projects on Aristotle in 
the Italian vernacular, scholars had considered Greek and Latin the only languages in 
278 See the project Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy, c. 1400-c. 1650  that ran from 2010 to 
2013 at the Uniersity of Warwick 
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/ren/projects/vernaculararistotelianism/) and the ERC Starting Grant 
project Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History 




                                                        
which Aristotelianism could carry original ideas and had not considered worth studying 
the vernacular translation of Aristotelian works. 
I believe that the results of this project will impact Renaissance scholarship in 
several respects. First, the discovery of a sophistic presence in the Renaissance will 
broaden our vision of the variety of traditions available at that time. Furthermore, it 
enriches the portrayal of the early-modern era that scholars, until now, have constructed. 
The Renaissance, thus, emerges as a unique moment in the history of Western thought, 
when a plurality of cultural traditions was not only reborn in the medium of the 
vernacular language but also culturally translated and interpreted in original ways. This 
dissertation has aspired to argue that sophistry – or a plurality of sophistic perspectives – 
must be considered to be a major factor in Renaissance culture along with Platonism, 
Hermeticism, Aristotelianism, and skepticism. If MacPhail’s book began uncovering the 
sophistic Renaissance, mostly in Latin literature and French culture, this dissertation 
draws attention to the Italian world, where the Renaissance was born. It should be noted 
that this dissertation represents a beginning rather than a completion of study on the 
subject. Part of the research vectors for deepening and broadening this investigation are 
already visible and can be briefly drafted. In the following pages, I would like to suggest 
the paths of research that I consider among the most interesting and promising. 
An issue that needs to be deepened is the difference between Latin and vernacular 
production on sophistry in Europe. Indeed, the vernacular writing aimed to share the new 
literature with the middle class, beyond the academic environment. It would be important 
to verify not only how the key philosophical terms of the sophistic movement were 
translated into the vernacular but also what vernacular expressions were adopted or 
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invented to express specific concepts and how arguing them in the vernacular might have 
inspired original ideas. Furthermore, the ways in which this linguistic process overlapped 
with the development of other traditions in the vernacular, mostly Platonism and 
Aristotelianism, but also skepticism, should be addressed. The complex and changeable 
linguistic setting, which was Renaissance Italy, where different vernacular languages 
competed for supremacy, should also be considered as a major factor in further research. 
Beyond linguistic concerns, it may be fruitful to research contemporary Italian 
literary production in Latin. Gerolamo Cardano is the most relevant example for 
engagement in the rebirth of ancient sophistry in Latin Renaissance literature. At least 
two of his works are relevant for the subject: the Neronis encomium (“Praise of Nero”) 
published in 1562 and Antigorgias dialogus sive de recta vivendi ratione (“Anti-Gorgias, 
or On the Right Way to Live”) published in 1566.279 Both of them, but especially the 
latter, show how much Cardano’s discourse relates to the ancient dispute between 
Socratic-Platonic philosophy and the culture of sophists. It is a matter of fact that Speroni 
and Cardano shared the same cultural environment in Padua, Bologna, and Rome in 
roughly the same years. Cardano’s interest in Gorgias and sophistry may be independent 
from Speroni’s rediscovery of sophistic rhetoric or vice-versa. In either case, comparing 
the two authors would shed light on the differences between two contemporaries writing 
on the same subject from different perspectives. 
Another path open for further research is on the legacy of Speroni’s works and the 
rebirth of sophistry between the late Renaissance and the Baroque era. As mentioned in 
279 On rhetoric in Cardano, see G. Giglioni. “The Many Rhetorical Personae of an Early Modern Physician: 
Girolamo Cardano on Truth and Persuasion.” Rhetoric and Medicine in Early Modern Europe. Eds. S. 
Pender and N. S. Strueve. Farnham, UK and Burlngton, VT: Ashgate, 2012.173-193. 
 171 
                                                        
chapter four, Claudio Scarpati suggested a nexus between the literary debate of the 
second half of the sixteenth century and the poetry and poetics of Giambattista Marino 
(1569-1625).280 One could argue that the Baroque as a culture of appearance and formal 
virtuosity could easily have found in sophistry a powerful ally and somehow also a 
philosophical foundation. Assuming the legitimacy of such a research direction, one may 
raise the following questions: how much of the sophistic Renaissance did Baroque culture 
inherit? Would it be possible to interpret Baroque poetics and poetry as a modern 
variation of a sophistic rhetoric? Does the prevalence of linguistic experimentation with 
new rhetorical devices imply the legacy of Gorgias’ Praise of Helen? 
The possible reciprocal influence of the debate over sophistry between Italy and 
the rest of Europe in the early-modern era is also a matter for further research. There is 
evidence that French literature had a part in the sophistic Renaissance. MacPhail has 
argued that Michel de Montaigne’s (1533-1592) writings are most closely related to 
sophistic rhetoric, making him an important figure in these respects. According to 
MacPhail, Montaigne uses rhetorical means to destroy rhetoric, so that Montaigne’s 
“essay is the modern form of rhetoric best adapted to weakening, and thus to 
strengthening rhetoric,” and finally “the essay […] is a sophistic form, and Montaigne is 
the champion of the Sophistic Renaissance.”281 Furthermore, the typical relativistic and 
pluralistic tendency in Montaigne’s Essays confirms a proximity to the ancient sophists’ 
approach.282 
280 C. Scarpati. “Iacopo Mazzoni tra Tasso e Marino.” Aevum 59 (1985): 433-458. 456-458. 
281 E. MacPhail. The Sophistic Renaissance. Genève: Droz, 2011. 71, 92. 
282  Ibid. 94-103. 
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One could also address the relationship between Speroni and the European 
authors who were particularly connected to the Italian Renaissance culture. In chapter 
three, I argued not only for the possible influence of Erasmus’ Praise of Folly on 
Speroni’s Dialogo della Discordia but also for the original aspects that make the latter 
unique in the history of Western philosophy and literature. Further research should aim to 
explore other possible parallels or influences across European borders, first in sixteenth-
century French culture.  
Scholars have argued that Speroni’s Dialogo delle lingue (1542), especially where 
he defends the vernacular as a language exchangeable for Latin in conveying cultural 
content, was a model for Joachim Du Bellay’s Deffence et illustration de la langue 
françoyse (1549).283 Speroni’s oeuvre may also have influenced other sixteenth-century 
French authors. A comparative study of Speroni and Michel de Montaigne seems 
particularly promising. For example, Speroni’s Dialogo della Discordia could have been 
a major source of inspiration for Montaigne’s De l’art de conferer – published in the 
third book of his Essais – which argues the positive effect of discord in education and 
self-development. 284 
Dorothea B. Heitsch’s interpretation of Montaigne’s De l’art de conferer has shed 
light on a particular point that is worthy of discussion here.285 Heitsch underlines the 
significance of images of competition and agon in Montaigne’s work, which “turns the 
283  See P. Villey. Les sources italiennes de la Deffence et illustration de Joachim du Bellay. Paris: 
Champion, 1908; I. Navarrete. “Strategies of Appropriation in Speroni and Du Bellay.” Comparative 
Literature 41 (1989): 141-154; J. Trabant. "Noch einmal über Du Bellay une Speroni." Renaissance - 
Episteme und Agon: Für Klaus W. Hempfer anläßlich seines 60. Geburtstages. Eds. Edited A. Kablitz, 
Edited by G Regn. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2006. 239-256. 
284 A parallelism between the intellectual approach of Seroni and Montaigne is suggested in P. De Capitani. 
“De l’art de persuader à l’art de bien juger et de bien dire: la rhétorique chez Sperone Speroni.” Cahiers 
d’études italiennes 2 (2005): 131-159. 
285 D. B. Heitsch. “Nietzsche and Montaigne: Concepts of style.” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of 
Rhetoric 17 (1999): 411-431. 
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essay into an arena of intellectual experience.”286 Indeed, Montaigne displays passion for 
agon when he defends discussion as the most fruitful exercise for the mind and notes that 
“the Athenians, and the Romans too, preserved this practice in great honor in their 
academies. In our time, the Italians retain some vestiges of it, to their great advantage, as 
is seen by a comparison of our intelligence with theirs.”287 Montaigne’s praise of the 
Italians could have been inspired by several literary examples, from Colluccio Salutati’s 
praise of “disputatio” in the first dialogue of Leonardo Bruni’s Dialogi ad Petrum 
Histrum to Sperone Speroni’s Dialoghi published in 1542, and Stefano Guazzo’s Civile 
conversatione, published in 1574.288 Furthemore, Montaigne possibly had the chance to 
experience the Italian practice of dialogue in his voyage in Italy in 1580-1581. According 
to his The Journal of the Journey to Italy, he visited Padua and Venice in November 
1580.289 In the very same year, Speroni was in Padua and already well-known in the 
Venetian as well as Roman intellectual environment. Despite the fact that Montaigne 
does not mention any encounter with Speroni or others figures of his milieu, one could 
imagine that he left those places with at least some acquaintance with Speroni’s works. If 
the third book of his Essais, written after his voyage, is also the result of his experience in 
Italy, then it is possible that Speroni’s influence played a role in it. 
286 Ibid. 430. 
287 M. de Montaigne. Essays III. Id. The Complete works. Eds. D. M. Frame and S. Hampshire. New York 
and Toronto: A. A. Knopf, 2003. 855. “Les Atheniens, et encore les Romains, conservoient en grand 
honneur cet excercice en leur Academies. De nostre temps, les Italiens en retiennent quelques vestiges, à 
leur grand profict, comme il se voit par la comparaison de nos entendemens aux leurs” (M. de Montaigne. 
Les Essais III. Ed. P. Villey. Paris: PUF, 1924. 922-923). 
288  J. Balsamo. “La conversation dans la “Librairie”: Montaigne et quelques italiens.” Dialogo & 
conversazione. I luoghi di una socialità ideale dal Rinascimento all’Illuminismo. Eds. M. H. Andersen and 
A. Toftgaard. Firenze: Olschki, 2012. 61-77. On the value of debating, particularly in scholastic authors, 
see the recent study of A. J. Novikoff. The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and 
Performance. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 
289 M. de Montaigne. Journal de voyage. Ed. Fausta Garavini. Paris: Gallimard, 1983. 160-166. 
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The practice of dialogue has had an important role in the development of Western 
culture since antiquity and is detectable in several forms throughout the Renaissance; 
nevertheless, the practice of praising discord seems to be a more specific and rare literary 
genre. As we discuss in chapter three, except for the pre-Socratic philosopher Eraclitus of 
Hephesus, I am not aware of another explicit defense of discord in Western literature 
before Speroni’s Dialogo della Discordia.  
Montaigne and Speroni seem to share the same passion for debate, conceived as 
an agon where discord helps in achieving excellent results. There is evidence of this in a 
passage from the De l’art de conferer in which Montaigne compares the dullness of 
reading books and the stimulation of discussion with worthy interlocutors: “if I discuss 
with a strong mind and a stiff jouster, he presses on my flanks, prods my right and left; 
his ideas launch mine. Rivalry, glory, competition push me and lift me above myself. 
And union is an altogether boring quality in discussion”. 290  Montaigne proposes 
metaphors of strife and love in order to clarify what he means:  
 
I like a strong manly fellowship and familiarity, a friendship that delights in the 
sharpness and vigor of its intercourse, as does love in bites and scratches that 
draw blood. It is not vigorous and generous enough if it is not quarrelsome, if it is 
civilized and artful, if it fears knocks and moves with constraint.291  
290 Montaigne. Essays III. 855. “Si je confere avec une ame forte et un roide jouster, il me presse les flancs, 
me pique à gauche et à dextre, ses imaginations eslancent les miennes. La jalousie, la gloire, la contention 
me poussent et rehaussent au dessus de moy-mesmes. Et l’unisson est qualité du tout ennuyeuse en la 
conference” (Montaigne. Les Essaie III. 923). 
291 Montaigne. Essays III. 856. “J’ayme une societé et familiarité forte e virile, une amitié  qui se flatte en 
l’aspreté et vigueur de son commerce, comme l’amour, és  morsures et esgratigneures sanglantes. Elle 
n’est pas assez vigoureuse et genereuse, si elle n’est querelleuse, si elle est civilisée et artiste, si elle craint 
le hurt et a ses allures contreintes” (Montaigne. Les Essaie III. 924). 
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This praise of discord as a means of improving intellectual life may have been borrowed 
from Speroni’ Dialogo della Discordia, or the two works may have evolved 
independently towards a similar conclusion. In either case, a comparative study 
addressing the subject may uncover that the agonistic culture of ancient Greece, 
traditionally animated by the verbal competition between sophists, is a common source 
for Montaigne and Speroni. 
Although the connection between Speroni’s works and France is the most 
promising for future research, one cannot exclude the possible influence of the Italian 
rebirth of sophistry in other parts of Europe. Heinrich Merkl’s recent book on Miguel de 
Cervantes (1547-1616) as an anti-sophist actually opens a new path of research on the 
diffusion of literature on sophistry in early-modern Spain.292 Merkl argues that Cervantes 
knew about sophistry from either Ficino’s translation and commentaries on Plato’s 
dialogues or different sources and that his Quijotes engage sophistry even if not 
explicitly. Merkl aims at demonstrating how Cervantes had an important part in the 
history of ideas, even while he criticizes and refuses sophistic perspectives. 
Also, modern Spanish scholarship has expressed interest in the subject. A most 
famous case is philosopher Fernando Savater’s book Apologia del sofista y otros 
sofismas. 293  The book collects different essays written between 1969 and 1973, and 
although only the first two writings are explicitly dedicated to sophistry, Savater 
292  H. Merkl. Cervantes anti-sofista: sobre Platón, Ficino, y los tres Quijotes, 1605, 1614 y 1615. 
Pontevedra: Editorial Academia del Hispanismo, 2011. See also H. Merkl. “Cervantes, Protágoras y la 
Postmodernidad. El ‘Quijote’ de 1605 y algunos diálogos de Platón.” Anuario de Estudios Cervantinos 1 
(2004): 139-147. 
293 F. Savater. Apologia del sofista y otros sofismas. Madrid: Taurus, 1973. 
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introduces his volume by announcing that his main subject will be the relationship 
between philosophy and rhetoric. Savater’s inclination toward the consideration of 
philosophy as a literary genre is claimed at the very beginning and confirmed throughout 
the book. In discussing the matter, Savater takes into serious consideration one of the 
most interesting of Nietzsche’s ideas: philosophy has found in rhetoric an enemy and an 
ally at the same time. In fact, Savater takes for granted the following Nietzschean 
argument: despite the fact that philosophy – in Plato’s definition of it – was born to reject 
the sophistic art, no philosophy – especially Platonism - would have been possible 
without rhetorical means of expression.294 One may notice that at the core of Speroni’s 
thinking there is a similar argument: in the attempt to destroy sophistry, Plato unveils 
himself as the worst sophist. 
Are Cervantes and Savater only isolated cases in the history of Spanish culture or 
just the most evident representatives of a broader, ongoing discourse on the value of 
sophistry in early modern and modern Spain? Expanding research into other Spanish 
authors and works may uncover additional significant cases of literature engaged with 
sophistic subjects and perhaps further connections between Spanish and Italian 
intellectual environments throughout history. 
What about the legacy of the recovery of sophistry in Germany? In the nineteenth 
century, German culture expressed an interest in the sophistic movement. Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is one of the most relevant cases in this respect. In 1851, 
Schopenhauer published a collection of philosophical reflections entitled Parerga and 
Paralipomena, in which he included his Art of always Being Right, gathering 38 
294 Ibid. 9. 
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stratagems to win an argument. Far from being simply a sarcastic exercise, this work in 
fact implies a specific Weltanschauung in which persuasion becomes the primary 
strength of any kind of argument in any field, implying a renunciation of reaching any 
truth or stable understanding of reality. In his work, Schopenhauer reduces all kind of 
argumentation to a rhetorical device for winning the interlocutor in a dialectical agon. 
Truth is not an objective anymore, and all the attention is dedicated to persuading instead 
of demonstrating. Overcoming Plato’s condemnation as well as Aristotle’s criticism of 
sophistry, Schopenhauer rehabilitates the sophistic attitude toward knowledge. 
 If Schopenhauer is the first German thinker who seems to be strongly influenced 
by the sophistic tradition, Friedrich Nietzsche is certainly the most significant as well as 
most complex case to be considered. 
Part of Nietzsche’s perspective is already present in Speroni’s defense of sophists 
and his condemnation of the Socratic and Platonic point of view discussed in chapter two. 
In order to appreciate this similarity, we should briefly recall Nietzsche’s interest in 
ancient sophists. According to Scott Consigny, who provided a close reading of the 1872 
essay Homer's Contest, the 1873 notes for the book Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, and other works of Nietzsche on the same subject, the ancient sophists’ rhetorical 
art strongly affected the German philosopher. 295 Nietzsche considered Protagoras and 
Gorgias the last representatives of the ancient ‘healthy’ Greek agonistic culture, because 
of their taste for competition, in which all aspects of life, even the most painful, are 
accepted and enthusiastically embraced. According to Nietzsche, the sophists prefigure 
his anti-metaphysical perspective in their refusal of any absolute truth. They were artists 
295 S. Consigny. “Nietzsche's Reading of the Sophists.” Rhetoric Review 13 (1994): 5-26. 
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able to create persuasive speeches through a surprising control of the linguistic means 
and stand against any Socratic and Platonic tyrannical philosophy. It would be worth 
exploring if this recovery was partially related to Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the 
Renaissance, nourished by his intellectual relation with the historian Jacob Burckhardt 
(1818-1897). Indeed, when the young Nietzsche joined the University of Basel, 
Burckhardt was an established scholar who had already published The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy (1860). Furthermore, from 1872 to 1886 Burckhardt taught a very 
popular course on ancient Greece for which he had kept gathering notes for the 
manuscript of his The Cultural History of Greece – eventually published in four volumes 
in 1898-1902 – a work that surprisingly points out the misleading judgment on sophists 
due to the overestimated Platonic condemnation of them. As Lionel Gossman 
demonstrated in his book Basel in the Age of Burckhardt, Burckhardt anticipated several 
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy through both works mentioned above. 296 One wonders 
if Burckhardt’s expertise in ancient Greece as well as the Italian Renaissance along with 
is heterodox perspective on ancient sophists is somehow related to Nietzsche’s recovery 
of the sophistic culture against the Platonic metaphysics. 
Remarkably, there is one specific element that Speroni and Nietzsche share and 
that makes them unique cases in the Renaissance and modern Europe respectively: their 
attacking Socrates for being mostly harmful to the Greek culture. This becomes even 
more striking when one considers that Socrates has been commonly considered a positive 
figure, spiritual guide, philosophical model, and even a Pagan anticipation of Christ. Both 
Speroni and Nietzsche inverted the common opinion and considered Socrates responsible 
296 See L. Gossman. Basel in the Age of Burckhardt. A study in Unseasonable Ideas. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2000. 297-346 (for Burckhardt’s opinion on sophists, see 339-340). 
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for poisoning the source of Western culture with his thought and practice. In chapter two 
of this dissertation, we analyzed Speroni’s Contra Socrate, in which two arguments are 
particularly close to Nietzsche’s position. First, Socrates actually misled Athens’s citizens 
by introducing the concept of essence in moral discussion. Second, his thinking was so 
twisted that it also affected his body, shaped more as a beast than a human being. 
According to Pierre Hadot, Nietzsche’s intellectual engagement with Socrates is complex 
and not always so easy to retrace.297 Nevertheless, I argue that one can clearly find along 
Nietzsche’s philosophical path the same type of arguments presented in Speroni’s Contra 
Socrate.  This is particularly evident in Nietzsche’s writing about Socrates and the Greek 
tragedy, published as a part of his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, in which 
the German philosopher highlights the pernicious effect of Socrates’ dialectics on Greek 
culture and argues that his uncommon ugliness reflected the monstrosity of his 
philosophy. A study of the similarity between Speroni and Nietzsche may not only 
contribute to understanding the legacy of the sophistic Renaissance but also to deepening 
the influence of the Italian Renaissance on one of the most revolutionary thinkers of the 
modern era.  
In recent years, Italian philosophy has shown a capacity for looking at its 
background and finding distinctive features in order to stress its unique contribution to 
Western culture, finding a specific strength in its own history. The most recent tendency 
in this direction is the “pensiero vivente” (“living thought”), recently proposed by 
Roberto Esposito.298 Esposito’s perspective intersects interestingly with this dissertation. 
297 P. Hadot. Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique. Editions Albin Michel: Paris 2002. 
298 See R. Esposito. Pensiero vivente. Origine e attualità della filosofia italiana. Torino: Enaudi, 2010. 
(Living Thought. The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy. Trans. Z. Hanafi. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2012). 
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According to Esposito, Italian thinkers, who have always lived in a changeable geo-
political climate, have been forced to develop both a flexibility in thinking to avoid any 
rigid philosophical system as well as a specific lexicon. From the fourteenth century to 
the “pensiero debole” (“weak thought”) of Gianni Vattimo, Italian philosophy has been 
characterized by a unique supremacy in Western culture. Indeed, philosophy ‘made in 
Italy’ is able to deal with praxis, avoid metaphysics and any rigid structure, engage 
contemporary political life, welcome plurality of perspectives, and intersect with different 
disciplines. 
According to Esposito, the originality of Italian thought stems from a specific 
historical and geographical context, the Italian peninsula, for centuries divided into 
regional states, and even city states, with different styles of life, ethical and political 
theories and habits. Italian philosophy was born on an unstable, changeable, volcanic 
land and, metaphorically speaking, embodies these features. The span of time between 
Dante and Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) is particularly rich for the variety and quality 
of philosophical literature. Nevertheless, one cannot find a solid, long-lasting medieval 
and early modern tradition, but rather a plurality of styles of thought, often unconnected 
and expressed in very different vernaculars. At the same time, this multiplicity 
determines the weaknesses and strengths of Italian philosophy. It is weak from the point 
of view of systematic philosophies, for example Kantianism or Idealism, but it is also 
strong because of its capacity to provide the most appropriate intellectual and 
argumentative tools for dealing with the challenges of our time. To represent his theory, 
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Esposito chooses Leonardo da Vinci’s (1452-1519) painting Battle of Anghiari, in which 
a tangled scene of horses and men offers a fair allegory of “living thought.”299  
It is not my intention to deepen any specific aspect of Esposito’s theory but rather 
to point out two tendencies that characterize his work in general. On the one hand, 
Esposito’s argument is extremely interesting for his historical and theoretical analysis of 
the peculiarities of Italian philosophy, and it actually prepares the field for further fruitful 
discussions within Italian Studies. On the other hand, Esposito’s book lacks exploration 
of early modern authors and movements that have yet to be studied. There is no effort to 
promote the lesser known or unknown authors and thoughts that would confirm and 
strengthen his argument. In fact, he refers only to the very well-known classics of the 
period. Machiavelli, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), Vico, are among the most frequently 
quoted. In other terms, one would expect a deeper contribution in terms of a recovery of 
unexplored traditions that would support the theory, especially for the time period, the 
Renaissance, during which, as Esposito’s book claims, Italian philosophy built its unique 
identity. The sophistic rebirth of fifteenth and sixteenth-century Italy is probably the most 
fitting tradition for Esposito’s conception of “living thought.”  Agon, mobility, flexibility, 
relativism, pluralism, and an anti-systematic approach to life are at the same time the core 
of the so-called “living thought” and the main features of ancient as well as early modern 
sophistry. 
As I write these conclusions, a new work on sophistry written by Barbara Cassin 
is being published in the US.300 Without any intention of discussing the content of this 
299 See Esposito. Living Tought. 84 
300 B. Cassin. Sophistical Practice. Towards a Consistent Relativism. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2014. 
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work, it is worth pointing out that this book confirms the current international interest in 
the richness of the sophistic approach as well as in addressing sophists as not only great 
historical figures but also valuable thinkers for interpreting the modern-day philosophical 
issues. Cassin’s book contributes to the scholarly discussion on the relationship between 
the sophistic tradition and current cultural debate. 
The recent international attention paid to sophistry indicates the need to recover a 
form of thought that can respond to questions that concern our world better than any 
metaphysical or systematic thought. Richard Rorty summed up most clearly what he 
believes should be the future of Western culture, in which sophists would have a central 
role:  
 
Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a 
matter of interaction with nonhuman reality. So we shall not see a difference in 
kind between “necessary” and “contingent” truths. At most, we shall see 
differences in degree of ease in objecting to our beliefs. We shall, in short, be 
where the Sophists were before Plato brought his principle to bear and invented 
“philosophical thinking”: we shall be looking for an airtight case rather than an 
unshakable foundation.301 
 
How much of this cultural project was a part of the Italian Renaissance without any 
awareness on the part of modern and post-modern scholarship? To what extent did 
Renaissance culture anticipate modern and post-modern discourses on a new anti-
301 R. Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Priceton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 157. 
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metaphysical philosophical path with an originality that was beyond what we have 
expected so far? This dissertation has also aimed to contribute to answering these 
questions through an investigation across the history of literature and philosophy. I 
believe that my research project may play a role in the recovery of what Christopher 
Celenza has called the lost Italian Renaissance, although from my perspective the “lost” 
part includes both Latin and vernacular literature in the span of time between Leonardo 
Bruni and Jacopo Mazzoni.302 
The Italian Renaissance, as an age of pioneering re-evaluation of ancient sophists 
and exploitation of their philosophical and literary potentialities, may have a central place 
in a revised history of Western culture. In fact, although the current call for a flexible and 
pluralistic approach to our world is a post-modern condition, the most valuable responses 
may lie in the pre-modern era and its interpretation of ancient authors.  
The capacity to face present challenges depends also on scholars’ work on our 
cultural roots. This dissertation aims to provide a substantial contribution in this 
direction. I like to imagine my work as an anceps opus – a double-headed work – which 
looks at the treasures of Renaissance literature while connecting cultural history to 
present discussions across disciplinary boundaries. 
  
302 Ch. S. Celenza. The Lost Italian Renaissance. Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 2004. An Italian version is now published: Il 
Rinascimento perduto. La letteratura latina nella cultura italiana del Quattrocento. Carocci: Roma, 2014. 
For a discussion on the place of Renaissance in the history of philosophy, see Ch. S. Celenza. “Lorenzo 
Valla and the Traditions and Transmissions of Philosophy.” Journal of the History of Ideas 66.4 (2005). 
483-506; and Id. “What Counted as Philosophy in the Italian Renaissance? The History of Philosophy, the 
History of Science, and Styles of Life.” Critical Inquiry 39.2 (2013): 367-401. 
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